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Determinants of Bidders’ Abnormal Returns 
in Chinese Domestic and Cross-Border M&As 
 
Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese 
domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), including the merger motives 
of acquiring firms, stock performance, and key determinants of performance. The key issues 
and empirical findings are summarised below. Chapter 2 focuses on merger momentum and 
motives under various market valuation periods for domestic M&As. We demonstrate that 
there is a form of merger momentum at the market level. The primary motive of mergers and 
the source of merger momentum is synergy creation, as predicted by neoclassical theory. 
However, the effect of merger momentum may be less important when market valuation 
deviates from its neutral level. Our results suggest that in high-valuation markets, bidding 
firms’ managers are more likely to be overconfident and to favour the market-timing strategy, 
but overly optimistic investors are not evident. In contrast, these managerial incentives are 
not indicated during low-valuation markets, but investors are found to be overly pessimistic 
towards any merger announcement. Chapter 3 provides new evidence on the role of 
investment banks in domestic M&As. Based on a modified reputational measurement, which 
accounts for the difference between the abilities of small and large bidders to select advisors, 
we find support for the “superior deal” hypothesis. The overall reputational effect of an 
investment bank is reflected by an increase in the stock price of the bidding firm in the short 
term with no long-term reversal. We further find that the deal duration is significantly greater 
for top-tier investment banks, which supports the “diligent advisor” hypothesis. Additionally, 
we find that the deal completion rates differ insignificantly between the two tiers of 
investment banks and that this difference can be explained by the trade-off between the 
“preventing poor deals” and “better deal completion skills” hypotheses. Overall, our results 
indicate that the short-term improvement associated with top-tier investment banks stems 
from their skills, diligence, and trustworthiness. Chapter 4 studies the wealth effects of 
acquirers that are engaged in cross-border M&As (CBMAs). Specifically, we examine both 
the short- and long-term abnormal returns of CBMAs that were undertaken after the RMB 
exchange rate reforms or during the financial crisis period, stratified according to whether 
the transaction was resource-related. We show that although resource-related CBMAs 
promote national interests, they are not value-destroying for shareholders. Indeed, such deals 
are especially welcomed by the market around the deal announcement if they are focussed. 
Furthermore, currency appreciation increases the relative wealth and decreases the cost of 
capital for acquirers, which allows them to gain significantly higher abnormal returns in both 
the short and long terms. Finally, the wealth destruction associated with higher managerial 
risk taking significantly outweighs the benefit of the lower cost of acquisition for acquirers 
during the financial crisis period, which leads to significant underperformance over the long 
term. 
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The market for corporate control plays a vital role in the efficient allocation of resources in 
an economy. Since the late 19th century, numerous merger waves have brought about 
substantial industrial restructuring in various parts of world, particularly in Europe, North 
America and Japan, and have garnered enormous attention from policymakers and 
researchers across different disciplines. Over the past decade, the M&A global landscape has 
shifted considerably due to the rapid growth of Asian markets. In particular, China has not 
only enjoyed 10% GDP growth on average over the last ten years but has also had the highest 
M&A volume in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan) for ten years in a row. In 2014, 
M&As in China reached a record high annual volume of 3,656 deals for a total of US$307.4 
billion, accounting for 46% of M&A volume in the Asia Pacific.1 It is clear that a wave of 
M&A activities has emerged in China as Chinese industries consolidate domestically and 
expand globally. Hence, the main objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of Chinese domestic and cross-border M&As, including the merger motives 
of acquiring firms, stock performance, and key determinants of performance. 
 
Last year, Chinese domestic deals accounted for 92% of the total M&A volume in China, 
the highest annual volume on record (US$281.5 billion via 3,222 deals). However, the 
upsurge in cross-border deal volume following the height of the global financial crisis in 
2008 and 2009 did not continue. Indeed, cross-border deal volume dropped to its lowest level 
since 2004 because of its myriad interconnections with the ongoing global economic 
uncertainty and because China is adapting to its “new normal”. Although the outbound 
activity failed to sustain its momentum, China continued to emerge as a force in the global 
M&A market with several landmark transactions, especially deals undertaken by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional natural resources and energy sectors to meet 
China’s increasing energy consumption needs.  
 
                                                     
1 Source: Global M&A Review, Dealogit, 2014. 
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Moreover, Asia Pacific investment bank revenue reached its highest annual level since 2010. 
China International Capital Corp led the Chinese M&A rankings in 2014 with US$52.2 
billion, followed by Bank of America Merrill Lynch and CITIC Securities.2 The demand for 
good financial advisory services is growing at an increasingly rapid pace as the Chinese 
market becomes more sophisticated, deal structures become more complex, and firms are 
urged to adapt quickly to changes in takeover, accounting and corporate regulations.  
 
Although empirical studies on M&As are numerous, studies that focus on Asian markets are 
quite sparse, especially those related to China. In addition, the evidence derived from past 
research based on developed markets may not be particularly apt when applied to the Chinese 
merger market. Deals that are undertaken in developed markets are primarily market driven 
and are subject to indirect government intervention via relevant policies, laws or regulations. 
Chinese M&As are less likely to be market driven and are often directly manipulated by the 
government, particularly with respect to firms with state-owned shares. In fact, a significant 
portion of Chinese deals are initiated to reform the management and operation of state-
owned assets, or even to pursue political goals. Hence, one could argue that if deals are 
motivated by an intent to optimise industrial structure, to allocate resources more efficiently, 
and – with the “helping hand” of the government – to achieve economies of scale, then 
potential wealth can be created for acquiring firms’ shareholders. Conversely, if deals are 
driven purely by political incentives, the wealth effect could be less likely for acquiring firms’ 
shareholders. The decisive role that the Chinese government plays in corporate investment 
and financing decisions makes the Chinese market unique and interesting for empirical 
research. 
 
In addition to the significant presence of SOEs and state-driven merger goals, another motive 
for us to study the Chinese market is the significant differences between the Chinese stock 
                                                     
2 Source: Thomson One Banker. 
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market and mature stock markets. There are no price limits in most mature stock markets, 
whereas the Chinese government sets a daily maximum share price fluctuation of 10% to 
enable investors to adopt a cooler approach and a more rational view of stock. Given the 
overwhelming presence of individual investors in the Chinese stock market, investor 
sentiment could be a more predominant factor in stock prices.3  Restricting daily price 
fluctuations may limit the effects of sentiment and thus exert a more substantial impact on 
acquiring firms’ wealth creation or destruction around deal announcements than would 
otherwise be the case.  
 
Other unique features of the Chinese economy, such as the lack of protection for minority 
shareholders, the absence of transparency coupled with inadequate financial disclosure 
mechanisms, the unique ownership structure of firms with state-owned shares (Zhou et al. 
(2012)) and the gradual reform of the split-share structure to convert non-tradable shares into 
tradable shares (Li et al. (2011)), provide additional reasons to analyse the Chinese merger 
market. 
 
Motivated by the above-described trends and facts, and China’s uniqueness, we aim in this 
thesis to fill the gap in the literature by investigating acquiring firms’ stock performance in 
both domestic and cross-border acquisitions and by examining factors that may impact 
shareholder wealth. In Chapter 2, we analyse the characteristics of Chinese domestic M&As. 
In particular, we examine the effect of merger momentum on acquiring firms’ returns in both 
the short and long terms to provide insight into different theories regarding when and why 
mergers take place. We also assess the effect of merger momentum on deals that are 
conducted during high market valuation periods compared with deals that are conducted 
                                                     
3  Wang, Zhou and Wang (2014) document that the Chinese stock market is dominated by 
inexperienced individual investors, while institutional investors only constitute a small part. In 2012, 
82% of the Shanghai stock exchange trading volume is initiated by retail investors as that of 2011. 
Because individual investors lack of information and stock picking skills, they are more likely to 
trade frequently and speculatively, and affected by sentiment. 
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during low market valuation periods to assess whether market-wide misvaluation (i.e., as 
investor sentiment becomes more positive or more negative) affects merger incentives. 
Moreover, we investigate how the effect of merger momentum differs between value (high 
BTMV) and growth (low BTMV) bidders to offer new insights on how investors evaluate 
mergers in China (i.e., whether investors are likely to over-react to bidders’ past managerial 
performance). Given the complexity of the M&A process, highly skilled specialists, such as 
investment banks and auditing, consulting and law firms, are often needed to act as 
intermediaries and provide professional advice. Among them, the most important and active 
intermediary is the investment bank. In Chapter 3, we aim to provide new insights on the 
role of investment banks by examining the correlation between investment bank reputation 
and the quality of the merger advisory services, the deal completion rate and the duration of 
deal completion. Finally, Chinese cross-border transactions are occasionally driven by 
opportunistic motives, such as favourable exchange rates and valuations, but they more 
commonly have a strategic component, namely, the desire to acquire resources overseas. In 
Chapter 4, we examine the short- and long-term performance of CBMAs that were 
conducted after RMB exchange rate reforms or during the financial crisis period, stratified 
according to whether the CBMA was resource-related, to provide new evidence on potential 
factors that affect the performance of acquiring firms, thereby offering a more complete 
picture of CBMAs. 
 
Although there is a small body of literature on the performance of Chinese acquiring firms 
post-transaction, no attention has been paid to variations in their performance over a merger 
cycle. In the spirit of Rosen (2006), in Chapter 2, we examine the interaction between recent 
market conditions and acquiring firms’ returns over the short and long terms. The focus is 
on the effect of recent merger history in the overall market (i.e., merger momentum and 
merger waves). We employ three different measures to capture recent market conditions: the 
trailing 12-month average cumulative abnormal return (CAR), to capture merger momentum; 
the trailing 12-month number of mergers, to capture merger waves; and the trailing 12-month 
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return on the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (SHComp) index, to capture stock market 
momentum. Rosen (2006) finds evidence of the impact of merger momentum in the US 
market; specifically, acquiring firms’ stock prices tend to increase if recent mergers of other 
firms have been favourably received by the market (i.e., if it is a “hot” merger market) or if 
the overall stock market is good. However, there is a reversal of this trend in the long term. 
Specifically, acquiring firms’ long-term returns are likely to be lower when either the merger 
market or the stock market is hot at the time when the merger is announced than they are 
otherwise. Rosen (2006) suggests that his findings are supported by the investor sentiment 
theory, which holds that investors, and possibly managers, are likely to be overly optimistic 
about any merger announced during hot merger or stock markets, which in turn gives rise to 
merger momentum. As the optimistic sentiment is replaced by the real performance of the 
merged firm over time, a reversal in stock prices is anticipated. Rosen (2006) also suggests 
that managerial motivations can operate in addition to investor sentiment, especially for 
mergers that occurred during the 1990’s merger wave, during which both merger momentum 
and the merger wave are found to have had a negative effect on acquiring firms’ returns.    
 
By analysing a comprehensive sample of 822 successfully completed domestic acquisitions 
that were announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010, where bidders are 
listed firms on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges, we find that bidders 
experience significant positive short-term CARs and insignificant long-term buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs). In addition, we observe a form of momentum in the Chinese 
merger market, whereby if the market has been reacting favourably to merger 
announcements, it tends to continue to do so. However, contrary to Rosen’s suggestion that 
merger momentum is caused by investor sentiment, our results indicate that the primary 
source of merger momentum is synergy creation, as predicted by neoclassical theory. 
Nonetheless, room exists for hubris and market-timing incentives, particularly during high 
market valuation periods. 
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More specifically, our univariate analyses individually controls for various bidder and deal 
characteristics, including government involvement (on either side of the deal); the target’s 
public status; the means of financing; bidder size; the ratio of deal value to bidder size; the 
bidder’s growth opportunities and operating performance; and whether the bidder and target 
operate in the same industry. We find that in general, merger momentum and merger wave 
measures are positively related to acquiring firms’ abnormal returns over both the short and 
long terms, except when the payment for the acquisition includes stock under the merger 
momentum measure over the long term.4 
 
Moreover, when all of the above-listed bidder and deal characteristics that affect bidder 
returns are controlled simultaneously in the multivariate analyses, our results reconfirm the 
existence of merger momentum at the market level but not at the firm level. We find that hot 
merger markets, as measured by the trailing 12-month average CAR, are associated with 
larger short-term announcement effects and higher long-term abnormal returns for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders. We also discover that over time, mergers conducted within a merger 
wave and during hot stock markets significantly outperform their counterparts. Overall, our 
results suggest that synergy creation is the primary motive of merger activity and the primary 
source of merger momentum, as predicted by neoclassical theory. Nevertheless, we observe 
that bidders who recently experienced stock price run-ups are more likely to be associated 
with worse post-announcement returns, which indicates that factors other than synergy 
creation may affect merger decisions, particularly during hot valuation markets, when more 
acquiring firms experience significant stock price run-ups and thereby become overvalued. 
 
                                                     
4 Deals that include stock payments are more frequent and experience significantly higher (lower) 
announcement (long-term) abnormal returns during hot merger markets than during cold merger 
markets. This indicates that there may be something unique about these deals. For instance, managers 
who perceive their stock prices as overvalued and expect to see a long-term reversal on stock prices 
may attempt to minimize this loss by timing the merger market and making stock acquisitions to 
capitalize on favourable market reactions to mergers. 
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Motivated by a rich stream of literature linking market valuation to merger activity, mode of 
financing and merger outcomes (Jovanovich and Rousseau (2002); Rhodes-Kopf and 
Viswananthan (2004)) and by the work of Antoniou, Guo, and Petmezas (2008), in which 
the merger momentum effect is found to be intensified in hot valuation markets due to overly 
optimistic investor sentiment, we classify the deals in our sample as being within a high or 
a low market valuation period using the methodology employed by Bouwman, Fuller and 
Nain (2009).5 Surprisingly, contrary to the literature, we find that the number of acquisitions 
per month during high valuation periods is only slightly higher than the number of 
acquisitions per month during low valuation periods (6.32 vs. 6.00 deals per month). 
Additionally, deals that are conducted in high valuation periods generate insignificantly 
higher CAR but significantly higher BHAR than do those conducted when market valuation 
is low. Deals announced during hot-valuation markets are also associated with the following 
characteristics: higher merger momentum and market momentum; payment that includes 
stock rather than 100% cash; acquisitions initiated by glamour firms or by those with good 
recent operating performance; and by firms whose last deal was favoured by the market or 
by which have recently experienced high stock price run-ups. Thus, although our results do 
not suggest that high stock market valuation triggers merger waves, the fundamental 
differences between deals announced during hot and cold valuation markets imply that 
market valuation does have an impact on merger decisions. After controlling for all of these 
characteristics in the multivariate analyses, we determine that a merger wave is driven 
primarily by synergy creation, but that the effect of merger momentum may not be as 
important when market valuation deviates from its neutral level. Moreover, we find that 
managers are more prone to hubris and market-timing incentives, but investors are not overly 
optimistic about merger announcements during hot-valuation markets. By contrast, these 
                                                     
5 First, the best line of fit is removed from the P/E of the month in question and of the past five years. 
A month is classified as being above (below) average if its detrended P/E is above (below) the 
preceding five years. Finally, the top (bottom) half of the above- (below-) average months are 
classified as high- (low-) valuation months. 
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incentives are not observed during cold valuation markets but investors are found to be 
overly pessimistic about any deal announced during this period. Although such sentiment 
places a downward pressure on bidder announcement returns, bidder stock prices revert 
significantly over time as sentiment is replaced by real firm performance. 
 
In addition, we examine the effect of merger momentum on growth and value bidders, and 
find that this effect is more pronounced for growth bidders than for value bidders in the short 
term, whereas the opposite is true in the long term.6 These results suggest that the lack of 
reliable information and the severe information asymmetry in China’s financial markets 
makes deal evaluation more challenging for individual investors. Hence, individual investors 
tend to consider acquiring firms’ past performance as a good indicator of future performance. 
However, such consideration often leads to less favourable investment decisions. 
 
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature not only by confirming that the effect of merger 
momentum is robust outside of the US and UK markets but also by demonstrating that 
merger momentum in China is explained primarily by neoclassical theory rather than 
investor sentiment theory, which drives merger momentum in developed markets. 
Nevertheless, the results yield an early indication that investor sentiment exerts a non-
predominant effect on the market’s reaction to merger announcements, possibly as a result 
of government intervention in daily stock price fluctuations. Thus, as the government 
gradually reduces the extent of its intervention, the sentiment effect might be enhanced and 
other motives for M&As might become more significant; this would be an interesting topic 
to consider in the future. Additionally, as takeover activity continues to increase and financial 
markets continue to evolve, a surge in demand for the financial services provided by 
investment banks is inevitable. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, no theoretical or 
empirical studies have been conducted in this area in China. 
                                                     
6 We define value and growth bidders as those with BTMVs above the top tertile and below the 
bottom tertile of our sample, respectively. 
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In Chapter 3, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by examining the role of investment 
banks and assessing whether the reputational capital mechanism is effective for merger 
advisory services in China. The investment banking industry is highly competitive and 
hierarchical, and market share league tables are widely publicized by both the media and the 
investment banks themselves to define leadership positions in the markets. Thus, academics 
and practitioners have come to use investment bank rankings or reputation as a measure of 
expertise and trustworthiness, and acquirers select investment banks based primarily on the 
banks’ perceived reputations. Nevertheless, until now, no clear correlation between 
investment banks’ reputations and the wealth gained by their respective clients through 
acquisitions has been found in academic journals. Most of the evidence in this area has been 
drawn from the US market and has shown a negative or, at best, insignificant relationship 
between the reputation of the acquirer’s investment bank and acquirer returns. Indeed, a 
positive relationship between investment bank reputation and bidder returns has been 
demonstrated only in the context of tender offers and public acquisitions, which casts doubt 
on the intuitive reputation-quality mechanism in merger advisory services.7 
 
In Chapter 3, we analyse a sample of Chinese public, private, and subsidiary M&As that 
included acquirers listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges that were 
announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010. The main research questions we 
aim to address in this chapter are the following: Does the reputational capital mechanism 
hold in the Chinese domestic market for merger advisory services in the short run? If so, 
does investment bank reputation have a long-term effect on the outcomes of acquiring firms? 
Are top-tier investment banks simply “execution houses” that undertake deals as instructed 
by their clients? How does the involvement of top-tier investment banks affect the length of 
                                                     
7 Regarding the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder returns in M&As overall, see Bowers 
and Miller (1990), Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991), Serves and Zenner (1996), and Rau (2000); for 
the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder returns in tender offers and public acquisitions, 
see Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), respectively. 
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time to deal completion? 
 
Following Fang (2005), we measure investment bank reputation using a binary classification. 
As Fang (2005) suggests, this type of classification not only captures the widely 
acknowledged two-tiered structure of the investment bank industry on Wall Street but also 
allows us to capture reputation in a manner that requires less precision than a continuous 
measurement does. More importantly, we modify the reputational measurement by taking 
into account the difference between large and small bidders’ ability to employ top-tier 
investment banks. This distinction is critical because the majority of bidders in our sample 
are small in terms of market capitalization compared with bidders in developed markets; 
hence, measuring market shares based solely on the total value of the transaction would lead 
to reputation bias in favour of large bidders. To account for this difference between large and 
small bidders, we first download annual market share league tables from Thomson One 
Banker that show the top 25 investment banks according to the total transaction value of 
deals on which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions targeting Chinese firms. Then, 
to balance the reputational effect between large and small bidders, we re-rank these 
investment banks according to the total number of transactions they advised (we refer this 
step as accounting for the “equilibrium effect” between total value and total number of 
transactions). In this study, the top 10 investment banks in the league table are classified as 
top tier, and the others are classified as non-top tier. Additionally, we follow Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2012) and track M&As among the investment banks themselves to 
correctly assign reputation to each deal in the sample. In the event that multiple investment 
banks advised a given deal, the deal is classified as being advised by a top-tier investment 
bank if at least one of the advisors belongs to the top-10 group. We find that of the 246 
M&As in our sample, 69 transactions are advised by top-tier investment banks, and 177 are 
advised by non-top-tier investment banks. 
 
The most frequent top-tier investment banks in our sample are Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, 
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Goldman Sachs & Co, and China International Capital Co. In contrast to previous studies of 
the US market that find that investment bank reputation rankings are stable over time (Rau 
(2000) and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)), we detect significant instability in the 
annual rankings across our sample period. For instance, more than 70% of the investment 
banks that appear in the annual top-10 investment bank rankings in any year during the 
sample period appear in the top 10 fewer than 4 times during the entire sample period. This 
result suggests that the use of annual investment bank rankings is more appropriate than the 
use of a single overall investment bank ranking across the entire sample period. 
 
In addition, we find that bidders experience significantly positive announcement and long-
term abnormal returns, confirming our findings in Chapter 2 that M&As in China are 
conducted predominately to extract synergistic gains. Furthermore, our results indicate that 
acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks perform significantly better than those 
advised by their non-top-tier counterparts in the short term, with no significant 
outperformance in the long term. These patterns generally stand after we individually control 
for acquirer size, relative size, target’s listing status, method of payment, and the relatedness 
of target and bidding firms’ main lines of operation. Moreover, our results remain robust 
when we control for all of the above-listed factors simultaneously in a multivariate 
framework, specifically, the overall effect of top-tier investment banks is a significant 
increase in the bidders’ stock prices in the short term with no long-term reversal, which 
supports the “superior deal” hypothesis we proposed. These results confirm the existence of 
the reputation-quality mechanism of merger advisory services in China. 
 
To further investigate the source of gains associated with top-tier investment banks, we 
evaluate the effect of investment bank reputation on the likelihood of acquisition completion, 
time to resolution and time to completion. Our results suggest that top-tier investment banks 
are associated with insignificantly higher completion rates and significantly longer 
resolution and completion durations. The effect of reputation on the likelihood of deal 
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completion seems to result from a trade-off between two of our proposed hypotheses. One 
hypothesis posits that top-tier investment banks are trustworthy and consistently reject bad 
deals for their clients (i.e., the “preventing poor deals” hypothesis). The other hypothesis 
states that top-tier investment banks are more skilled at completing deals, particularly deals 
that are more challenging to complete (i.e., the “better deal completion skills” hypothesis). 
The effect of investment bank reputation on the duration of deal resolution and completion 
supports the “diligent advisor” hypothesis, which maintains that because top-tier investment 
banks have more reputational capital, they might take more time to carefully evaluate 
transaction terms and negotiate favourable terms for their clients. We conclude that the 
outperformance of top-tier investment banks stems from their skills, diligence, and 
trustworthiness. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the role of investment 
banks in China. Rather than focusing exclusively on short-term reputational effects, our 
analysis extends to the long term to provide a complete picture of the subject, which is crucial 
to understanding how the effect of investment bank reputation on merger outcomes changes 
over time. Our study is the first to employ a modified reputational measurement to account 
for the difference between small and large bidders’ abilities to select advisors and clearly 
shows that the reputational capital mechanism is effective for merger advisory services in 
the Chinese market. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 both show that Chinese domestic M&As are value-enhancing for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders, and Chapter 2 finds specifically that mergers are initiated primarily to 
achieve value maximization and economic efficiencies, which supports the neoclassical 
theory; however, the rationale and efficiency of firms transacting abroad have been 
somewhat ambiguous and have not attracted sufficient attention in prior literature. 
 
Western media have often described Chinese buyers as “the buyers of first resort” because 
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they possess the key characteristics of being cash-rich and interested in almost everything 
regardless of the lack of clearly defined goals or apparent synergy. Similarly, Morck, Yeung 
and Zhao (2008) suggest that a high savings rate, weak corporate governance, and distorted 
capital allocation are likely to result in wasteful overseas investments by Chinese firms. 
Moreover, announcements of CBMAs by Chinese firms are frequently subject to intense 
media scrutiny and often raise political concerns, especially if the transaction is high profile 
and targets resource-related sectors, due to the prominent role played by the Chinese 
government in acquisition decisions. This discussion gives rise to an interesting question for 
us to address, namely, whether acquisitions that promote national interests are detrimental 
to shareholder wealth. In addition, Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) show that both currency 
appreciation and macroeconomic performance can affect the valuation of bidder or target, 
which leads to a real increase in wealth and enhances the ability of acquirers to finance 
acquisitions. In a similar vein, we observe that the outburst of Chinese outbound merger 
activity in recent years has been fuelled by both the favourable exchange rates that occurred 
after the RMB exchange rate reform and by favourable valuations resulting from the global 
financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that currency appreciation and the financial crisis might 
lead to greater relative wealth or lower cost of acquisition for Chinese acquirers engage in 
CBMAs and might impact their returns.  
 
In Chapter 4, we aim to examine the impact of resource-related industry sector preference 
(which is driven by national interests), changes in the exchange rate policy (which led to 
RMB appreciation of greater than 20%) and the global financial crisis (which lowered the 
cost of acquisition and caused attitudes to shift in favour of Chinese acquirers) on bidding 
firms’ abnormal returns over the short and long runs. We employ a comprehensive sample 
of 111 successfully completed CBMAs announced between 01 January, 2002 and 31 January, 
2011 that involved acquirers listed on all stock exchanges. We partition the sample according 
to whether the target industry belongs to the energy or material sector (“Resource-Related 
Target”) or to any other sector (“Non-Resource-Related Target”). Then, the sample is divided 
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further based on whether the transaction was announced before RMB appreciation (“Before 
Currency Appreciation”) or after RMB appreciation (“After Currency Appreciation”). 8 
Finally, the sample is divided again according to whether the deal was announced before the 
global financial crisis (“Before Financial Crisis”) or after the global financial crisis (“After 
Financial Crisis”).9 
 
We find that resource-related deals generate significant positive abnormal returns and 
insignificant abnormal returns for bidders’ shareholders in the short and long terms, 
respectively. Additionally, bidders targeting resource-related firms significantly outperform 
their counterparts two years post-announcement. Furthermore, we find that acquirers that 
conducted deals after the exchange rate reform experienced significant gains and losses over 
the short and long terms, respectively, and that the gains are significantly higher but the 
losses are insignificantly different than the losses of deals undertaken before the reform. 
Moreover, we show that acquirers that initiated takeovers after the financial crisis 
experienced significant gains at the deal announcement and significantly outperformed 
acquirers that initiated takeovers before the crisis. However, the long-term stock 
performances of these two groups of acquirers are insignificantly different from each other. 
 
More importantly, we employ multivariate regression analyses to control for any 
confounding effects in the univariate comparisons and to reveal the net effects of resource-
related deals, currency appreciation and financial crisis on acquirer returns. Our results 
generally confirm the above-listed univariate findings by showing that although resource-
related deals promote the national interest, they are not detrimental to shareholder wealth; 
indeed, such deals are especially value-enhancing in the short run if they are focussed.  
 
                                                     
8 We define the “After Currency Appreciation” period as the period beginning on 21 July 2005. 
9 We define the “After Financial Crisis” period as the period beginning on 15 September 2008, the 
date on which Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
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In addition, we observe that currency appreciation has a significant and positive impact on 
bidder announcement returns. The effect of currency appreciation likely reflects a more 
general valuation effect that can be attributed either to the misvaluation theory (Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003)) or to the wealth theory (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). To 
determine which theory drives the impact of currency appreciation, we extend the analysis 
to the long term and find support for the wealth theory because currency appreciation adds 
to firm value over the long term by increasing the relative wealth and lowering the cost of 
capital for acquiring firms.  
 
Finally, we find that the financial crisis exerts an insignificant impact on acquirers’ 
announcement returns but a significant negative impact on acquirers’ long-term abnormal 
returns. This is interesting because one would suppose that the financial crisis caused a 
substantial slump in the stock prices of western firms and hence lowered the cost of 
acquisition for Chinese acquirers, which would have led to increased wealth gains for 
Chinese acquirers that conducted acquisitions after the crisis. However, our results indicate 
that another effect may be triggered by the financial crisis: managerial opportunism. We 
suggest that long-term underperformance occurs because managers may believe that 
completing an acquisition will become more difficult as the competition for targets heats up 
or that targets may be less willing to sell if other means of funding become available as the 
economy recovers. Therefore, it is likely that managers will conduct acquisitions without 
carefully investigating their respective targets and rush to buy. These managers may 
anticipate a decline in their stock prices in the short term but hope that their decisions will 
be value-enhancing over time. Indeed, our results show that such managerial opportunism 
cancels out the positive effect of lower cost of acquisition and significantly damages 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Chapter 4 not only fills the gap in the literature but also makes several important 
contributions. First, it demonstrates that the soaring domestic demand for energy and natural 
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resources can be met without damaging shareholders’ wealth. Second, this is the first 
empirical work that shows that currency appreciation has a significant positive effect on the 
wealth of acquiring firms because it increases acquirers’ relative wealth and decreases their 
cost of capital. Third, Chapter 4 adds to the empirical literature on behavioural finance by 
demonstrating that the managerial opportunism of acquiring firms increased significantly 
during the recent financial crisis. Finally, Chapter 4 helps investors gain more insights into 
China’s outbound activity and performance over the last decade and may alleviate the 
concerns of western firms regarding future investments from Chinese entities. 
 
In general, the contribution of this thesis lies in the following aspects. First, it provides an 
overall picture on Chinese M&As, both domestic and cross-border, and offers new evidence 
on many topics that have been widely studied in the developed markets but unexplored in 
China. Our study employs the most recent and comprehensive datasets, and examines 
whether the outcomes from the developed markets can be carried over to China. More 
specifically, we find that the effect of merger momentum is robust outside the US and UK 
markets, with synergy creation being the primary source of merger momentum in China 
rather than the overly optimistic investor sentiment during hot markets found in other 
developed countries. Second, our results contribute to the behavioural corporate finance 
literature by providing evidence that the degree of irrationality for both Chinese managers 
and investors vary across different market valuation periods. However, unlike the empirical 
findings drawn from prior research based on developed markets, where overoptimism is 
widely observed among investors; we find that Chinese investors tend to be affected more 
by negative market sentiment than by positive market sentiment. Thus, our work contributes 
to the existing literature related to whether investors are prone to different market sentiments 
in different markets. Third, we find that managers undertaking domestic M&As are more 
likely to be affected by hubris or market-timing incentives during bullish periods, and those 
undertaking CBMAs are more likely to suffer from managerial opportunism during financial 
crisis period. Last but not least, our work contributes to the literature by providing new 
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evidence on the role of investment banks and being the first study that justifies the 
effectiveness of reputational capital mechanism for merger advisory services in China. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explores the effects of merger 
momentum, market valuation, and the motivations for Chinese domestic M&As. Chapter 3 
empirically examines the role of investment banks and the effectiveness of the reputational 
capital mechanism in merger advisory services in China. Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese 
CBMAs by examining factors that potentially affect bidder gains. These factors include 
industry selection preference, RMB appreciation and the global financial crisis. Finally, 
Chapter 5 concludes by presenting the primary findings and proposing areas for future 
investigation. 
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Chapter 2: Merger Momentum, Motives 
and Market Valuation: Evidence from 
China 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, China has surprised the world with its “economic miracle”: an average 
GDP growth rate of 10%. China became the second-largest economy in the world in 2010 
with a GDP of US$5.88 trillion, and it is projected to become the largest economy in the 
world by 2025.10 The market for corporate control is a vital part of any healthy, growing 
economy and thus it is no surprise that China's economic miracle has been mirrored by a 
dramatic increase in the amount of M&A activities in the market. During the first half of 
2012, although the US remained locked in first place with total deals valued at US$455 
billion, China took second place with US$80 billion in deals, nearly double that of the UK, 
which ranked third with US$41 billion.11 
 
Although these numbers give us a good indication of the shift in the global balance of M&A 
power – a shift that has accelerated since the global financial crisis and is likely to become 
even more pronounced in the foreseeable future –almost the entire understanding of merger 
waves, merger momentum, stock market momentum and the impact of market-wide 
misvaluation on merger motives and outcomes is based on evidence from the US and UK, 
thus ignoring the second-most important market for corporate control in the world. In this 
chapter, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by empirically examining topics related to 
merger momentum in China. 
 
Rosen (2006) employs three measures to capture recent broad market conditions: the trailing 
12-month average CAR to capture merger momentum; the trailing 12-month number of 
mergers to capture the merger wave; and the trailing 12-month return on the market index to 
                                                     
10  Source: EY.com, M&A maturity: assessing country risks and opportunities - M&A maturity 
profile: China. 
11 Source: EY.com, Fresh blow to M&A as it enters triple dip recession – global value drops under 
US$1t for the first time since 2009. 
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capture stock market momentum. He finds evidence of merger momentum, meaning that the 
market’s reaction to a merger is positively correlated with the market’s reactions to other 
mergers in the recent past or with changes in the overall stock market. However, both 
correlations are reversed over the long term. He concludes that his results support the 
investor sentiment theory, which posits that merger momentum arises because certain 
investors, possibly managers, are overly optimistic when the merger or stock market is hot. 
Consequently, because the increase in merger announcement returns is due to factors 
unrelated to synergy gains, a reversal is expected in the long term as optimistic sentiment is 
replaced by reality. Moreover, Rosen (2006) finds that mergers conducted during the merger 
wave of the 1990s were value-destroying for the bidding firms’ shareholders both at the 
announcement and over the long term, suggesting the operation of managerial motivations 
in addition to investor sentiment. 
 
In the spirit of Rosen (2006), we examine the interaction between broad market conditions 
and bidders’ short- and long-term performance by employing a comprehensive sample of 
822 successfully completed domestic M&As in China that were announced between 1 
January 2002 and 31 December 2010 and involved bidders listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. In our univariate analysis, we control for various bidder- and 
deal-specific characteristics, including the government’s involvement in the deal on either 
the bidder or target side; the target firm’s listing status; the means of financing; bidder size; 
the ratio of deal value to bidder size; the bidder’s growth opportunities and operating 
performance; and whether the bidder and target operate in the same industry. Generally 
speaking, both the merger momentum and merger wave measures indicate that acquisitions 
conducted in hot market conditions (either in a hot merger market or on-the-wave) are 
significantly more value-enhancing for bidding firms’ shareholders in terms of both short- 
and long-term returns than acquisitions conducted in cold market conditions (either in a cold 
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merger market or off-the-wave) are.12 For instance, mergers announced during hot merger 
markets (on-the-wave) generate 2.14% (2.61%) more wealth for bidding firms’ shareholders 
than those announced during cold markets (off-the-wave) at a 1% significance level. The 
outperformance is more pronounced over the long term. Bidders enjoy 28.35% (36.90%) 
higher post-announcement returns for mergers initiated during hot merger markets (on-the-
wave) than those initiated during cold markets (off-the-wave) at a 1% significance level. In 
essence, our results imply that merger activities in China are driven by synergy creation, 
which supports the neoclassical theory of mergers. 
 
Next, we perform the short-term multivariate analysis, which simultaneously controls for all 
of the various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics that are found to influence bidder 
returns. Our results support the existence of merger momentum; that is, the market’s reaction 
to an acquisition is positively correlated with the market’s reaction to other acquisitions in 
the recent past. A one-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average CAR leads 
to a 0.78-percentage-point increase in the bidder’s 5-day announcement returns. These 
results are consistent with prior studies. For example, Rosen (2006) documents that in the 
US, a 0.38-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average CAR is associated 
with a one-percentage-point increase in the bidder’s 5-day announcement returns, and 
Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) find that in the UK, a 0.20-percentage-point increase 
in the trailing 12-month average CAR is associated with a one-percentage-point increase in 
the bidder’s 5-day announcement returns. These results suggest not only that the effect of 
merger momentum is robust outside the US and UK but also that merger momentum might 
exert a more substantial impact on bidding firms’ announcement returns in China than it does 
in the US and UK. 
                                                     
12 An acquisition is categorized as being announced during a “hot merger market” if its trailing 12-
month average CAR is more than the median and is categorized as being announced during a “cold 
merger market” otherwise. Similarly, an acquisition is made “on-the-wave” if its trailing 12-month 
number of mergers is more than the median and “off-the-wave” otherwise. 
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However, we do not find that market reaction to an acquisition is significantly affected by 
the number of acquisitions that were conducted in the market during the previous year (i.e., 
the merger wave measure). Note that because the merger wave measure captures both the 
initial (2002 – 2005) and growth (2006 – 2010) phases of the merger cycle and because the 
growth phase occurred on a much larger scale than the initial phase did, the merger wave 
measure might essentially proxy for the growth phase. Hence, our results may simply imply 
that those two phases similarly affect bidder announcement returns. 
 
Additionally, we find that the results obtained from the long-term multivariate analysis 
confirm that the more favourable initial market reaction to acquisitions announced during a 
hot merger market holds over a longer time horizon. Indeed, the coefficient of the merger 
momentum measure is much larger in the long-run regression than in the short-run regression: 
a one-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average CAR leads to 8.74- and 
9.06-percentage-point increases in the bidder’s post-announcement and total window returns, 
respectively. 
 
The long-term multivariate analysis also shows that acquisitions initiated on-the-wave 
significantly outperform their counterparts and that the aggregate stock price is significantly 
positively correlated with bidder returns over the long term. Hence, the results of our 
multivariate regression reinforce the results of the univariate analyses. The consistency in 
our results suggests that merger waves may be caused by changes in the business 
environment and that both of these phenomena may lead to increased overall stock prices 
and more profitable merger opportunities, which in turn implies that merger activity in China 
is motivated by synergy gains, as predicted by the neoclassical theory of mergers.  
 
However, the neoclassical theory fails to explain certain distinct patterns in our sample, 
especially patterns that occur during “hot” markets, such as sharp increases in stock 
payments during bullish periods and the reversal in bidder announcement returns in the long 
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term when acquisitions financed in part by stock are conducted during hot merger markets. 
Hence, further examination is performed. 
 
Golbe and White (1988), among others, observe a positive correlation between market 
valuation and aggregate merger activity. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a market 
misvaluation theory under which (rational) managers time the market to use their overvalued 
equity to purchase undervalued (or less overvalued) target firms; as a result, overvaluation 
in the aggregate or in certain industries can lead to wave-like clustering in time. By contrast, 
Rosen (2006) argues that managers may be imbued with the same optimistic beliefs as 
investors during bullish periods, which leads to merger waves. Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-
Nanos (2010) further suggest that overconfident bidders are likely to hide their overpayment 
and conduct poor-quality deals during bull markets, which also leads to merger waves. All 
of the above theories suggest that when market valuation deviates from its neutral level, the 
intensity and motives for merger activity might change.  
 
We therefore split our sample into high- and low-valuation market subsamples according to 
the approach used by Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). We define the top (bottom) quarter 
of the monthly detrended P/E ratio of the SHComp index as a hot (cold) valuation market. 
Our results suggest that irrespective of stock market valuation, merger activity is driven 
primarily by synergy gains; however, there is room for hubris and market-timing incentives 
in high-valuation markets characterized by optimistic investor sentiment. Conversely, these 
incentives are not evident when investors are overly pessimistic about acquisitions that take 
place during low-market valuation periods. Such pessimistic investor sentiment exerts 
downward pressure on bidder announcement returns but reverts significantly over the long 
term when pessimistic sentiment is replaced by good firm performance. 
 
In addition to market valuation, information asymmetry influences firm performance. Zhou, 
et al. (2012) state that Chinese financial markets are characterized by a lack of reliable 
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information, a high degree of information asymmetry and an overwhelming number of 
individual investors. We argue that in this type of environment, investors are likely to over-
react to bidders’ past managerial performance and to consider past performance as a good 
indicator of future performance, at least with respect to M&As. We categorize bidders into 
“growth” and “value” groups, which is a popular grouping method and has gained 
prominence in several recent behavioural theories of stock market over-reaction and under-
reaction following major corporate events.13 
 
We find that the positive effect of merger momentum is more pronounced for growth bidders 
than for value bidders in the short term, whereas the opposite is true over the long term as 
anticipation is replaced by reality. Our results are in line with the afore-mentioned 
proposition and suggest that Chinese investors fail to understand that high firm valuation 
does not necessarily equal superior firm performance. Nevertheless, we find that both growth 
and value bidders generate significant gains for their shareholders during hot market 
conditions over the long term, which reinforces the neoclassical theory of mergers. 
 
To sum up, our work differs from existing research in several aspects. First, because the 
majority of takeovers in China involve the purchase of only a portion of the target firm’s 
ownership, analysing the effect of merger momentum on major transfers would be 
inconclusive and would underestimate the primary driver of takeovers. Hence, we include 
both partial and full acquisitions to estimate the merger momentum effect in the market and 
conduct sensitivity tests based on each type of acquisition. Second, we study and compare 
the effect of merger momentum under different market valuations using a comprehensive set 
of Chinese domestic merger data. By doing so, we shed light on the various investor 
sentiments that exist during periods when the market valuation deviates from its neutral level 
and on the impact of different types of sentiment on merger motives and outcomes. Third, 
                                                     
13 Bidders with top-tertile BTMV are categorized as value bidders, and bidders with bottom-tertile 
BTMV are categorized as growth bidders. 
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we compare the effects of merger momentum on bidder announcement returns for growth 
and value bidders to offer insights into how investors react to merger announcements in 
China, where information uncertainty is known to be particularly high. 
 
This chapter makes several important contributions. First, China is renowned for its recent 
growth and newfound economic might. Although China is gaining recognition as an 
emerging M&A giant, its current M&A market remains far below its full potential. Therefore, 
given the importance of M&A activity in a growing economy, it is essential to examine 
corporate control activity to determine how China can better position itself to become the 
leading economy in the world in the next several decades. Second, China’s unique corporate 
ownership structure sets it apart from most developed economies. Specifically, China’s 
government remains an overwhelming presence in many corporate acquisitions, either 
through direct control or in conjunction with other legal entities. In addition, SOEs in certain 
industry sectors, such as finance, utilities, and telecommunication, are closely bound to 
economic plans established by the government. China’s ownership structure has been found 
to have significant impact on corporate takeovers. For example, Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis 
(2009) and Zhou et al. (2012) find that overall, SOEs outperform privately owned enterprises 
(POEs). Therefore, the unique composition of the Chinese M&A market is another 
interesting factor that distinguishes it from other developed markets and is worth 
investigating. Third, most studies on merger momentum are based on US and UK markets, 
despite the possibility that merger momentum is a universal phenomenon and despite the 
ongoing evolution of China’s corporate control market. Examination of merger momentum 
outside developed economies is worthwhile both to determine whether this phenomenon is 
sensitive to the choice of market and to remedy the paucity of research on merger momentum 
in areas outside developed economies. Finally, understanding merger waves in China will 
contribute to the foundation for a new area of research: understanding how merger waves in 
one economy affect merger activity in other economies. As the world’s economies become 
increasingly integrated, international influences on merger activity will become more 
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significant (Makaew (2010)). 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature and 
develops testing hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology, and reports the 
summary statistics. Section 2.4 presents and discusses the univariate results and the 
multivariate regression results. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the chapter and outlines future 
research ideas. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
This sections first reviews the literature on various factors that cause mergers to cluster, 
beginning with neoclassical theory and following with behavioural explanations (agency 
conflict, hubris and market misvaluation). Given that merger clusters within a merger wave 
represent a high proportion of the overall activity, an understanding of the factors that give 
rise to merger clustering would help us better comprehend the main drivers of merger activity. 
In addition, we review the literature on merger momentum and the effect of market valuation 
on merger momentum.  
 
2.2.1 Merger Waves 
 
Previous research establishes that M&A activity tends to cluster in time and within industries, 
causing so-called merger waves. Becketti (1986) undertakes an examination of the relation 
between aggregate merger activity and macroeconomic conditions and finds that although 
there is a weak correlation between merger activity and aggregate production, merger 
activity is strongly positively correlated with capital utilization and negatively correlated 
with increases in interest rates. In addition to macroeconomic factors, Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) suggest that industry-level economic and technological shocks and deregulation can 
 28 
 
lead to merger clustering. Building on the research of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) find that industry-level merger clusters in the 1990s experienced 
positive reactions from the market, indicating that merger activity is driven by economic 
rationales. Although most studies focus on the US market, Powell and Yawson (2005) 
investigate the UK market and find that increased merger activity is caused by foreign 
competition and industry returns rather than by industry growth. Regardless of the various 
explanations for merger activity across different countries, there are two general strands of 
literature: neoclassical and behavioural. 
 
2.2.2 Neoclassical Theory, Evidence and Synergy Creation 
 
Neoclassical theory proposes that mergers waves follow technological, economic or 
regulatory shocks. Because these shocks lead to disturbances in asset valuation, rational 
managers undertake mergers in response to shocks to reallocate assets efficiently and to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth. Because managers compete for best combination of assets, 
mergers cluster in time.  
 
Nelson (1959) documents merger movements in American industry from 1895 to 1920 and 
finds that mergers cluster in times of economic growth and transportation-system 
development. Moreover, he emphasizes that there is a close relationship between mergers 
and capital market conditions. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find an outburst of 
merger activity during economic booms and attribute this outburst to increases in acquirers’ 
cash flows and decreases in acquirers’ financial constraints during bullish periods. 
 
Matsusaka (1993) examines the conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s and finds that 
although the market reacts positively to diversifying acquisitions overall, the market reaction 
becomes negative if the target’s managers are fired, which suggests that investors are 
skeptical about the acquiring firm’s management skills when the acquisition is diversifying 
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in nature. For focussed acquisitions, the announcement return is zero if target management 
is retained and negative otherwise, indicating that managerial discipline may have been 
another factor in public acquisitions. 
 
On the contrary, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) consider the mergers of the 1960s to be largely 
inefficient and find that the merger wave of the 1980s aimed to deconglomerate large 
corporations because of the failure of the 1960s wave. The 1980s merger wave is associated 
with a large proportion of LBOs and hostile takeovers, and numerous studies provide 
evidence of enhanced profitability and efficiency gains during the 1980s wave (Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter (1988) and Jensen (1993)).  
 
Harford (2005) studies waves during the 1980s and 1990s and contends that merger clusters 
are caused by external shocks, such as economic, regulatory and technological changes. 
Mergers that occur on-the-wave create more value than do those that occur off-the-wave, 
which supports the neoclassical theory of merger waves. Moreover, in addition to 
neoclassical theory, Harford (2005) argues that a sufficient level of market liquidity is 
necessary for merger activity. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) also support 
the importance of neoclassical theory in explaining merger activity by finding that only 
approximately 15% of merger activity is driven by misvaluation.  
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest reallocation of assets only happens when value creation 
is available either through synergies or by replacing managers with low-skill or suffer from 
excessive agency problems. Synergies can be created not only from economic merger 
rationales, such as economies of scale (in the form of revenue enhancement), or economies 
of scope (in the form of cost reduction), or the efficient combination of different technologies, 
but also from financial rationales. 
 
Lewellen (1971) suggests that synergies can be generated from “pure” financial 
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combinations in the absence of any opportunities in operating efficiencies. For example, less 
volatile cash flows, higher debt capacity and increased ability to deduct interest from taxable 
income can be achieved if the cash flows of the acquiring firm and target firm are imperfectly 
aligned. The weaker the correlation is between two firms, the greater the merger-created 
synergies are.  
 
Similarly, Erickson and Wang (2007), among others (Kaplan (1989); Schipper and Smith 
(1991)), suggest that a profitable corporation subject to corporate income tax has an 
incentive to acquire a target with a net operating loss that can be carried forward to take 
advantage of the tax benefits. In this case, synergies can be created by combining the 
acquirer’s profits with the target’s tax attributes, and the government provides all of the 
synergies in the form of tax reduction.  
 
According to the pecking order theory postulated by Myers and Majluf (1984), the cost of 
financing increases with information asymmetries between well-informed managers and 
less-informed investors. Managers use their informational advantage to issue equity, and 
because investors are aware of managerial incentives, investors discount the price of equity 
accordingly. In essence, this type of discounting is a potential underinvestment problem. 
Therefore, financial slack is valuable to firms because it allows managers to avoid the choice 
between issuing undervalued equities and forgoing positive net present value investment 
opportunities.  
 
Considering the underinvestment problem described by Myer and Majluf (1984) and the free 
cash flow problem described by Jensen (1986), Smith and Kim (1994) find that synergies 
can be created by combining a low-slack company with a high-free-cash-flow company (i.e., 
a company with low growth opportunities) or by combining a high-slack company with a 
low-free-cash-flow company (i.e., a company with high growth opportunities). 
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A frequently used proxy for growth opportunity is Tobin’s Q (market-to-book), which places 
greater emphasis on the market for corporate control of assets. A firm’s investment rate is 
positively correlated with its Tobin’s Q. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) extend the Q-theory 
of investment and propose a “Q-theory of mergers”. They find that a firm becomes more 
acquisitive as its Tobin’s Q increases; the rate of change is even higher than that for direct 
investment. Generally, firms with high Tobin’s Qs purchase those with low Tobin’s Qs. 
Therefore, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) suggest that mergers help channel capital from 
poor management or projects to better management or projects and that the merger waves in 
the US during the 1900s, 1920s, 1980s and 1990s were responses to profitable reallocation 
opportunities. 
 
Conversely, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) find that mergers unite firms with similar 
Tobin’s Q ratios. Those authors attribute this phenomenon to increased friction in the search 
for unlike firms.  
 
2.2.3 Behavioural Explanations  
 
Although much research on the causes and effects of mergers is based on the neoclassical 
school of thought, surprisingly few empirical findings support the prediction that merger 
activity is value-enhancing. Hence, questions have arisen regarding the two underlying 
assumptions of neoclassical theory, namely, “managers maximize shareholder wealth” and 
“capital markets are efficient”. Relaxing these assumptions can lead us to behavioural 
explanations (agency theory, hubris, herding and misvaluation), which not only help explain 
why mergers underperform but also provide more a realistic view of merger motives. 
 
2.2.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that although the separation of ownership and control 
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between investors (who have no direct role in the management of the firm) and management 
has many benefits, it is nearly impossible to ensure at no cost that management will make 
optimal decisions to maximize investors’ welfare. A later work by Jensen (1986) finds that 
the agency conflict between managers and investors over optimal firm size and cash 
payments to shareholders is more severe in firms characterized by high free cash flows and 
few growth opportunities and that the managers of such firms tend to undertake low-benefit 
or value-destroying deals, typically diversification programs, to fulfil their own personal 
interests.14 
 
By contrast, Stulz (1988) offers different insights on management ownership to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) at the lower end of management ownership. He finds that higher 
management ownership benefits shareholders by providing more effective opposition to 
tender offers and higher premium offered if a tender offer is made. He emphasizes that the 
shareholders’ wealth creation in this case is caused by manager’s self-interest to gain private 
benefits from control rather than better alignment of interests with shareholders. However, 
at the higher end of management ownership, a further increase in management ownership 
leads to management entrenchment and decreases shareholders’ wealth or effectively 
precludes a takeover.  
 
Moreover, Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2009) find that during industry shocks in which mergers 
are anticipated to create potential synergies, self-interested managers have incentives to keep 
their firms independent by engaging in defensive acquisitions because they may be subject 
to losing private benefits, play a subordinated role or lose their jobs if their firms are acquired. 
Hence, managers who have the same motive race to increase firm size to ensure they are too 
large to be eaten and results in defensive merger waves. Nevertheless, other managers who 
                                                     
14 Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that the agency conflict associated with the “separation of 
ownership and control” often stems from managers’ tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the 
firm’s resources for their own consumption, managers’ low incentive to create value if their own 
ownership stake is low, managers’ avoidance of personal costs, etc. 
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care about firm value are also motivated to increase firm size to be better positioned as 
attractive targets and obtain higher takeover premium. As a result, they may display waves 
of profitable acquisitions.  
 
2.2.3.2 Hubris Hypothesis 
 
Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis proposes that overconfident managers are likely to believe 
in their own ability to create value and extract potential synergies from a proposed 
acquisition. Overconfident managers believe that they possess superior abilities to identify 
hidden synergies and choose better targets. Managers suffering from hubris are thus likely 
to overestimate future returns or the capitalized value of their future leadership and, hence, 
to overpay for the target in question, thereby destroying shareholder wealth. Roll (1986) is 
the first person to suggest that a decision maker’s psychological bias can drive merger 
activity; he also emphasizes the importance of this bias, given that most CEOs engage in few 
takeovers whereas repeated failures must occur before people will update beliefs about 
themselves.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that because overconfident managers (as proxied by CEOs’ 
personal over-investment in their respective companies and by their portrayals in the press) 
tend to overestimate their abilities, they are more acquisitive and undertake unfavourable, 
value-destroying mergers. Value destruction is most severe if managers have access to 
internal financing and the merger is diversifying in nature. 
 
Moreover, Andrikopoulos (2009) finds that the long-term underperformance of equity 
issuers in the UK, regardless the reason for the issue (to finance takeover, expansion or new 
projects, etc.), can be mainly attributed to some managers being overconfident about the 
profitability of their expansion plans or prone to empire-building. This is because he 
discovers that the underperformance is most pronounced for firms expanding aggressively 
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in the early period after issue.  
 
It is worth to note that unlike agency theory, which posits that managers suffer from moral 
hazard or opportunism and the desire to increase their personal undiversified risk or to 
broaden the scope of their authority at the expense of shareholder wealth, the hubris 
hypothesis maintains that overconfident managers engage in good-faith but value-decreasing 
mismanagement, that is, managers do not deliberately jeopardize shareholder wealth through 
merger activities. Another difference between managers suffering from hubris and self-
interested managers is the type of takeovers that they are likely to conduct. Self-interested 
managers have a greater tendency to engage in larger and more public acquisitions because 
their primary goal is to maximize their personal utility, whereas overconfident managers are 
likely to consider public acquisitions more thoroughly. However, because overconfident 
managers make takeover decisions based on personal beliefs or estimations, such managers 
tend to be more affected by overall market sentiment. 
 
2.2.3.3 Managerial Herding 
 
Herding refers to the phenomenon whereby a decision maker follows the behaviour of 
previous decision makers and ignores his/ her private information. Persons and Warther 
(1997) propose that managers rely on information embedded in the actions of early movers 
and continue to imitate them until the experience is sufficiently poor, which implies that late 
movers perform worse than early movers.  
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2005) suggest that merger waves can be explained by the hubris 
theory combined with herding behaviour. That is, merger waves are caused by managers 
who imitate the previous behaviour of successful pioneering firms. Because managers’ 
primary intent is to strike a successful deal by imitating successful early movers, later-
moving managers are likely to suffer from hubris and thus to operate on an irrational basis, 
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for example, by ignoring their private information regarding the value of a deal. As a result, 
the trend of “efficient mergers followed by inefficient mergers” is often observed during a 
merger wave.  
 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) contend that mergers initiated during high stock market 
valuation periods experience higher announcement returns but suffer from worse long-term 
performance than do mergers that are initiated during low stock market valuation periods. 
Furthermore, those authors divide the high-valuation-period sample into early and late 
movers and find that late movers drive long-term underperformance. Hence, they conclude 
that managerial herding causes the overall underperformance of acquirers during high-
valuation periods and that herding behaviour predominates among late movers.  
 
Duchin and Schmidt (2013) compare on-the-wave mergers with off-the-wave mergers and 
find that on-the-wave mergers perform worse over the long term. They suggest that 
underperformance is due to the higher cost of external monitoring, which allows agency-
driven managers to “get away” from bad decisions. In addition, in managerial herding, career 
concerns may cause managers to follow their peers and initiate deals that destroy shareholder 
value.  
 
2.2.3.4 Market Inefficiencies and Persistent Market Mispricing 
 
Contrary to the hubris hypothesis, under which financial markets are rational but managers 
are not, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that merger waves result from stock market 
overvaluation because rational managers respond to less-than-rational markets. Hence, 
mergers are a form of arbitrage for rational managers, who attempt to benefit from incorrect 
valuation. More specifically, managers time the market and use overvalued equity to acquire 
undervalued or less overvalued targets. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) further assume that target 
managers are rational but have relatively short time horizons and are self-interested; hence, 
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target managers accept the overvalued equity and sell it. This theory is related to the 
neoclassical theory but helps rationalise certain stock market evidence that neoclassical 
theory fails to explain. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also find that merger activity is driven by stock 
market misvaluation. They suggest that both bidders and targets are misvalued and that 
misvaluation comprises two components, a firm-specific (not shared) component and a 
market-wide (shared) component. Because rational managers of target firms cannot 
determine whether misvaluation is a market effect, sector effect, or firm effect, target 
managers will accept an offer if they calculate positive synergies based on their own private 
information. However, when market-wide overvaluation is high, target managers tend to 
overestimate potential synergies because they mistakenly attribute a larger proportion of 
misvaluation to their own firms. Hence, misvaluation can drive merger waves, even when 
both bidder and target managers are rational.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) find evidence that supports the prior 
literature. They separate MTBV into three components; two that track misvaluation at the 
firm and sector levels and one that tracks long-run growth opportunities. They find that 
acquirers with high firm-specific misvaluation use stock to buy targets with relatively low 
firm-specific misvaluation, especially when misvaluation at the sector level is positive. 
Moreover, cash targets are more undervalued than stock targets are, whereas stock acquirers 
are more undervalued than cash acquirers. The authors further suggest that merger activity 
is positively correlated with short-run deviations from long-run valuation trends, especially 
when stock is used as means of payment. Finally, they show that surprisingly, low long-run 
value-to-book firms buy high long-run value-to-book targets. This result could be explained 
by managers from low-value firms aiming to acquire managerial talent to create value and 
avoid further managerial entrenchment. 
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2.2.4 Merger Momentum and Market Valuation 
 
Although researchers have focussed extensively on why and when mergers occur, less 
attention has been paid to the causes of variation in merger quality over a merger cycle. 
 
Rosen (2006) defines merger momentum as a correlation between the market’s reaction to a 
merger announcement and the recent merger history of the overall market. A hot merger 
market is one in which the response to other recent mergers has been favourable. Rosen 
(2006) notes that hot merger markets are related to but not necessarily the same as merger 
waves, although both measure recent merger market conditions. Waves are measured by 
either the number or value of mergers, whereas the hotness of a merger market is measured 
by the market’s reaction to recent merger announcements. Moreover, market reaction 
contains more valuable information for research purposes because it accounts for more than 
just the synergies created in a merger. Specifically, market reaction also captures the ability 
of managers to pass on some of the benefits of synergies to their shareholders, whether the 
market anticipated the merger and whether investors react rationally to merger 
announcements. Therefore, merger momentum better reflects factors that commonly 
influence the synergies available from different mergers. Rosen (2006) finds evidence of 
merger momentum, that is, the market reaction to mergers is positively correlated with the 
response to other recent mergers and with changes in the overall stock market. However, 
both correlations become negative over the long term. The author concludes that his results 
are consistent with investor sentiment theory; specifically, merger momentum arises because 
certain investors, possibly managers, are overly optimistic during hot merger markets. 
Therefore, a boost in announcement returns is caused by investor sentiment, which is 
irrelevant to synergy gains, and long-term reversal occurs as investor sentiment dissipates 
and the merger’s performance becomes known. Moreover, Rosen (2006) finds that 
managerial motivation may operate in addition to investor sentiment, especially during the 
merger wave of the 1990s.  
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Similarly, Antonious, Guo and Petmezas (2008) examine the merger momentum effect in 
the UK and find support for the investor sentiment theory. They also discover that market 
valuation influences merger outcomes and stimulates announcement returns but ultimately 
results in significant long-term reversal. In other words, they suggest that the effect of merger 
momentum is stronger during hot stock market valuation periods than other periods, 
highlighting the critical role that investor sentiment plays in explaining merger outcomes. 
Finally, the authors find that when stock market valuation is high, mergers within waves are 
likely to be correlated with each other and co-move in the same direction.  
 
2.2.5 Hypotheses Development 
 
It is well established that mergers come in waves – a clear clustering of aggregate activity 
occurs in the time series. Although numerous studies have focussed on documenting merger 
waves, less attention has been paid to the issue of why merger waves occur. To fill this gap 
in the literature, we aim to compare the quality of mergers in a merger cycle and under hot 
and cold market valuation to shed light on different theories of why and when mergers occur. 
There are three main theories that are in line with the notion of merger momentum, although 
each provides different predictions regarding bidders’ returns. 
 
Neoclassical Theory: 
Neoclassical theory maintains that rational merger waves are the result of an economic 
disturbance that leads to industry reorganization. This type of merger wave was first 
documented by Coase (1937), who argues that technological change leads to aggregate 
merger activity. Neoclassical theory assumes that managers act to maximize shareholder 
value; the concept is that the occurrence of an economic, technological, or regulatory shock 
in an industry causes managers both inside and outside of the industry to respond by 
reallocating assets through mergers and partial-firm acquisitions. Merger activities cluster in 
time as managers react simultaneously to compete for the best combination of assets 
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(Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001); Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002)). According to this theory, merger momentum may result from shocks that 
increase the synergies that may be obtained from a particular type of merger. Mergers that 
are announced following these shocks should perform better on average than other mergers 
in both the short and long runs, and merger momentum reflects the positive autocorrelation 
in announcement returns.  
 
Hypothesis I – Mergers announced following a groups of mergers that are driven by 
economic, technological or regulatory shocks that lead to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions that in turn increase the available synergies should perform better on average than 
other mergers in both the short and long runs. 
 
Managerial Motivations and the Hubris Hypothesis: 
Due to the lack of intensity of efficient merger activities, other theories are also used to 
explain merger waves. For example, if managerial motivations drive merger decisions, then 
mergers during waves are likely to perform worse than other mergers. Jensen (1986) and 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that managers can use mergers for private 
benefits; Goel and Thakor (2010) argue that when CEO compensation increases with firm 
size based on market value, CEOs are more likely to be envious, and CEO envy can result 
in merger waves even if the initial trigger for the wave is idiosyncratic; and Gorton, Kahl 
and Rosen (2005) find that defensive waves can result from economic shocks because 
managers are willing to acquire other firms to avoid being acquired themselves, even if the 
acquisition is not value-enhancing for shareholders. Therefore, mergers during such 
managerial-motivation-initiated waves are less likely to generate wealth gains than those 
occurring off-the-wave.  
 
The hubris hypothesis (Roll (1986)) assumes that overconfident managers misevaluate the 
target’s intrinsic value; even if positive synergies may be attained from the deal, 
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overconfident managers may simply overpay for these synergies. If merger momentum 
results from a group of managers suffering from hubris, and these managers have sufficient 
external resources to finance mergers, then managers will conduct acquisitions even if they 
anticipate an initial decline in stock prices because they believe that their decisions will be 
proven correct in the long term.  
 
Since shareholders do not have complete corporate control, they cannot prevent managers 
from making such acquisitions. Hence, when mergers are driven either by managerial 
motivations or by hubris, rational shareholders are assumed to immediately discount the 
stock price. In addition, given that these acquisitions are value destroying in nature, there is 
no reason that the post-acquisition returns should be reversed in the long term. These types 
of mergers are likely to occur more frequently during high-valuation periods simply because 
boom markets provide more external resources and takeover opportunities, which can 
intensify managerial motivations and hubris.  
 
Hypothesis II – Mergers announced following a group of mergers that are driven by 
managerial motivations or hubris should perform worse on average than other mergers in 
both the short and long runs. 
 
Investor Sentiment Hypothesis: 
Rosen (2006) provides evidence that investor sentiment (i.e., the reaction of investors to 
factors other than the synergies created by the merger) is an important driver of merger 
activity and results in favourable initial market reactions to merger announcements during 
hot merger markets. He argues that if investors, and possibly managers, are excessively 
optimistic about mergers announced during a particular time period, managers may react 
rationally or irrationally to meet this demand by making acquisitions. However, because 
these transactions are not conducted based on fundamentals but instead cater to short-term 
demand, any increase in bidder stock prices in the short term should reverse over the long 
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term as optimism is eventually replaced by reality. Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) 
further find that during high-valuation periods (as measured by detrended market-wide P/E), 
there is a stronger merger momentum effect because investors, and possibly managers, are 
more easily affected by optimistic market sentiment. They also find that high market 
valuation affects the quality of mergers and stimulates short-term returns but ultimately leads 
to more significant long-term underperformance as the track records of mergers become 
known. 
 
Hypothesis III – Mergers announced following a group of mergers that are driven by over-
optimistic beliefs in the market should perform better and worse on average than other 
mergers in the short and long runs, respectively. 
 
Hypothesis IV – The effect of merger momentum is more pronounced (i.e., more positive 
in the short term and more negative in the long term) during high-valuation markets because 
investor optimism tends to be higher during these periods.  
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1 Sample Selection and Characteristics  
 
We collect a sample of successfully completed Chinese domestic M&As that were 
announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010 from Thomson One Banker. The 
original sample contains 2,040 deals. We require that bidders are listed firms (on either 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges) with return data available from one year prior to 
three years after merger announcements and that the deals’ transaction values are reported, 
which leaves us with 1,235 deals. We then follow Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and 
exclude acquisitions involving financial firms because those authors suggest that financial 
firms face a relatively more stringent regulatory environment and experience a unique return 
behaviour compared with firms operating in other industries. We next drop duplicate 
acquisitions and acquisitions that are not targeted at public, private or subsidiary firms, 
which leaves us with a sample of 915 deals. Finally, we follow Rosen (2006) and exclude 
any bidding firms with negative book values of equity, ratios of book-to-market values of 
equity greater than 10, or returns on assets below -100% or above 200%. Ultimately, we are 
left with a total of 822 domestic M&As. 
 
We collect a number of informational items regarding each firm and deal from Thomson 
One Banker, including name, public status, DataStream code, primary industry as measured 
by the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification code, government ownership in the 
acquirer or target, announcement date, method of payment and transaction value. Other 
information, including each acquirer’s share price, market value, market-to-book value, 
return on assets and return on common equity, as well as the price-to-earnings ratio and price 
index for the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, are obtained from Thomson 
DataStream. 
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Table 2.1 reports the time-distribution of our sample data. Two distinctive phases of a merger 
cycle can be observed. The first phase is the initial phase, which began in 2002 and ended in 
2005. During the initial phase, both the number and total value of transactions experienced 
a sharp increase followed by a sharp decrease. This phase is quite volatile and the majority 
of deals are small in terms of transaction value. The second phase is the growth phase, which 
began in 2006 as the merger market regained its momentum. Merger activity increased 
rapidly as the stock market became bullish, and both the total number and value of 
transactions roughly doubled from 2006 to 2007. Within one year, the percentage of deals 
financed with 100% stock nearly quintupled. From 2007 to 2008, the total value of 
transactions doubled again, and for the first time, stock-only deals outnumbered cash-only 
deals.  
 
[Insert Table 2.1] 
 
Compared with the initial phase, the surge in merger activity during the growth phase was 
driven more significantly by deals’ large transaction values and the bidders were 
significantly larger, indicating that the growth phase of the merger wave occurred on a much 
larger scale. In terms of the method of payment, cash offers were more predominant than 
stock offers overall, but there is an increasing trend for stock offers. It is also clear that as 
the market cools down, the percentage of cash offers increases, and as the market heats up, 
the percentage of stock offers increases. Stock offers reached a maximum of 18.37% in 2008, 
just before the spread of the global financial crisis. 
 
2.3.2 Classification of High- and Low-Valuation Markets 
 
We aim to examine whether the impact of merger momentum on bidder outcomes 
fundamentally differs between mergers announced in high-valuation markets and mergers 
announced in low-valuation markets. 
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We follow the approach of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) and first detrend the market 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index) P/E by removing the best straight line of fit 
from the P/E for the month in question and for the five preceding years. We use this approach 
because the P/E ratio of the market has trended upward over time and thus the use of the 
actual P/E ratio in a particular month leads to the classification of all months in the recent 
years of our sample as high-valuation periods and the classification of all earlier periods as 
low-valuation periods. Second, we categorize each month as above (below) average if the 
detrended market P/E of that month was above (below) the past-five-year average. Third, 
we classify the top half of the above-average months as high market valuation periods and 
the bottom half of the below-average months as low market valuation periods. The remaining 
months are classified as neutral market valuation periods. Based on this specification, we 
refer to mergers that were announced during months of high-, neutral- and low-valuation 
markets as high-, neutral- and low-market mergers, respectively. Overall, half of our sample 
period is classified as a neutral-valuation market, and the other half comprises high- and 
low-valuation markets.  
 
Our sample comprises 158 high market valuation mergers (6.32 per month on average), 484 
neutral market valuation mergers (9.13 per month on average), and 198 cold market 
valuation mergers (6.00 per month on average). In addition to the fact that most acquisitions 
were initiated during neutral market valuation periods, this composition differs from those 
found in previous studies. Specifically, in the US and UK markets, significantly more deals 
are announced per month during hot market valuation periods, whereas in our sample, the 
number of deals announced per month during hot market valuation periods is only slightly 
greater than the number announced per month during cold market valuation periods. 
Therefore, we do not find that misvaluation drives aggregate patterns in merger activities.  
 
One possible explanation for the difference between our sample and the US and UK markets 
could be that government intervention and the binary structure of the Chinese economy (i.e., 
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the coexistence and development of both SOE and private firms) makes timing the market 
for overvaluation and using overvalued stock as means of payment more difficult or less 
important for many deal makers. Regarding SOE firms, most of their state- and legal-person 
owned shares are not released to and non-tradable in secondary stock markets, and SOEs 
may benefit from preferential loans, favourable tax treatment, government sponsorship and 
bailout policies (Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2009)). In addition, the deal timing for SOEs 
could be driven by political will. Thus, SOE firms could be less prone to market 
overvaluation.  
 
We argue that privately owned (i.e., non-SOE) firms are more prone to market overvaluation 
than SOE firms. Nevertheless, it is difficult for privately owned firms to access to free cash 
on the market to provide financing, and official approval is required for investment projects 
above a certain size (Haggard and Huang (2008)). Hence, even if private firms want to time 
the market for overvaluation, this practice is generally not easy to execute. Indeed, we find 
that acquisitions without government involvement are more frequent than those with 
government involvement in high-valuation markets, whereas the reverse is true in cold-
valuation markets. Therefore, we argue that acquirers’ ability to time the market in China 
may be influenced by certain unique factors that are not present in most market-oriented 
economies. This argument merits further investigation. 
 
2.3.3 Methodology 
 
2.3.3.1 Short-Term Event Study Methodology 
 
To measure short-term market announcement returns, we follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) 
standard event study methodology and calculate CARs for a five-day window (-2, +2) 
surrounding the announcement date obtained from Thomson One Banker. The two-day lag 
is chosen to capture any potential leaks prior to a merger announcement and the two-day 
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lead is chosen to fully capture the share price reaction of acquirers. 
 
We calculate the daily normal returns of the acquirer and the market as follows: 
ri = ln(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
) 
 
where ri is the daily normal return of firm i. Pi, t and Pi, t-1 refer to the daily price index for 
firm i at day t and day t-1, respectively.  
rm = ln(
Pm,t
Pm,t−1
) 
 
where rm is the daily normal return of Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (SHComp) index. 
Pm, t and Pm, t-1 refer to the daily price index for the SHComp index at day t and day t-1, 
respectively.  
 
We note that various methodological approaches are available for the estimation of short-
term abnormal return (AR), including the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) recommended 
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the holding period abnormal return (HPAR) advocated 
by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and the market model suggested by Brown and Warner 
(1985). Given the limitations associated with models such as CAPM (Roll (1977)), we intend 
to employ the market model to calculate AR. However, because many of the firms in our 
sample are frequent acquirers; thus, there is a high probability that if market parameters are 
estimated based on an acquirer’s stock price in the year prior to the merger announcement, 
previous merger attempts by the acquirer would be included in the estimation period, which 
would lead to less meaningful beta estimations. Hence, we follow Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) and choose the modified market adjusted model over the market model. 
In the modified market adjusted model, AR is defined as anything earned above the market 
return each day; the expected return of a stock is assumed to be that earned by the market 
(Seiler (2004)). In addition, Brown and Warner (1980) compare the market model with the 
modified market adjusted model and find that a firm’s beta does not significantly improve 
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the estimation in short-window event studies. Therefore, in our study, the AR on any firm i 
is determined by the difference between its return and the return of the SHComp index: 
ARi,t = ri,t − rm,t 
 
Consequently, the focus of the modified market adjusted model is to examine whether the 
return on a given stock during the event window is significantly different from that of the 
market during the same period (Ma (2004)). Given that the market plays an important role 
in potential firm misvaluation, we believe that the modified market adjusted model is 
particularly appropriate for estimating ARs in this study.  
 
Finally, we summate ARs to give the five-day cumulative AR (CAR (-2, +2)) surrounding 
the announcement date: 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t
t=+2
t=−2
 
 
T-statistics are used to test whether the null hypothesis holds, that is, whether the mean CAR 
is equal to zero for a sample of n firms. The conventional formula to compute t-statistics is 
as follows:  
tCARi =
∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1
(σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) /√n)
 
 
where ∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1  refers to the sample mean and σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) refers to the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviation for the sample of n firms. To assess the strength of the evidence 
against the null hypothesis, we convert t-statistics into probabilities (i.e., p-values), which 
are presented in the results section. The larger the p-value, the weaker the evidence that the 
mean CAR is different from zero; and vice versa. 
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2.3.3.2 Long-Term Methodology 
 
To measure the long-term returns of acquirers, many authors advocate the use of the BHAR 
approach because of its accurate measurement of abnormal returns experienced by an 
investor (Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999); Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Buchheim et al. 
(2001)), but Fama (1998), among others, suggest a calendar-time portfolio approach.15 The 
debate essentially centres on the trade-off between type I and type II errors. The BHAR 
approach gives hypothesis tests significant power but may reject too many nulls (type I 
errors). In contrast, the portfolio approach, in which individual events are aggregated into 
calendar-time portfolios, discards valuable information (such as it averages over months of 
“hot” and “cold” event activity) and reduces the power of hypothesis tests (type II errors). 
In addition, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggest that there should be at least 10 firms in 
each month’s portfolio to avoid sample bias problems. Because our sample suffers from 
small sizes of some monthly portfolios that hinder the use of the portfolio approach, we 
follow Rosen’s (2006) paper and employ the BHAR approach  
 
We measure the returns over two periods: one that starts three days after a deal announcement 
and ends three years after the deal announcement (post-announcement returns) and one that 
starts two days prior to the deal announcement and ends three years after the deal 
announcement (total window returns). Total window returns aim to capture the total stock 
market impact of the deal, including the effect of the announcement that is excluded from 
post-announcement returns. The BHAR is defined as the value of holding a long position in 
the acquiring firm’s stock and a short position in a benchmark index over the same period:  
BHAR = ∏[1 + Ri,t]
T
t=1
− ∏[1 + Rm,t]
T
t=1
 
 
                                                     
15 Fama (1998) argues that the BHAR approach suffers from compounding expected returns and 
associated problems from the short-run analysis. 
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where Ri,t refers to the returns of acquiring firm i at time t and Rm,t refers to the returns of the 
SHComp Index at time t. T refers to the holding period. 
 
Regarding the computation of t-statistics, we note that the BHAR approach is associated 
with a potential positive-skewness problem, whereby it can produce statistically significant 
results even when there is none due to the short-run movement effect. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
suggest that the bootstrapped t-statistic helps correct for instances in which the 
methodological approach over-rejects the data and hence incorrectly rejects a true null 
hypothesis. Therefore, we implement the skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistics 
procedure used by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) to compute the statistical significance of 
BHAR. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is given by the formula below:  
tsa = √n (S +
1
3
γ̂S2 +
1
6n
γ̂) 
 
where γ̂ is the skewness, S is the standard deviation, and n is the number of observations: 
S =
BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t
σ(BHARt)
 
 
γ̂ =
∑ (BHARit − BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t)
3n
i=1
nσ(BHARt)3
 
 
2.3.4 Empirical Model  
 
Our empirical model aims to test how recent merger activity and changes in the overall stock 
market affect bidders’ merger outcomes in both the short and long terms.16 To offer a more 
complete examination of merger momentum in China, we also test how merger momentum 
affects bidder returns during hot- and cold-valuation markets to provide insight into why 
mergers occur in conditions of market-wide misvaluation. Moreover, we investigate how the 
                                                     
16 This model was first advocated by Rosen (2006) for the US market and by Antoniou, Guo and 
Petmezas (2008) for the UK market. 
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effect of merger momentum differs between high-BTMV and low-BTMV bidders to shed 
light on how investors evaluate mergers in China.  
 
To assess bidder performance in both the short and long runs more precisely, we control for 
various acquirer and deal characteristics that are found to affect bidder returns. In addition, 
to account for repeat acquirers, the standard errors are clustered at the acquiring firm level 
and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Combining all variables, the multivariate framework 
for the acquirer’s CAR or BHAR is shown below: 
 
CAR or BHAR =  α +  β1 × Trailing 12 − month average CAR + β2 × Trailing 12
− month no. of mergers +  β3 × Trailing 12
− month return on SHComp index + β4
× CAR on bidder′s last announcement + β5 × First merger dummy  
+  β6 × Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years + β7
× Trailing 12 − month BHAR on bidder′s stock 
+  β8 × Government involvement dummy + β9  × Private target dummy
+  β10 × Subsidiary dummy + β11 × Payment incl. stock dummy +  β12
× Ln (MV) +  β13 × Relative size +  β14 × BTMV + β15 × ROA +  β16
× Diversifying dummy + ∑ γi × Year dummy + εi 
          
The dependent variable in our model is either CAR (cumulative announcement return) or 
BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal return), which is the market reaction to a merger 
announcement in the short and long terms, respectively. The measurements for short- and 
long-term market reactions to merger announcements are described in Section 2.3.3.1 and 
2.3.3.2, respectively.  
 
Table 2.2 presents the correlation coefficients of each pair of variables used in the 
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multivariate analysis. Our results show that high correlations exist between merger 
momentum and merger wave measures, “first merger dummy” and “number of mergers by 
firm in the last 3 years” variable, and private and subsidiary dummies, indicating these 
variable pairs are likely to create multicollinearity problems. To check for the severity of 
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is computed following all of the 
regressions. We find that the VIF values for our main variables of interests (“trailing 12-
month average CAR” and “trailing 12-month no. of mergers”) are under 2 in all of the 
regressions. The highest VIF values are for private and subsidiary dummies in all of the 
regressions, which are around 5. However, given that these two dummies are control 
variables and represent a categorical variable with three categories where the reference 
category (public) is small, multicollinearity can be safely ignored.17 
 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
 
Our main results are the five-day CAR around the merger announcement date (5-day CAR), 
the post-announcement BHAR for the period starting three days after a deal announcement 
and ending three years after the deal announcement (Post-announcement Returns), and the 
total window BHAR for the period starting two days prior to the deal announcement and 
ending three years after the deal announcement (Total Window Returns). Total Window 
Returns capture the entire stock market impact of the deal, including the effect of the 
announcement that is excluded from Post-announcement Returns. Rosen (2006) suggests 
that the 5-day CAR for the bidding firm around the first public mention of the deal (i.e., 
when the deal is first discussed or proposed) would give us the market’s immediate reaction 
to the deal. Market reaction contains any new information, including synergies created by 
the deal, the split of synergies between bidder and target, and investor sentiment at deal 
                                                     
17 The results of multicollinearity checks are available upon request. Regarding to situations where 
multicollinearity can be safely ignored, see source: statisticalhorizons.com – When Can You Safely 
Ignore Multicollinearity, Sept 10th 2012. 
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announcement. 
 
The main variables of interest in this study are the merger activity variables and stock market 
momentum variable. Two measures are used to proxy for merger activity, one that captures 
merger momentum and one that captures recent merger waves of the overall market.  
 
The merger momentum measure captures the hotness of merger markets and is calculated as 
the average 5-day CAR for all sample mergers that occurred in the 12 months prior to the 
third day before a merger announcement (“trailing 12-month average CAR”). A hot merger 
market is one in which recent mergers have generated favourable announcement returns. 
Merger momentum can reflect common factors that affect the synergies created in different 
mergers. For example, when most mergers following an economic or regulatory shock 
simultaneously experience positive announcement returns, there is a possibility that the 
shock created common synergies (Andrade, Mitchell and Strafford (2001)). Rosen (2006) 
finds that bidder announcement returns are likely to be higher if the merger is announced 
following other mergers that have been perceived favourably by the market. However, there 
is a reversal in bidder returns in the long term. His results suggest that investor sentiment 
plays an important role in the market’s reaction to a merger announcement and that 
managerial motivations may operate in addition to investor sentiment, especially during the 
merger wave of the 1990s. Similarly, Helwege and Liang (1996) show that market reaction 
to a corporate announcement can be affected by investor sentiment regarding initial public 
offerings. 
 
In the univariate analysis, we use the trailing 12-month average CAR to proxy for the hotness 
of the merger market. A deal is categorized as announced during a “hot merger market” if 
its trailing 12-month average CAR is more than the median and is categorized as announced 
during a “cold merger market” otherwise.  
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Shughart and Tollison (1984) show that there is autocorrelation in merger activity, that is, 
the number of mergers in one year helps predict the number of mergers in the next year. 
Because mergers usually come in waves, factors contributing to the autocorrelation of the 
number of mergers might also affect bidder announcement returns. Therefore we capture the 
recent overall merger conditions using the merger wave measure, which is calculated as the 
total number of deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement (“trailing 12-month 
no. of mergers”). A deal is made during a merger wave if merger activity during the past 12 
months is high. In the univariate analysis, we categorize a deal as made “on-the-wave” if its 
trailing 12-month number of mergers is more than the median and “off-the-wave” otherwise.  
 
Figure 2.1 present two measures of recent overall merger activity. One is the trailing 12-
month number of deals, which captures the merger wave, and the other is the trailing 12-
month average 5-day CAR, which captures merger momentum.  
 
[Insert Figure 2.1] 
 
This figure shows that these two measures are positively correlated. There is one obvious 
local peak during the growth phase indicated by the wave measure, which suggests that the 
periods around 2009 are hotter than the rest of the sample periods. There is also a smaller 
local peak during the initial phase, but it is negligible compared with the local peak that 
occurred in the growth phase. Hence, the wave measure is likely to miss the local peak during 
the initial phase. In contrast, no distinct trend is observed for the merger momentum measure; 
rather, it picks up multiple peaks during both phases. Therefore, hot merger markets are 
related to but not necessarily the same as merger waves; the two measures indicate different 
aspects of merger markets.  
 
Table 2.3 presents bidder and target industry distribution stratified by the two measures of 
recent overall merger activity.  
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[Insert Table 2.3] 
 
Bidders in the high-technology and materials sectors are more interested in conducting 
mergers on-the-wave than off-the-wave, whereas the opposite is true for bidders in the energy, 
health and industrial sectors. In addition to bidders in the high-technology and materials 
sectors, bidders in the real estate sector are more active when the response to recent mergers 
has been positive (i.e., during hot merger markets), whereas health- and industrial-related 
bidders are the least concerned about the hotness of the merger market. 
 
The most targeted industries during merger waves are the high-technology, materials and 
retail sectors, whereas the most targeted industries off-the-wave are energy, health, industrial 
and real estate. Firms in the energy, materials and high-technology sectors are the top targets 
during hot merger markets, whereas firms in the health, industrial and real estate sectors are 
the top targets during cold merger markets.18 
 
Again, we observe a high degree of similarity between our measures of recent merger 
activity when the merger activity across various industry sectors is displayed, but the 
measures are not necessarily the same. Combining both measures, we find that the high-
technology and materials sectors are the most influenced by overall merger market 
conditions, whereas the health and industrial sectors are the most resilient to merger market 
conditions. Note also that real estate bidders are more strategic about their investment timing 
than high-technology and materials bidders are; one explanation for this result may be that 
the intensity of merger activities within the real-estate sector causes bidders to consider their 
decisions more carefully. Moreover, our results suggest that bidders are most strategic about 
the timing of acquisitions if their targets belong to the energy sector. Specifically, energy-
                                                     
18 A report called “The great buy-out: M&A in China” by Economists Intelligence Unit (i.e., The 
great buy-out: M&A in China, Economists Intelligence Unit, 2006) indicates that the hottest sectors 
for domestic M&As are industrial, energy and power, materials, high technology and real estate, 
which is similar to our findings. It further posits that these deals tend to cluster around SOE purchases 
of their own subsidiaries or each other. 
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related firms are the most often targeted firms when the merger market is hot and are the 
least targeted firms during merger waves, which suggests that bidders intend to capitalize on 
merger momentum during hot merger markets and on low target valuation during off-the-
wave periods.  
 
As is true generally, mergers occur more frequently when stock markets are booming, and 
numerous studies based on either neoclassical or behavioural schools of thoughts offer 
explanations for the associated merger outcomes. Under neoclassical theory, mergers 
initiated during bullish periods should perform better on average than those initiated during 
other periods. However, if bullish periods result in more firms with overvalued equity, these 
firms are likely to use their overvalued equity to purchase undervalued or less overvalued 
assets, and thereby earn lower announcement returns with no long-run drift (Dong et al. 
(2006)). Overoptimistic sentiment during hot market valuation periods can also increase 
bidder announcement returns temporarily, but there is a reversal of this trend over the long 
term (Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010)). Therefore, we measure the overall 
condition of the stock market (i.e., as a source of market momentum) as the change in the 
SHComp value-weighted index for the period beginning one year prior to the merger 
announcement and ending three days prior to the merger announcement (“Trailing 12-month 
return on SHComp index”).  
 
Furthermore, we control for bidder-specific merger momentum using three variables: “CAR 
on bidder’s last announcement”, “First merger dummy” and “Number of mergers by firm in 
the last 3 years”. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is used as a proxy for the bidder’s 
acquisition quality and is measured as the 5-day announcement return on the bidder’s last 
deal if the last deal was announced within the previous three years. “First merger dummy” 
is a binary variable that equals one if the current deal is the firm’s first merger announcement 
in the last three years. Finally, “Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years” is used to 
capture how acquisitive the firm is and is measured as the number of deals conducted by the 
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bidder within the previous three years. Earlier literature demonstrates that overconfident 
managers acquire more frequently than rational managers do because overconfident 
managers are more likely to underestimate the risks and overestimate the potential synergies 
associated with the proposed acquisitions. Hence, overconfident managers experience 
declines in their announcement returns as they continue to acquire more targets ((Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007); Billett and Qian (2008)). Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) 
find that deals conducted by overconfident acquirers (as proxied by firms that conducted five 
or more acquisitions within three years) are most value destroying when the deals are 
announced during cold-valuation markets. Even during hot valuation markets, when 
overconfident managers can take advantage of positive investor sentiment, investors react 
negatively to deals announced by overconfident managers.  
 
In addition to bidder-specific merger momentum, we control for bidder-specific stock 
momentum, which is measured as the bidder’s market-adjusted BHAR relative the 
benchmark SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days before 
the deal announcement (“trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder’s stock”). Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) posit that a run-up of the bidder’s stock price can affect how a merger is financed. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) examine the incentives behind managerial decisions by 
analysing the relationship between acquirers’ past performance and their returns on current 
acquisitions and suggest that poor performance drives managers to try a change in approach. 
Alternatively, Rosen (2006) find that an acquirer’s idiosyncratic return is weakly negatively 
related to its announcement return. His results support a particular version of Roll's hubris 
hypothesis, which predicts that the worst acquisitions are made by well-performing firms 
because the managers of well-performing firms are most likely to be affected by hubris. 
 
Finally, we control for the following well-documented and relevant measures of deal and 
bidder characteristics, all of which are known to affect both short- and long-term abnormal 
returns: “Government involvement”, a binary variable that equals one if either the acquirer 
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or the target has any state-ownership and equals zero otherwise; “Private target”, a binary 
variable that equals one if target is a private firm and equals zero otherwise; “Subsidiary 
target”, a binary variable that equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm and equals zero 
otherwise; “Payment incl. stock”, a binary variable that equals one if the deal is financed at 
least in part by stock and equals zero otherwise; “Diversifying deal”, a binary variable that 
equals one if the target is in a different industry than the bidder (as measured using the first 
two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code) and equals zero otherwise; “Ln(MV)”, which 
is measured as the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement; 
“Relative Size”, which is measured as the ratio of the deal value to the bidder’s market value 
of equity one month prior to the deal announcement; “BTMV”, which is measured as the 
bidder’s book value to market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement; 
and “ROA”, which is measured as the bidder’s return on assets one year prior to the deal 
announcement. 
 
2.3.5 Sensitivity Tests 
 
To ensure the reliability of our results, several sensitivity tests are performed. To conserve 
space, all sensitivity tests are available upon request.  
 
First, to check the robustness of the results, the short-run event window is shortened from 5 
days to 3 days around the announcement date; and the long-run event window is shortened 
from 36 months to 24 months after the announcement month. We find that the results are 
largely in line with our main findings, although certain coefficients lose their significance at 
conventional levels.  
 
Second, to control for outliers, we winsorize the returns and continuous independent 
variables at the 1st and 99th, 2nd and 98th, and 5th and 95th percentiles. Our results are robust 
to the changes in percentiles. 
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Third, to ensure that our results are not based on one particular definition of market valuation, 
we measure market valuation based on the SHComp value-weighted index. In addition, we 
change the length of the historical data used for the P/E by changing the de-trending 
approach to 3 years. Our results remain unchanged. 
 
Fourth, we further split our sample into partial and full acquisitions and find that merger 
momentum effect persists in both acquisition types. 
 
Fifth, to ensure that our results are not based on one particular corporate performance 
measure, we use ROA to measure the acquirer’s operating efficiency. The higher the ROA, 
the more efficient management is in utilizing its asset base (Mishkin (2006)). We find that 
in the short term, the effect of merger momentum is more positive and significant for high-
ROA acquirers than for low-ROA acquirers. Moreover, a significant long-term reversal is 
found for high-ROA acquirers but not for low-ROA acquirers. These results yield the same 
implication as the BTMV results, namely, that Chinese investors tend to evaluate the 
acquiring firm’s future operating performance based on the firm’s past performance, which 
is often misleading and can destroy investors’ returns over the long term.  
 
Finally, we consider the endogeneity issue that might arise from certain observed and 
unobserved (omitted) variables that increase both the number of mergers and the market 
reaction to merger announcements. To check for endogeneity, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
is employed. In a statistical model, if the right-hand-side endogenous variables are correlated 
with the error term, if there is reverse causality between the dependent and independent 
variables, or if the model contains any omitted variables, the OLS parameters are rendered 
biased and/or inconsistent. Hence, confidence intervals and hypothesis testing will be 
misleading (Greene (2003)). After performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we obtain a 
Durbin score of 1.5879 with a p-value equal to 0.2076 (insignificantly different from zero). 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, and we 
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conclude that our results do not indicate the presence of endogeneity.19 
 
2.3.6 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics, including the mean, median, and number of 
observations of bidder and deal characteristics for the overall sample and for the hot and cold 
market valuation subsamples. Statistical tests for differences between the means of each 
characteristic in high and low market valuation periods are also presented. 
 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
 
We find that the mean (median) of the trailing 12-month average CAR is 0.012 (0.012), 
indicating that Chinese bidders enjoy positive returns around merger announcements 
throughout the sample. Deals announced during hot-valuation markets have a significantly 
higher trailing 12-month average CAR (0.006) than those announced during cold-valuation 
markets, suggesting that deals announced during hot market valuation periods are also 
announced in hotter merger markets than those announced during cold market valuation 
periods. 
 
On average, 101 deals were completed in the year prior to the deal announcements made 
throughout the sample. The mean trailing 12-month number of mergers during hot-valuation 
markets is insignificantly higher than that for cold-valuations markets, which implies that 
merger waves are less likely to be the result of stock market overvaluation in China, which 
is opposite to the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) for the US market. 
 
                                                     
19 The instrumental variable used is the total number of deals made for the period starting two years 
and ending one year prior to the deal announcement. This instrumental variable helps to predict the 
trailing 12-month number of mergers, but its correlation with bidder CARs is less clear. 
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Market momentum, as proxied by the change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting 
one year and ending three days prior to a merger announcement, has a mean (median) of 
19.05% (-4.21%). This finding suggests that the majority of deals are conducted following 
stock market downturns, whereas a minority are initiated following huge upswings in the 
market. In addition, we observe that deals announced during hot-valuation markets are 
associated with positive changes in the stock market (mean=100.29%), whereas the opposite 
is true for deals announced during cold-valuation markets (mean=-18.82%). The difference 
between the trailing 12-month returns on the SHComp index for deals announced during hot 
and cold valuation markets is 119.10% at a 1% significance level. 
 
In terms of bidder-specific merger momentum, we find that the CAR on a bidder’s last 
announcement differs significantly between deals announced during hot and cold market 
valuation periods. Bidders that announce deals during bullish periods are likely to have 
experienced announcement gains from their most recent deal. For bidder-specific stock 
momentum, our results show that the majority of bidders are associated with negative stock 
price run-ups one year prior to the current deal announcement, whereas the minority are 
associated with large and positive stock price run-ups. These results also suggest that in 
China, the majority of merger activity is not driven by past good firm performance. Moreover, 
bidders that engage in M&As during hot-valuation markets experience significantly higher 
stock price run-ups than those that engage in M&As during cold-valuation markets (35.74%, 
p-value=0.000). It is also worth noting that during high-valuation periods, the mean run-up 
is 27.93% but the median run-up is negative, whereas the mean and median run-ups are both 
negative during cold-valuation periods, which implies that managers in firms that have 
recently experienced extreme increases in their stock prices are more likely to conduct deals 
in hot valuation markets, possibility because these managers are driven by hubris, or by the 
incentive to use their overvalued stock to finance deals and to allow the high market 
valuation to serve as a cover for their overvalued share price. 
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Public acquisitions represent 4.99% of our sample. The majority of transactions are private 
(26.16%) and subsidiary (68.86%) acquisitions. Private acquisitions occur significantly 
more frequently in hot valuation markets than in cold valuation markets.  
 
Regarding methods of payment, there are significantly fewer deals financed entirely with 
cash during hot-valuation periods than during cold valuation periods. Conversely, 
significantly more deals are financed at least in part with stock in hot-valuation periods than 
in cold-valuation periods. This is consistent with the view that when managers believe their 
stock is overvalued (undervalued) relative to its intrinsic value, payment in stock (cash) is 
preferred. In the same vein, our results suggest that Chinese bidders tend to favour stock 
financing in hot valuation markets to take advantage of the mispricing effect. 
 
The mean (median) bidder size as measured by its natural logarithm is 8.126 (7.948), which 
is equivalent to US$3381.247 million (US$2829.909 million). Bidders engaged in 
acquisitions during hot-valuation markets are significantly larger in market value terms than 
those in cold-valuation markets. 
 
The mean and median BTMV for the bidders in our sample are 0.371 and 0.319, respectively. 
We observe that bidders that announce deals during hot-valuation markets possess 
significantly lower BTMV values than those that announce deals during cold-valuation 
markets, implying that deals are more likely to be initiated by glamour firms during hot stock 
markets.  
 
Mean (median) bidder ROA is 5.538% (4.835%). Bidders that engage in acquisitions during 
hot market valuation periods have significantly higher ROA one year prior to the acquisition 
announcement compared with those that engage in acquisitions during cold market valuation 
periods, suggesting that bidders with better operating performance are more likely to engage 
in acquisitions when market valuation is high.  
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Finally, 39.1% of the acquisitions in our sample have government involvement (i.e., either 
the bidder or the target has some state-ownership). In addition, 25.91% of the bidders are 
experienced, and 53.04% of the deals are diversifying.  
 
In sum, our results indicate that merger waves in China are not likely to be driven primarily 
by stock market misvaluation. Most bidders announce deals following negative stock price 
run-ups during the previous year and following stock market downturns. Deals announced 
during hot-valuation markets are likely to be associated with more positive merger 
momentum and market momentum; financed at least in part with stock; initiated by glamour 
firms with better operating performance one year prior to the deal; and undertaken by bidders 
whose last deal was favoured by the market and whose stock has recently experienced large 
price run-ups. Therefore, although we do not find evidence to support the notion that stock 
market booms gives rise to merger waves, the fundamental differences between deals 
announced during hot- and cold-valuation markets imply that market misvaluation does have 
an effect on managerial decisions; specifically, managers are more likely to time the market 
to absorb their overvalued equity, and managers in firms that have recently performed well 
(i.e., managers that may be affected by hubris) are more likely to conduct deals during bullish 
periods. These findings can be explained in part by the theory proposed in Section 2.3.2., 
which suggests that government intervention in China makes timing the market to take 
advantage of overvaluation and financing deals with overvalued stock more difficult for non-
SOE firms and less important for SOE firms. 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents the short- and long-run univariate comparison analyses for acquirer 
returns under hot and cold merger market portfolios and under on-the-wave and off-the-wave 
period portfolios. In addition, we present the short- and long-term multivariate regression 
analyses of acquirer returns for the overall sample, the hot and cold market valuation 
subsamples, and the high- and low-BTMV bidder subsamples. 
 
2.4.1 Univariate Analyses 
 
This section presents the short- and long-run univariate comparison analyses for acquirer 
abnormal returns by bidder- and deal-specific characteristics under hot and cold merger 
market portfolios and under on-the-wave and off-the-wave period portfolios. 
 
2.4.1.1 Short-Term Analysis – Merger Momentum 
 
Table 2.5 presents the 5-day CAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced during 
hot merger markets and those announced during cold merger market for the entire sample 
and for subsamples based on various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month 
average CAR is used as a proxy for the hotness of the merger market. A deal is categorized 
as announced during a “hot merger market” (i.e., with a high trailing 12-month average CAR) 
if its trailing 12-month average CAR is greater than the median and as during a “cold merger 
market” (i.e., with a low trailing 12-month average CAR) otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5] 
 
The overall 5-day CAR for bidders in our sample is 1.61% and is statistically significant at 
the 1% significance level. These results are driven primarily by the positive returns achieved 
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by acquisitions initiated in hot merger markets and targeted at private firms. Deals initiated 
during hot merger markets enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns of 2.68% around 
the announcement date, which is 2.14% higher than the abnormal returns obtained by deals 
initiated during cold merger markets, at a 1% significance level. The results of our univariate 
comparison suggest that there is a form of merger momentum, that is, the market reaction to 
an acquisition is positively related to the market response to other acquisitions in the recent 
past. 
 
Acquisitions with and without government involvement generate significantly positive 
announcement returns of 2.05% and 1.32%, respectively. In addition, we find that regardless 
of government involvement, deals announced in hot merger markets are significantly more 
value-enhancing for shareholders than are those announced in cold merger markets, which 
suggests that the effect of merger momentum holds after controlling for state-ownership in 
either the bidder or the target in an acquisition. 
 
Private acquisitions account for 95% of our sample. Bidders experience significantly 
positive announcement returns of 1.60% if the target is privately owned, whereas bidders 
that acquire public firms experience insignificantly positive returns. Our results are 
consistent with those of previous studies, which show that bidders acquiring privately held 
firms enjoy significant gains around the announcement date (Travlos (1987); Chang (1998); 
Draper and Paudyal (2006); Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002)). In addition, when we 
divide private acquisitions based on different methods of payment, we find that acquisitions 
financed entirely with stock experience the most significant gains (8.11%, p-value=0.00), 
whereas acquisitions targeted at public companies that are financed entirely with stock 
experience the lowest announcement returns (-0.11%, p-value=0.99).20 These findings are 
in line with the hypotheses regarding limited competition (i.e., underpayment), monitoring 
(i.e., there will be more blockholders in the newly combined firm) and information (i.e., 
                                                     
20 To save space, the test results are not shown here but are available upon request. 
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signalling that the bidding firm’s stock is valuable), all of which predict an increase in the 
bidder’s stock price when privately owned firms are acquired using equity. Moreover, 
bidders conducting private acquisitions in hot merger markets generate significantly higher 
abnormal returns of 2.43% than those conducting private acquisitions in cold merger markets, 
whereas the difference is insignificant for bidders conducting public acquisitions. We note 
that the results regarding public acquisitions might be limited due to the small sample size. 
 
An examination of the performance of deals financed at least in part with stock shows that 
bidders earn significantly positive announcement returns of 8.49%. Moreover, deals 
announced during hot and cold merger markets generate significant returns of 9.53% and 
5.86%, respectively. Bidders using non-stock payment methods generate significant 
abnormal returns of 0.55% overall and 1.06% during hot merger markets, which is 
considerably less than the returns generated by deals whose payment includes stock. By 
contrast, Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2004) find that bidders experience a price pressure 
effect on their stock prices if the acquisition is paid with equity, due to merger arbitrage short 
selling (the arbitrage hypothesis); and Myers and Majluf (1984) find that stock transactions 
lead to negative announcement returns because such transactions signal the market that the 
bidders’ stocks are overvalued (the information content hypothesis). We suggest that the 
higher announcement returns experienced by bidders in our sample for deals that were 
financed at least in part by stock are likely because those acquisitions targeted privately 
owned firms (which is consistent with the limited information, monitoring and information 
hypotheses). Furthermore, our results show that the mean bidder return for deals financed at 
least in part with stock during hot merger markets is insignificantly higher than the mean 
return for deals financed at least in part with stock during cold merger markets, whereas the 
difference is positive and significant for cash-only deals. Hence, although we cannot reach 
any meaningful conclusion about the effect of merger momentum on deals financed at least 
in part by stock, there is a form of merger momentum for cash-only deals. We note that the 
insignificant effect of merger momentum on deals that were financed at least in part by stock 
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may be due to the small sample size.  
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) document a size effect on bidders’ announcement 
returns whereby small firms achieve higher synergy returns, both in percentage and dollar 
terms, than large firms do. They suggest this effect is due to managerial overconfidence in 
large firms rather than to overvaluation because managers in large firms tend to complete 
more acquisitions and to pay more for their acquisitions. Our results show that although deals 
conducted by small firms achieve higher abnormal returns than deals conducted by large 
firms, the difference is not significant (1.55% vs. 1.34%). Interestingly, we also observe that 
large bidders experience significantly positive announcement returns if they initiate 
acquisitions during cold merger markets, whereas insignificant returns are obtained by small 
bidders in these conditions. Large bidders are most active during hot merger markets, 
whereas the reverse is true for small bidders. Hence, our results might suggest that large 
bidders that conduct mergers during cold merger markets are less likely to be affected by 
hubris than those that conduct mergers during hot merger markets. Moreover, we find the 
effect of merger momentum is relatively pronounced for small bidders but insignificant for 
large bidders. 
 
Regarding the effect of relative size on bidder announcement returns, Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins (1983) find that the relative size of the target to the bidding firm has a positive effect 
on bidders’ abnormal returns. Similarly, Loderer and Martin (1990) contend that bidder 
returns are significantly higher when the deal value is greater than one-third of the bidding 
firm’s market value. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find a positive relationship 
between bidder returns and the relative size of the target in private and subsidiary 
acquisitions but find a negative relationship between them in public acquisitions. Our results 
indicate that bidder abnormal returns are significant and positive for high relative-size 
transactions (4.23%, p-value=0.00) but insignificant for low relative-size transactions. The 
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mean difference (4.03%) is statistically significant at a 1% level.21 Consistent with the prior 
literature, we suggest that the positive correlation between relative size and bidder abnormal 
returns is likely due to the predominance of private acquisitions in our sample. Moreover, 
high relative-size transactions conducted during hot merger markets yield the highest 
announcement returns, 6.16%, which are 4.19% higher than the announcement returns for 
high relative-size transactions conducted during cold merger markets. These results imply 
that the merger momentum effect is most significant for transactions with a high target-to-
bidder size. 
 
Glamour firms are firms with high growth prospects and value firms are firms with low 
growth prospects. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that glamour bidders experience 
significantly superior announcement returns but lower long-term returns compared with 
value bidders, regardless of the means of payment. This finding supports the extrapolation 
hypothesis, which argues that the market over-reacts to bidders’ past performance at merger 
announcements but that over time, the market corrects its previous over-extrapolation of past 
performance as it assesses bidders’ post-merger performance. By contrast, Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) find that value bidders gain more than glamour bidders at deal 
announcements. They suggest that their findings are more in line with the method of payment 
hypothesis, which maintains that glamour firms tend to use overvalued stock as means of 
payment more often than value firms do, than with the extrapolation hypothesis. Similarly, 
Dong et al. (2006) demonstrate a negative correlation between firm valuation and 
announcement returns, and attribute this correlation to highly valued bidders communicating 
to the market that their valuations are not warranted by fundamentals by using overvalued 
equity to acquire less overvalued assets (i.e., the overvaluation hypothesis). Our results 
indicate that both high- and low-BTMV firms generate significant returns in the short run 
for their shareholders (1.20% and 2.20%). We further find that low-BTMV (glamour/ growth) 
bidders consistently earn more abnormal returns than high-BTMV (value) bidders, 
                                                     
21 To conserve space, the test results are not provided in this paper but are available upon request.  
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regardless of the merger market conditions. High-BTMV bidders tend to conduct more 
acquisitions in cold merger markets, whereas low-BTMV bidders are more acquisitive in hot 
merger markets. In addition, value bidders favour cash as means of payment, whereas stock 
payment is preferred by glamour bidders. 22  Therefore, our results are in line with the 
extrapolation hypothesis but also suggest that it is profitable for glamour bidders to exploit 
and convert their overvalued equity into real assets, especially during hot merger markets. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that after controlling for bidder BTMV, the merger 
momentum effect remains significantly positive.  
 
In terms of bidders’ financial performance, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) claim that 
firms with better prior performance make better acquisitions. In the same vein, we find that 
high-ROA bidders (2.23%, p-value=0.00) are associated with higher abnormal returns 
around the acquisition announcement date than low-ROA bidders are (1.41%, p-value=0.01), 
albeit this difference is insignificant. However, the correlation is reversed during hot merger 
market, with high- and low-ROA bidders gaining abnormal returns of 2.26% and 4.15%, 
respectively. Additionally, high-ROA bidders are more acquisitive during hot merger 
markets, whereas low-ROA bidders are more acquisitive during cold merger markets. We 
note that firms with high past growth in returns are likely to be highly valued, similar to 
firms with low BTMVs. Putting these results together, we observe that low-ROA bidders 
engage in fewer acquisitions in hot merger markets but generate the most value for their 
shareholders. In addition, the effect of merger momentum is most significant for transactions 
conducted by low-ROA bidders.  
 
The existing literature suggests that investors respond negatively to diversifying acquisitions 
(Campa and Kedia (2002); Doukas and Kan (2004); Villalonga (2004)). A common 
                                                     
22 Value bidders undertook 22 (69) acquisitions with pure stock (cash) payments, whereas glamour 
bidders undertook 39 (53) acquisitions with pure stock (cash) payments. More detailed results are 
available upon request.  
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explanation for the diversification discount is that managers conducting diversifying 
acquisitions have the tendency to overinvest, possibly due to overconfidence (Hadlock, 
Ryngaert and Thomas (2001)). We do not find evidence to support the adverse effect of 
diversification on bidder abnormal returns. Indeed, our results show that diversifying deals 
(1.81%, p-value=0.00) are slightly more value-enhancing than focussed deals (1.38%, p-
value=0.00) and that bidders gain the most around merger announcements if they acquire a 
firm in a different industry during hot merger markets. Despite the high abnormal returns, 
we find that diversifying deals are less frequent during hot merger markets, whereas focussed 
deals are more frequent during hot merger markets. After controlling for deal relatedness, 
we find that merger momentum has a more significant impact on diversifying deals than on 
focusesd deals. 
 
In sum, our results suggest that overall, the merger momentum effect is robust to firm and 
deal characteristics, albeit it is more pronounced for acquisitions with small bidders, high 
target-to-bidder size and low-ROA bidders and for diversifying acquisitions. To determine 
whether the effect of merger momentum on bidding firms’ performance is persistent over 
time, we perform a comparison analysis for bidder BHAR three years post-merger 
announcement (see Table 2.7).  
 
2.4.1.2 Short-Term Analysis – Merger Wave 
 
Table 2.6 presents the 5-day CAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced on-
the-wave and those announced off-the-wave for the entire sample and for subsamples 
according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month number of 
mergers is used to capture the merger wave. A deal is categorized as being announced “on-
the-wave” (i.e., high trailing 12-month no. of mergers) if its trailing 12-month number of 
mergers is more than the median and as “off-the-wave” (i.e., low trailing 12-month no. of 
mergers) otherwise. 
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 [Insert Table 2.5] 
 
Our results indicate that acquisitions announced on-the-wave significantly outperform those 
announced off-the-wave. This outperformance is robust to various firm and deal 
characteristics but is more pronounced for acquisitions with small size bidders, high target-
to-bidder size, low-ROA bidders and all-cash financing. Rosen (2006) suggests that if the 
neoclassical theory of mergers holds (i.e., managers act in the interests of shareholders and 
only make acquisitions to create synergies for shareholders), then mergers concentrated 
around common shocks should positively affect the potential synergies attained through all 
mergers. In other words, mergers conducted during waves should perform better, on average, 
than those conducted during other times. Moreover, under neoclassical theory, the number 
of mergers (merger wave measure) and market reaction to merger announcements (merger 
momentum measure) should be highly correlated. The results of our univariate analyses of 
merger momentum and the merger wave largely coincide with one another, which provides 
an early indication that mergers in China are driven by synergy creations. Additionally, if 
mergers are truly conducted to exploit synergies, they should add value to the firm over the 
long term; hence, we examine the effect of the merger wave on bidder BHAR three years 
post-merger announcement by performing a univariate comparison analysis (see Table 2.8). 
  
2.4.1.3 Long-Term Analysis – Merger Momentum 
 
Table 2.7 presents the post-announcement returns univariate comparison analysis for deals 
announced during hot merger markets and those announced during cold merger markets for 
the entire sample and for subsamples according to various bidder and deal characteristics. 
The post-announcement return is measured as the bidder’s BHAR over the period starting 
three days after a deal announcement and ending three years after the deal announcement. 
The trailing 12-month average CAR is used as a proxy for the hotness of the merger market. 
A deal is categorized as being announced during a “hot merger market” (i.e., high trailing 
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12-month average CAR) if its trailing 12-month average CAR is more than the median and 
as being announced during a “cold merger market” (i.e., low trailing 12-month average CAR) 
otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 2.7] 
 
The overall bidder post-announcement return in our sample is -2.16% and is statistically 
insignificant, primarily due to the poor post-acquisition returns for deals initiated during cold 
merger markets. Similarly, Black et al. (2013) document that Chinese bidders experience 
insignificant returns three years post-merger announcement. Moreover, we find that deals 
announced during hot merger markets earn significantly positive post-announcement returns 
of 12.12% and significantly outperform deals announced during cold merger markets by 
28.35% at a 1% significance level. Rosen (2006) proposes that if the initial market reaction 
to mergers is driven by investor sentiment, then the long-term performance should be no 
better than it would have been without the merger, and he finds evidence to support this 
proposition. However, our results suggest that mergers announced during hot merger markets 
are undertaken to exploit synergies and continue to be value enhancing for bidding firms’ 
shareholders over the long run, which supports the neoclassical theory of mergers.  
 
Acquisitions with and without government involvement both fail to generate any significant 
abnormal returns three years post-deal announcement, which is attributable to their 
underperformance during cold merger markets over the long term. However, deals 
announced during hot merger markets continue to create value over the long term, regardless 
of government involvement (7.09% for deals with government involvement and 15.27% for 
deals without government involvement). Hence, our results indicate that the effect of merger 
momentum holds after controlling for state-ownership in acquisitions. 
 
Acquisitions targeting privately owned firms during hot merger markets attain higher returns 
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over the long run, 12.15% and significant at a 1% significance level, than do deals targeting 
publicly listed firms during hot merger markets, which attain insignificant returns. During 
cold merger markets, both public and private acquisitions are value-destroying and result in 
losses of -28.08% and -15.34%, respectively, for bidding firms’ shareholders. Nonetheless, 
acquisitions announced in hot merger markets significantly outperform those announced in 
cold merger markets, regardless of the target’s listing status.  
 
Black et al. (2012) find that Chinese bidders that use equity to finance their deals enjoy 
significant positive gains of 58.03% over the three years following the merger announcement 
and conclude that the Chinese market is not driven by market-timing. Similarly, we find that 
bidders that finance their deals at least partially with stock experience returns of 31.39% 
three years after deal announcement and significantly outperform bidders that finance deals 
without stock (-7.29%, p-value=0.01). Although deals financed at least in part by stock 
achieve significantly higher returns than all-cash deals do in both hot and cold merger 
markets, we find that the effect of merger momentum is reversed over the long term for deals 
financed at least in part by stock. The highest post-announcement return is obtained for deals 
financed at least in part by stock during cold merger markets. This implies there might some 
market-timing incentives to include stock as payment for deals conducted during hot merger 
markets but not for those conducted during cold merger markets. Hence, we posit that 
although neoclassical explanations are important, market-timing may explain a nontrivial 
fraction of merger activities in China, especially those merger activities conducted during 
hot merger markets with stock financing. 
 
Regarding bidder size, we find that although large firms enjoy positive announcement 
returns, they significantly underperform three years post-merger announcement (-12.23%, 
p-value=0.00). In contrast, small bidders continue to generate marginally significant gains 
over the long term (10.92%, p-value=0.07). Deals conducted by small bidders enjoy the 
highest post-announcement gains in hot merger markets, whereas deals undertaken by large 
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bidders suffer the greatest losses in cold merger markets. After controlling for the bidder size 
effect, our results suggest that the positive correlation between merger momentum and 
bidder abnormal returns persists over the long term.  
 
In terms of relative size effect, we find that acquisitions associated with high relative size 
generate significant post-announcement returns (9.94%, p-value=0.03), whereas those 
associated with low relative size are associated with significant value destruction over the 
long run (-8.52%, p-value=0.03). The outperformance of acquisitions associated with high 
relative size is attributed primarily to the high positive long-run returns generated in hot 
merger markets, and the underperformance of acquisitions associated with low relative size 
is driven mainly by the significant losses incurred in cold merger markets. Furthermore, our 
results suggest that the effect of merger momentum is robust over the long term regardless 
of the relative size of an acquisition. 
 
The three year post-announcement return reveals that high-BTMV bidders gain significantly 
in hot merger markets (17.14%, p-value=0.01) but lose significantly in cold merger markets 
(-21.12%, p-value=0.01). For deals conducted by low-BTMV bidders, the long-term return 
is only significantly positive in hot merger market (10.32%, p-value=0.01). Mergers 
announced in cold merger markets consistently underperform those announced in hot merger 
markets, irrespective of the bidding firm’s valuation. Moreover, we observe that the effect 
of merger momentum becomes more pronounced for value bidders over the long term, which 
deserves further examination. 
 
Over the long term, bidders with high ROA generate insignificant abnormal returns and 
significantly outperform bidders with low ROA, which experience losses of -12.04% and 
are significant at a 5% level. Deals initiated by low-ROA bidders in hot merger markets 
create the most significant abnormal returns three years post-merger announcement (10.09%, 
p=0.04) but also underperform the most in cold merger markets, accruing losses of -29.02% 
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over the same time period. Furthermore, we observe that after controlling for the ROA effect, 
merger momentum has a more pronounced impact on bidder post-announcement returns for 
deals initiated by low-ROA bidders.  
 
Finally, we observe that regardless of the type of takeover and whether the deal is diversified 
or focussed, deals announced during hot merger markets earn positive post-announcement 
returns and significantly outperform those announced during cold merger markets, which 
demonstrate negative post-announcement returns. The results imply that the effect of merger 
momentum holds robustly over time. Our results also show that diversifying acquisitions 
conducted during hot merger markets experience the highest abnormal returns over the long 
term, whereas focussed acquisitions conducted during cold merger markets are the most 
value-destroying.  
 
In sum, the overall trend for post-announcement returns is that deals announced during hot 
merger markets are value enhancing for bidding firms’ shareholders, whereas the opposite is 
true for deals announced during cold merger markets (except for the payment-includes-stock 
subsample). The differences in the means between bidder returns three years post-merger 
announcement in hot and cold merger markets is significantly positive across various bidder 
and deal characteristics, except for the payment-includes-stock subsample. Our results show 
that the effect of merger momentum on bidding firms’ performance is rather persistent over 
time, which implies that the neoclassical theory plays an important role in explaining merger 
activities in China. 
 
2.4.1.4 Long-Term Analysis – Merger Wave 
 
Table 2.8 presents the post-announcement returns univariate comparison analysis for deals 
announced on-the-wave and those announced off-the-wave for the entire sample and for 
subsamples according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The post-announcement 
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return is measured as the bidder’s BHAR over the period starting three days to a deal 
announcement and ending three years after the deal announcement. The trailing 12-month 
number of mergers is used to capture the merger wave. A deal is categorized as announced 
“on-the-wave” (i.e., high trailing 12-month no. of mergers) if its trailing 12-month number 
of mergers is more than the median and “off-the-wave” (i.e., low trailing 12-month no. of 
mergers) otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 2.8] 
 
Our results indicate that acquisitions announced on-the-wave significantly outperform those 
announced off-the-wave over 3-year period post-deal announcement date. This 
outperformance is robust to various firm and deal characteristics, except for insignificant 
underperformance obtained for the payment-includes-stock subsample. The results based on 
the merger wave are almost completely in line with the results based on merger momentum. 
Again, the merger wave results suggest that merger during waves perform better on average 
than do those conducted off-the-wave, in both the short and long terms, which implies that 
merger waves are driven by neoclassical explanations (i.e., to maximize synergy gains and 
to improve efficiency). 
 
2.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 
This section presents the short- and long-run multivariate regression analysis results for the 
overall sample, for hot and cold market valuation subsamples and for high- and low-BTMV 
bidder subsamples. 
 
2.4.2.1 Short- and Long-Term Multivariate Regression Analyses – Overall Sample 
 
The results from the univariate analysis of the overall sample suggest that both the trailing 
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12-month average CAR (i.e., the proxy for merger momentum) and the trailing 12-month 
number of mergers (i.e., the proxy for the merger wave) have positive and significant effects 
on bidder announcement returns and long-term returns, which supports the neoclassical 
hypothesis. However, univariate analyses can be misleading because they do not account for 
any confounding effects that influence bidder returns. Therefore, we employ multivariate 
analyses to control for various bidder- and deal-characteristics and reveal the net effect of 
merger momentum and the merger wave. The results are presented in Table 2.9.  
 
[Insert Table 2.9] 
 
The overall sample regression indicates that there is a form of merger momentum at the 
market level but not at the firm level. We find that the market-level merger momentum 
variable, which is the trailing 12-month average CAR, has a positive coefficient and is 
statistically significant at a 1% level. A one-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-
month average CAR leads to a 0.76-percentage-point increase in bidder 5-day announcement 
returns. We note that the merger momentum effect is well documented in existing studies. 
For example, Rosen (2006) documents that in the US, a 0.38-percentage-point increase in 
merger momentum is associated with a one-percentage-point increase in bidder 5-day 
announcement returns, and Antonious, Guo and Petmezas (2008) find that in the UK, a 0.20-
percentage-point increase in merger momentum is associated with one-percentage-point 
increase in bidder 5-day announcement returns. These results provide an early indication 
that the merger momentum effect does not exist only in developed merger markets; indeed, 
this phenomenon might play a more significant role in developing merger markets. 
 
Although the merger wave measure, which is the trailing 12-month number of mergers, is 
found to exert a positive and significant effect on bidder announcement returns in the 
univariate analysis, the coefficient of the merger wave measure is insignificant in the 
multivariate regression. Both Rosen (2006) and Antonious, Guo and Petmezas (2008) find 
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an insignificant impact of the merger wave measure on bidder CARs and suggest that the 
reason might be that the merger wave measure captures two waves, one of which is on a 
much larger scale than the other. Similarly, we observe two phases (i.e., the initial (2002 – 
2005) and growth (2006 – 2010) phases) over our sample period and note that the growth 
phase dominates in terms of the number of mergers. Hence, we suggest that the wave 
measure essentially proxies for the growth phase, which shows bidder announcement returns 
differ insignificantly between two phases. 
 
Furthermore, our results suggest that both market-level and firm-level stock momentum have 
insignificant effects on bidder performance over the short term.  
 
Consistent with the univariate analysis, we find that payment-includes-stock deals are 
associated with a 4.52% improvement in CAR, ceteris paribus. Because the majority of deals 
target privately owned firms, we suggest that the CAR improvement might be attributable to 
three factors. First, bidding firms face less competition when purchasing private targets, and 
this limited competition is likely to result in higher underpayment, which translates into 
higher returns for the bidding firms’ shareholders (Chang (1998)). Second, we suggest that 
the small number of owners of a private target firm are likely to become blockholders in the 
newly combined entity if the deal is financed with stock. The monitoring of managerial 
performance is likely to be enhanced by the addition of blockholders, which will result in 
higher firm value (Draper and Paudyal (2006)). Third, given that the owners of a private 
target firm acquired in a stock purchase will possess a large amount of shares in the newly 
combined entity, they have more incentive to cautiously assess the value of the bidding firm 
before accepting the offer. Therefore, the willingness to accept a stock offer conveys a 
positive message to the market regarding the value of the bidding firm and leads to a positive 
market reaction around the merger announcement (Draper and Paudyal (2006)).  
 
We further find that the bidder’s size has a negative and significant influence on 
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announcement returns. Consistent with the prior literature, this correlation might be due to 
any one of the following theories: managerial incentives are better aligned with shareholder 
incentives in small firms because managers have more ownership in smaller firms than in 
larger ones; small firms tend to pay lower acquisition premiums than large firms; small firms 
lack analyst coverage, which may lead to profitable opportunities for investors if the small 
firm’s stock price deviates temporarily from its real value; higher returns result from the 
higher risk associated with smaller firms; and managers of larger firms are more likely to 
suffer from hubris (Chang (1998); Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004)). 
 
In accordance with many existing studies in which larger acquisitions are found to have a 
higher effect on bidder abnormal returns than smaller acquisitions do (Jensen and Ruback 
(1983); Jarrell and Poulsen (1989); Loderer and Martin (1997)), we also observe that the 
ratio of deal-to-bidder size exerts a significant and positive effect on bidder announcement 
returns.  
 
Furthermore, we include ROA as an accounting measure of performance because ROA may 
capture bidder performance that is not reflected by stock market returns. We find that bidder 
ROA one year prior to the merger announcement has a significant and positive impact on 
bidder announcement returns, implying that deals announced by firms with better prior 
operating-performance-to-capital-invested ratios are perceived more favourably by the 
market.  
 
Because it may take several years for a bidder to fully absorb a target, we extend our study 
to the long term by using a three-year window to allow for complete integration. We measure 
a bidder’s long-term performance as its BHAR over the period starting three days after the 
deal announcement and ending three years after the deal announcement (i.e., post-
announcement returns). Additionally, we calculate a bidder’s BHAR for the period starting 
two days prior to the deal announcement and ending three years after the deal announcement 
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(i.e., total window returns). The later measure allows us to capture the entire stock market 
reaction to the deal, including the effect of the announcement that is excluded from the post-
announcement measure. Moreover, we include bidder announcement returns (i.e., bidder 
CAR) as an additional control variable in the post-announcement returns.  
 
Consistent with the results of our univariate analysis, we find that the coefficient of the 
trailing 12-month average CAR (the measure of merger momentum on the market level) has 
a significant and positive effect on both the post-announcement period and total window 
returns. The coefficient is much larger than that of the short-run regression; a one-
percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average CAR leads to a 8.74-percentage-
point increase in bidder BHAR three years post-announcement. The effect on the total 
window return is even higher, with a 9.06-percentage-point increase. Hence, our results 
suggest that firms that initiate mergers during hot merger markets experience an upward drift 
in their stock prices over both the short and long terms and significantly outperform firms 
that initiate mergers during cold merger markets. 
 
Similarly, we find that the trailing 12-month number of mergers (the merger wave measure) 
has a positive and significant effect on both post-announcement and total window returns. 
This suggests that mergers announced on-the-wave perform significantly better over the long 
term than those announced off-the-wave, which is consistent with the results of our 
univariate analysis. Furthermore, despite the coefficient on the bidder CAR variable having 
a sign of reversal, both the merger momentum and merger wave measures hold even after 
controlling for CAR reversal.  
 
Moreover, our results indicate that the effect of stock market momentum becomes 
significantly positive over the long term. This implies that there is a positive correlation 
between aggregate stock market prices and potential merger synergies for bidding firms, 
meaning that on average, mergers announced during hot stock markets perform better for 
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bidding firm shareholders than mergers announced during cold stock markets.  
 
Overall, our findings suggest that merger waves may be caused by changes in the business 
environment that lead to increases in overall stock prices and to more profitable merger 
opportunities, which supports the neoclassical theory of mergers and is in line with our first 
hypothesis.  
 
Additionally, we find that the firm-level stock momentum variable, which is measured as the 
bidder’s market-adjusted BHAR relative to the benchmark SHComp value-weighted index 
for the period starting one year before and ending three days before the deal announcement, 
exerts a negative and significant impact on both post-announcement and total window 
returns. This finding is consistent with that of Rosen (2006), who also finds a negative 
coefficient on the bidding firm’s stock. He suggests two explanations for this negative 
correlation: first, managers who recently experienced success in generating more returns for 
their respective firms are more likely to suffer from hubris (Roll (1986)), and second, firms 
are more likely to issue stock to finance acquisitions if they have experienced a recent run-
up in their stock prices or if they believe that their stock is overvalued (Myers and Majluf 
(1984); Travols (1987)). After excluding all acquisitions involving stock payments, we rerun 
the BHAR regressions and find that the coefficient on bidder run-up is less negative but 
remains significant (-0.079, p-value=0.047 for the post-announcement returns regression;  
-0.076, p-value=0.063 for the total window returns regression).23 Therefore, we suggest that 
managerial hubris explains a large portion of the negative coefficient on the bidder run-up 
variable but that the market-timing factor cannot be completely ignored.  
 
Other control variables with significant coefficients in the regressions for bidder long-term 
returns have signs that reinforce the results of the short-term regression analysis. More 
specifically, payment-includes-stock acquisitions, relative size of deal-to-bidder’s market 
                                                     
23 To conserve space, the regression results are not presented herein but are available upon request. 
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value of equity and bidder ROA continue to have a positive correlation with bidder returns 
over the long term, whereas bidder size continues to have a negative impact on bidder returns 
over the long term. Hence, our results suggest that the factors affecting merger momentum 
and merger wave continue to exist after controlling for various bidder and deal 
characteristics. 
 
In sum, the results of the multivariate analysis confirm those of the univariate analysis and 
reinforce the positive effect of merger momentum on bidder announcement returns, post-
announcement returns and total window returns, which is consistent with the neoclassical 
theory of mergers and with the predictions outlined in our first hypothesis, which suggests 
that mergers are driven primarily by synergy creation.  
 
2.4.2.2 Short- and Long-Term Multivariate Regression Analyses – High and Low 
Market Valuation Subsamples 
 
A growing number of studies show that merger outcomes in hot market valuation periods 
differ from those in cold market valuation periods. We divide the sample into hot- and cold-
valuation periods and find that both results support our main findings for the overall sample, 
that is, the primary driver of merger waves is the creation of synergies, which supports the 
neoclassical theory of mergers and our first hypothesis. Additionally, the results for hot-
valuation markets suggest that there is room for other motives, such as hubris and market 
timing, especially for deals announced when market valuation is high. Conversely, the results 
for cold valuation markets suggest that bidding firms’ managers are not influenced by hubris 
or market-timing incentives and that investors are overly pessimistic when market valuation 
is low. 
 
The following section presents the short- and long-run multivariate analyses for acquirer 
performance by controlling for various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics in the hot 
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and cold market valuation subsamples. 
 
Table 2.10 presents the hot market valuation subsample regression results. We find that the 
coefficient on merger momentum is not statistically significant during hot market valuation 
periods in either the short or long term, which suggests that merger momentum may be less 
important when market valuation deviates away from its neutral level. These results reject 
our proposed hypothesis IV, which posits that the merger momentum effect should be more 
pronounced during high valuation markets because as investor sentiment is higher during 
these periods.  
 
[Insert Table 2.10] 
 
In contrast, the coefficient on the number of mergers variable is significantly positive in all 
regressions for short- and long-term bidder performance. This indicates that the market 
perceives that mergers occurring on-the-wave are better than mergers occurring off-the-wave 
and thus leads us to reject our second hypothesis, which contends that managerial 
motivations and/or hubris are the main driving forces behind merger waves, especially 
during hot-valuation markets, when external resources become more accessible. 
 
Nevertheless, the possibility that managers suffer from hubris or time the market to take 
advantage of market misvaluation during high market valuation periods, when investor 
sentiment is optimistic, cannot be completely ruled out. This is because our results show a 
more negative and pronounced impact of bidder run-up on bidder long-term returns in hot 
valuation periods than in neutral valuation periods. Moreover, by re-running the BHAR 
regressions for high market valuation periods without payment-includes-stock deals, we find 
that the coefficient on bidder run-up is less negative but remains significant in both 
regressions, which may be attributed to managerial hubris or to managers timing the market 
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to make acquisitions, with hubris being the more predominant factor.24 
 
In line with the multivariate regression results for the overall sample, we find payment-
includes-stock deals are associated with even higher bidder return gains for both the short 
and long terms compared with the overall sample. The associated increases in CAR, post-
announcement returns and total window returns are 7.03%, 35.79% and 40.25%, respectively, 
ceteris paribus. As discussed in earlier sections, we suggest that these improvements are 
driven largely by the gains achieved by private acquisitions financed at least in part with 
stock. Moreover, high market valuation periods provide more takeover opportunities, which 
can allow bidders to more easily time the market to finance takeovers with overvalued equity 
to lock in real assets, which in turn reduces the losses that may occur as overvalued equity 
reverts downward to its intrinsic level over time. 
 
Our results also indicate that the coefficient of bidder size for bidder announcement and 
long-term returns becomes more negative and remains significant during high-valuation 
periods. These results may occur because larger firms are more likely to be overvalued 
during hot-valuation markets, which leads to high costs for managerial discretion and 
facilitates poor acquisition decisions by managers (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004)).  
 
Moreover, the financial strength of the bidding firm, as measured by its BTMV one month 
prior to the merger announcement, is associated with higher long-term returns. Similarly, 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that growth firms experience negative long-term abnormal 
returns whereas value firms experience positive abnormal returns after the completion of 
major corporate events.25 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that glamour bidders outperform 
                                                     
24 To conserve space, the regression results for the neutral-valuation markets are not presented herein 
but are available upon request. We find the coefficient for bidder run-up in the post-announcement 
returns regression and the total window returns regression for the neutral-valuation periods are -
0.1022 (p-value=0.072) and -0.0969 (p-value=0.094), respectively. 
25 The terms “growth firms” and “glamour firms” are used interchangeably in this study. 
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value bidders, irrespective of the means of payment for the acquisition, in the short term. 
However, a reversal is found for bidders’ long-term performance, suggesting that the market 
fails to understand that past managerial performance is not necessarily a good indicator of 
future performance. 
 
Consistent with the overall sample, we find that bidder ROA is significantly positively 
related to bidder returns over the long term for acquisitions announced during hot market 
valuation periods. This result suggests that deals announced by firms with superior prior 
financial performance continue to perform better irrespective of stock market valuation.  
 
In sum, our multivariate analysis results for high market valuation periods reinforce our 
earlier findings for the overall sample, which suggest that the neoclassical explanations for 
mergers are the primary drivers of merger waves in China. Additionally, the results suggests 
that managerial hubris and market-timing are more pronounced during high-valuation 
markets and may help explain a nontrivial fraction of merger activity in China, but they are 
not sufficiently pronounced to cause merger waves. 
 
Table 2.11 presents the cold market valuation subsample regression results. Our results 
indicate that the effect of merger momentum on bidder announcement returns is not 
significant during cold market valuation periods, which suggests that when the stock market 
is depressed, investors are unconfident and sceptical about any deals that occur. Investors 
are likely to respond negatively and may cause substantial departures from the fundamental 
value of mergers, especially when recent past deals have experienced positive reactions. We 
argue that this might be due to investors’ concerns about managers’ incentives to capture 
gains from recent market reactions and thereby hide their poor decisions. However, our 
results also show that merger momentum is associated with better bidder performance over 
the long term. The significant reversion to the fundamental value of the merger as merger 
performance becomes known over the long term confirms the existence of overly pessimistic 
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investor sentiment during cold valuation periods. Moreover, this reversion implies that 
acquisitions during cold valuation periods are driven primarily by synergy creation.  
 
[Insert Table 2.11] 
 
Additionally, we observe that although the merger momentum measure is associated with 
better bidder performance over the long term, the merger wave measure is associated with 
better bidder performance in the short term. This finding indicates that the market responds 
favourably to acquisitions announced on-the-wave and that the difference between a hot 
merger market (as measured by recent announcement returns) and a merger wave (as 
measured by the number of mergers) is especially significant in cold market valuation 
periods. 
 
Market-wide momentum has a positive and marginally significant impact on bidder 
announcement returns in cold valuation markets. Moreover, there is a marginally significant 
positive relationship between the first-merger dummy and bidder total window returns. As 
in earlier sections, we show that acquisitions involving firms with government ownership 
are more frequent during cold market valuation periods. We also find that the government 
involvement dummy is significantly positively correlated with both post-announcement and 
total window returns, suggesting that acquisitions with government involvement during cold 
market valuation periods are especially value enhancing for bidding firms’ shareholders over 
the long term. This might be because managers in state-related firms are more cautious about 
investment decisions in weak market conditions, when there are more restraints on access to 
external financing. 
 
Consistent with the overall sample regression results, the effect of bidder size and ROA 
persist under different market valuation periods. There is also an indication that the effects 
of bidder size and bidder ROA on bidder short- and long-term returns are more pronounced 
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when market valuation is low, suggesting that if a bidder- or deal-specific characteristic has 
previously been known for its persistent effect on merger outcomes, its effect is likely to be 
intensified by pessimistic investor sentiment during cold-valuation markets. 
 
Interestingly, we find that payment-includes-stock acquisitions are not associated with 
superior bidder performance in either the short or long terms during cold valuation markets, 
which indicates that stock payments are viewed least favourably when market valuation is 
low. This might be attributable to the fact that bidder stock prices are closer to their intrinsic 
value or may be undervalued when the overall market valuation is low, which prevents 
bidders from gaining from underpayment using overvalued stock. 
 
Moreover, our results indicate that the negative effect of bidder-specific stock momentum is 
positive but insignificant on bidder long-term returns. These results imply that managers are 
least likely to be overconfident or to time the market during cold-valuation periods.  
 
In sum, we find that bidders engaged in mergers during low market valuation periods aim to 
create wealth and to benefit shareholders, which supports the neoclassical theory of mergers. 
Bidders seem to be unaffected by hubris or market-timing incentives when market valuation 
is low. We also provide evidence for the bounded rationality of investors and overly 
pessimistic investor sentiment during cold market valuation periods. 
 
2.4.2.3 Short- and Long-Term Multivariate Regression Analyses – High and Low 
BTMV Bidder Subsamples 
 
In addition to market valuation, information asymmetry is also known to affect firm 
performance. Zhou, et al. (2012) state that Chinese financial markets are characterized by a 
lack of reliable information, a high degree of information asymmetry and an overwhelming 
number of individual investors. We argue that in this type of environment, investors are more 
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likely to consider bidders’ past managerial performance to be a good indicator of future 
performance. We divide the sample into high-BTMV (i.e., value) and low-BTMV (i.e., 
growth) bidder subsamples and expect that the effect of merger momentum will be more 
pronounced for growth bidders than for value bidders in the short term but that the opposite 
trend will be found over the long term as anticipation is replaced by reality. 
 
Table 2.12 presents the high-BTMV bidder subsample regression results. Our results show 
that the coefficient on the merger momentum variable is positive but insignificant in the short 
run, indicating that merger momentum may have a less significant impact for value bidders 
than for growth bidders. However, over the long term, we find that value bidders are 
associated with significantly higher returns if their deals are announced in a hot merger 
market than if their deals are announced in a cold merger market, which is in complete 
contrast to the insignificant difference between hot and cold merger markets for growth 
bidders. 
 
 [Insert Table 2.12] 
 
Table 2.13 presents the low-BTMV bidder subsample regression results. We find that the 
coefficient on the merger momentum variable is positive and statistically significant at a 1% 
level for low-BTMV bidders. A one-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month 
average CAR leads to a 1.66-percentage-point increase in bidder 5-day announcement 
returns, which is much higher than that for the overall sample (0.76-percentage-point 
increase). However, acquisitions conducted by growth bidders in hot merger markets do not 
generate significantly higher long-term returns than they would if they were conducted in 
cold merger markets. 
 
 [Insert Table 2.13] 
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The merger wave measure has a marginally negative effect on bidder announcement returns 
for growth bidders, which may be because highly valued bidders are more likely to be 
affected by hubris or a herding mentality during a wave. However, we find that over the long 
term, the merger wave measure exerts a positive and significant effect on bidder returns. 
Additionally, stock market momentum has a significant and positive effect on bidder returns 
three years post-merger announcement for both growth and value bidders, indicating a 
positive correlation between aggregate stock market prices and the potential synergies that 
are available to bidding firms. 
 
In a nutshell, our results suggest that if the recent market conditions are hot, either as 
measured by the merger momentum or merger wave measure or by stock market momentum, 
growth and value bidders are more likely to generate better returns on average over the long 
term, which supports the neoclassical theory of mergers. Moreover, we find that growth 
bidders are more prone to merger momentum in the short term, implying that Chinese 
investors tend to base their merger evaluations on – and over-react to – the bidding firm’s 
managerial track record. However, the outperformance of value firms over the long term 
suggests that investors fail to understand that past managerial performance is not necessarily 
a good indicator of future performance and that high firm valuation does not necessarily 
equal better firm performance; hence, our results are in line with the extrapolation hypothesis 
as proposed Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and suggest such evaluation approaches may lead 
to value-destroying decisions for investors and should thus be discouraged. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This study focuses on the correlation between broad Chinese market conditions (as measured 
by merger momentum, merger waves and stock market momentum) and bidder returns in 
the short and long terms. We employ a sample of 822 successfully completed domestic 
M&As in China announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010 involving 
acquirers that are listed firms on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
 
In our univariate analyses, we find that both the trailing 12-month average CAR (i.e., the 
proxy for merger momentum) and the trailing 12-month number of mergers (i.e., the proxy 
for merger waves) have a positive and significant effects on bidder announcement returns 
and long-term returns. The results are robust after controlling for various bidder- and deal-
specific characteristics. In other words, when the market has reacted favourably to recent 
merger announcements, it tends to continue to do so, suggesting that there is a form of 
momentum in the merger market. Moreover, mergers that occur on-the-wave create more 
wealth than do those that occur off-the-wave, which supports the neoclassical theory of 
merger waves. 
 
Because the univariate analyses do not account for any confounding effects that may affect 
bidder returns, we employ a multivariate analysis to simultaneously control for all bidder- 
and deal-specific characteristics found to influence bidder returns. Again, we find support 
for the existence of merger momentum, that is, the market reaction to an acquisition is 
positively correlated with the market reaction to other acquisitions in the recent past. More 
specifically, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average 
CAR leads to a 0.76-percentage-point increase in bidder 5-day announcement returns.  
 
Extending the multivariate analysis to the long term, our results show that the more 
favourable initial market reactions to acquisitions announced during hot merger market are 
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associated with better bidder performance over the long term. The correlation between 
merger momentum and bidder returns is much more pronounced over time; a one-
percentage-point increase in the trailing 12-month average CAR leads to an 8.74-percentage-
point increase in bidder BHAR three years post-deal announcement date. The effect on the 
total window return is even higher, with a 9.06 percentage point increase. We also find that 
mergers announced on-the-wave significantly outperform those announced off-the-wave 
over the long term. Moreover, mergers announced during hot stock markets perform better 
on average for bidding firm shareholders than do mergers announced during cold stock 
markets. 
 
Overall, our multivariate regression results reinforce those of the univariate analyses, 
suggesting that merger waves may be caused by changes in the business environment that 
lead to increases in overall stock prices and to more profitable merger opportunities, which 
supports the neoclassical theory of mergers and is in line with our first hypothesis.  
 
Other studies propose that market-wide misvaluation appears to affect merger activities, 
motives and outcomes (Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002); Rhodes-Kropf and Viswananthan 
(2004)). Additionally, Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) find that the over-optimistic 
investor sentiment during high market valuation periods influences the effect of merger 
momentum. Therefore, we split our sample into high and low valuation market subsamples 
and find that merger momentum may be less important when market valuation deviates from 
its neutral level. In addition, although merger activity is driven primarily by synergy gains, 
irrespective of stock market valuation, the tendency for managers to be driven by hubris and 
market-timing incentives is more pronounced during high valuation periods, and these 
incentives can help explain a nontrivial fraction of merger activity in China during these 
periods. However, these incentives are not found during cold market valuation periods, but 
there is evidence of the bounded rationality of investors and overly pessimistic investor 
sentiment during these periods. 
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Moreover, given the high level of information asymmetry and the lack of reliable 
information in Chinese financial market, we argue that investors tend to consider a firm’s 
past performance to be a good indicator of future performance and fail to understand that 
high firm valuation is not equivalent to superior firm performance. In line with this 
proposition, by splitting the sample into growth and value bidders, we find that the positive 
effect of merger momentum is more pronounced for growth bidders than for value bidders 
in the short term, whereas the opposite is true over the long term, as anticipation is replaced 
by reality. Nevertheless, both growth and value bidders generate significant gains for their 
shareholders during hot market conditions over the long term, reinforcing the neoclassical 
theory of mergers.  
 
In sum, the acquisitions conducted during our period of study prove to be profitable for 
bidding firms’ shareholders. Our findings suggest that there is a form of momentum in 
mergers and that the source of merger momentum is primarily attributable to neoclassical 
explanations. Moreover, our results give an early indication that Chinese investors tend to 
be affected more by the negative market sentiment than by positive market sentiment. We 
suggest that future research address the question of what makes investors become susceptible 
to different market sentiments because the answer to this question could help us better 
understand how investors process new information and make decisions. 
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Table 2.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics by Year 
This table presents the time-distribution of a sample of domestic Chinese public, private and subsidiary M&As announced between 1 January 2002 
and 31 December 2010 drawn from Thomson One Banker, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. Column 
(2) reports the number of deals per year as donated by “N”. Column (3) reports the total transaction value per year. Column (4) to (7) report the 
yearly mean and median market value of acquirers and the yearly mean and median transaction value of acquisitions. Column (8) to (10) reports 
the percentage of acquisitions by methods of payment. Transaction values are reported in millions of dollars and at the exchange rate of December 
2010. Cash and stock offers are those financed with either 100% cash or 100% stock. Mixed offers are all deals financed with neither pure cash 
nor pure stock, and include payment methods classified as “other” and “unknown” by Thomson One Banker. 
Year (1) N (2) 
Total  
transaction value 
(US$mil) (3) 
Mean  
market equity  
(US$mil) (4) 
Median 
market equity  
(US$mil) (5) 
Mean  
transaction value  
(US$mil) (6) 
Median  
transaction value 
(US$mil) (7) 
Cash 
offer  
(8) 
Stock 
offer  
(9) 
Mixed 
offer  
(10) 
2002 32 482.97  810.62  361.36  15.09  9.81  12.50% 3.13% 84.38% 
2003 64 1579.64  883.72  339.03  24.68  7.27  18.75% 0.00% 81.25% 
2004 74 1721.84  539.39  274.46  23.27  5.16  31.08% 1.35% 67.57% 
2005 57 637.29  481.55  168.77  11.18  5.26  36.84% 0.00% 63.16% 
2006 60 3836.34  1016.80  232.04  63.94  8.17  21.67% 3.33% 75.00% 
2007 112 7512.09  990.22  458.78  67.07  9.10  16.07% 15.18% 68.75% 
2008 147 14706.29  1183.76  489.73  100.04  13.30  17.69% 18.37% 63.95% 
2009 142 15184.95  1063.09  450.24  106.94  14.18  16.90% 17.61% 65.49% 
2010 134 21071.33  1269.78  604.98  157.25  23.32  23.88% 11.94% 64.18% 
Overall 822 66732.73  915.44  375.49  63.27  10.62  21.71% 7.88% 70.41% 
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Figure 2.1 The Trailing 12-month Number of Mergers and the Trailing 12-month Average CAR 
This figure presents the trailing 12-month number of mergers and the trailing 12-month average CAR for a sample of domestic Chinese public, 
private and subsidiary M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010 drawn from Thomson One Banker, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. The average CAR is the trialing 12-month average 5-day cumulative abnormal returns, 
and the number of deals is the total number of mergers announced in the prior 12 months. A merger is included as the date of its announcement. 
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Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlations of all variables used in the multivariate analysis. The sample contains 882 domestic Chinese public, 
private and subsidiary M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010 drawn from Thomson One Banker, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. “Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the average 5-day CAR for all 
sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total 
number of deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index” is the change in the SHComp 
value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days prior to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the last 
announcement by the firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First merger dummy” is a binary variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the deal is the first announcement by the bidder in the past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three years” is the number of 
deals announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period 
starting one year prior to an announcement. “With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if either side of a deal 
(acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and zero otherwise. “Private Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is 
targeted at a private firm, and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a subsidiary 
firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment incl. stock” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with some stock; and 
zero otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “Relative 
size” is the ratio of the deal value to the market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal announcement. “BTMV” is bidder’s 
book to market value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “ROA” is bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the 
deal announcement. “Diversifying” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is in a different industry to the bidder as measured 
using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code, and zero otherwise. 
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Ln(MV) Relative 
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BTMV ROA 
Trailing 12-
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CAR 
               
Trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers/1000 
0.5343               
Trailing 12-
month return on 
SHComp index 
-0.1550 -0.0934              
CAR on 
bidder's last 
announcement 
0.0585 0.0600 0.0651             
First merger 
dummy 
-0.0534 -0.1001 0.0100 -0.0476            
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12-month 
return on 
SHComp 
index 
CAR on 
bidder's last 
announce-
ment 
First 
merger 
dummy 
Number 
of 
mergers 
by firm 
in the last 
3 years 
Trailing 
12-month 
BHAR 
on 
bidder's 
stock 
Government 
involvement 
Private 
target 
Subsidiary Payment 
incl. 
stock 
Ln(MV) Relative 
size 
BTMV ROA 
Number of 
mergers by firm 
in the last 3 
years 
-0.0063 0.0665 0.0141 0.0300 -0.8773           
Trailing 12-
month BHAR 
on bidder's 
stock 
0.1990 0.2634 0.0398 0.1012 -0.0302 -0.0123          
Government 
involvement 
0.0304 -0.1067 -0.1079 0.0128 0.0676 -0.0400 -0.0090         
Private target -0.0089 -0.0209 -0.0095 -0.0499 0.0802 -0.1008 0.0252 -0.0693        
Subsidiary 0.0147 0.0393 0.0400 0.0409 -0.0969 0.0840 -0.0482 0.0011 -0.8109       
Payment incl. 
stock 
0.1635 0.2366 0.0868 -0.0016 0.1324 -0.1070 0.0923 0.0964 -0.0735 0.0505      
Ln(MV) 0.2484 0.0956 0.1552 0.0454 -0.1053 0.1779 0.2952 0.1798 0.0942 -0.1812 0.0017     
Relative size 0.1044 0.1803 -0.0080 -0.0067 0.1157 -0.1064 0.0271 0.0698 -0.0871 0.0655 0.1597 -0.1740    
BTMV -0.1737 -0.0666 -0.1979 -0.0741 -0.0546 0.0963 -0.2623 0.0583 -0.1110 0.0093 -0.0426 -0.2234 0.0463   
ROA 0.1193 0.1316 0.1241 0.0853 -0.0679 0.0860 0.3574 0.0034 0.0378 -0.0613 0.0126 0.3272 -0.0825 -0.1212  
Diversifying -0.0101 -0.0236 -0.0063 -0.0196 -0.0037 -0.0642 0.0356 -0.1642 0.0019 0.0008 0.0109 -0.2020 0.0413 -0.0230 -0.0878 
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Table 2.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics by Industry Sector 
This table presents both bidder and target industry distributions stratified by hot and cold merger markets, and by on-the-wave and off-the wave. 
The sample contains 882 domestic Chinese public, private and subsidiary M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2010 
drawn from Thomson One Banker, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. A deal is categorized as announced 
during the “Hot merger market” if its trailing 12-month average CAR is more than the median and “Cold merger market” otherwise; and 
categorized as announced “On-the-wave” if its trailing 12-month number of mergers is more than the median and “Off-the-wave” otherwise. “CPS” 
stands for Consumer Products and Services; “ENE” stands for Energy and Power; “GOVAGY” stands for government and agencies; “HEA” stands 
for Healthcare; “HT” stands for High Technology; “IND” stands for Industrials; “MAT” stands for materials; “MEDIA” stands for media and 
entertainment; “RE” stands for Real Estate; “RETAIL” stands for Retail; “STAPLES” stands for consumer staples; “TELE” stands for 
Telecommunication; and “Sum” is the total number of deals conducted under each corresponding category.
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Acquirer industry CPS ENE GOVAGY HEA HT IND MAT MEDIA RE RETAIL STAPLES TELE Sum 
Hot merger market 18 40 0 26 39 71 103 4 42 17 41 7 408 
Cold merger market 23 42 2 51 27 83 89 11 30 17 32 7 414 
              
On-the-wave 22 36 0 24 37 68 107 6 36 18 38 8 400 
Off-the-wave 19 46 2 53 29 86 85 9 36 16 35 6 422 
Sum 41 82 2 77 66 154 192 15 72 34 73 14 822 
              
              
Target industry CPS ENE GOVAGY HEA HT IND MAT MEDIA RE RETAIL STAPLES TELE Sum 
Hot merger market 21 44 1 25 37 68 99 10 69 11 21 2 408 
Cold merger market 16 39 1 43 27 80 80 9 86 6 24 3 414 
              
On-the-wave 20 38 1 20 39 63 100 11 74 12 21 1 400 
Off-the-wave 17 45 1 48 25 85 79 8 81 5 24 4 422 
Sum 37 83 2 68 64 148 179 19 155 17 45 5 822 
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Table 2.4 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics such as the mean, median, and number of observations for bidder- and deal-characteristics for the overall 
sample, and for hot and cold market valuation subsamples, respectively. Hot (cold) market valuation is defined follow Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) 
using the top (bottom) quarter of the monthly Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (i.e., SHComp) index detrened P/E ratio. “Trailing 12-month average 
CAR” is calculated as the average 5-day CAR for all sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement. “Trailing 12-
month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on SHComp 
index” is the change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days prior to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last 
announcement” is the last announcement by the firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First merger dummy” is a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first announcement by the bidder in the past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three years” is 
the number of deals announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the 
period starting one year prior to an announcement. “With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if either side of a deal 
(acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and zero otherwise. “Public Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted 
at a public firm, and zero otherwise. “Private Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a private firm, and zero 
otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “100% cash” 
is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed entirely with cash; and zero otherwise. “Payment incl. stock” is a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with some stock; and zero otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market 
value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of the deal value to the market value of the bidder as measured 
one month before the deal announcement. “BTMV” is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “ROA” is 
bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal announcement. “Diversifying” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target 
is in a different industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code, and zero otherwise. The equation CARi =
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 5-day CAR. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHARs with bootstrapped 
p-values (1000 replications) shown in parentheses. Statistical tests for differences in means for each characteristic for high and low market valuation 
periods are also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. “SD” donates the standard 
deviation for the overall sample and “N” donates the number of observations in each portfolio.
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 Overall 
Hot market valuation 
(1) 
Cold market valuation 
(2) 
Difference (1)-(2) 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median Mean Median Mean   p-value 
Trailing 12-month average CAR 0.0123  0.0116  0.0147  0.0073  0.0090  0.0018  0.0013  0.0055 *** (0.000) 
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 0.1011  0.1110  0.0398  0.0889  0.0970  0.0867  0.0730  0.0023  (0.563) 
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp 
index 0.1905  -0.0421  0.6564  1.0029  1.2900  -0.1882  -0.2091  1.1910 *** (0.000) 
CAR on bidder's last announcement 0.0011  0.0000  0.0332  0.0061  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0061 * (0.071) 
First merger dummy  0.7409  1.0000  0.4384  0.7532  1.0000  0.7222  1.0000  0.0309  (0.521) 
Number of mergers by firm in the last 
3 years 0.3552  0.0000  0.6877  0.3038  0.0000  0.3722  0.0000  -0.0684  (0.327) 
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's 
stock  0.1020  -0.0138  0.5824  0.2793  -0.0119  -0.0781  -0.0867  0.3574 *** (0.000) 
Government involvement 0.3905  0.0000  0.4882  0.3544  0.0000  0.4111  0.0000  -0.0567  (0.287) 
Public target 0.0499  0.0000  0.2178  0.0506  0.0000  0.0944  0.0000  -0.0438  (0.125) 
Private target  0.2616  0.0000  0.4398  0.3165  0.0000  0.2167  0.0000  0.0998 ** (0.038) 
Subsidiary 0.6886  1.0000  0.4634  0.6329  1.0000  0.6889  1.0000  -0.0560  (0.279) 
100% Cash 0.2105  0.0000  0.4079  0.1519  0.0000  0.3111  0.0000  -0.1592 *** (0.001) 
Payment incl. stock 0.1326  0.0000  0.3394  0.1203  0.0000  0.0611  0.0000  0.0591 * (0.057) 
Ln(MV)  8.1275  7.9482  1.0987  8.5183  8.2913  7.5954  7.3087  0.9228 *** (0.000) 
Relative size (%) 0.0265  0.0036  7.1771  1.7288  0.2093  2.5787  0.0529  -0.8499  (0.221) 
BTMV 0.3710  0.3185  0.2345  0.2619  0.2275  0.5712  0.5182  -0.3093 *** (0.000) 
ROA (%) 5.5383  4.8350  5.5383  6.7174  5.8500  4.4901  4.1700  2.2273 *** (0.000) 
Diversifying 0.5304  1.0000  0.4994  0.5190  1.0000  0.5167  1.0000  0.0023  (0.966) 
5-day CAR 0.0161  0.0048  0.0853  0.0143  0.0149  0.0065  -0.0027  0.0078  (0.373) 
Post-announcement Returns -0.0216  -0.0735  0.7508  0.0462  0.9290  -0.2543  0.7587  0.3005 ** (0.002) 
Total Window Returns -0.0086  -0.0795  0.7634  0.0596  0.9885  -0.2470  0.7766  0.3066 ** (0.002) 
N 822 158  180        
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Table 2.5 Univariate Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR – Merger Momentum 
This table presents the 5-day CAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced during high trailing 12-month average CAR (i.e., hot 
merger market) versus those announced during low trailing 12-month average CAR (i.e., cold merger market) for the entire sample, and subsamples 
according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month average CAR is calculated as the average 5-day CAR for all sample 
mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement and is used as a proxy for the hotness of the merger market. A deal 
is categorized as announced during “hot merger market” if its trailing 12-month average CAR is more than the median and “cold merger market” 
otherwise. The “With government involvement” subgroup includes either acquirers or targets with any state-ownership, and “Without government 
involvement” subgroup includes acquirers or targets with zero state-ownership. The “Public Deals” subgroup includes deals targeting publicly-
listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the “Private deals” subgroup. The “Payment incl. stock” and the “Payment without 
stock” subgroups are created depending on whether or not the deal is financed with at least some stock. The “Diversifying Deals” and the “Focussed 
Deals” subgroups are created according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry, with the same industry deals in the 
former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further categorize the top-tertile bidder size as deals with “High Bidder Size”, while the bottom-
tertile bidder size as deals with “Low Bidder Size”. Same categorization method is used to classify deals with “High relative size”/ “Low relative 
size”, “High BTMV”/ “Low BTMV”, and “High ROA”/ “Low ROA”. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The mean 
CARs are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. Statistical tests for differences in means are also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 
5% level and 10% level is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within each portfolio. 
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5-day CAR All 
With 
government 
involvement 
Without 
government 
involvement 
Public Private 
Payment 
incl. Stock 
Payment 
without 
stock 
High bidder 
size 
Low bidder 
size 
All 0.0161 *** 0.0205 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0169  0.0160 *** 0.0849 *** 0.0055 ** 0.0134 *** 0.0155 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
N 822  321  501  41  781  109  713  273  273  
High trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.0268 *** 0.0319 *** 0.0237 *** -0.0126  0.0280 *** 0.0953 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0127 ** 0.0432 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.00)  
N 408  157  251  12  396  78  330  173  95  
Low trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.0055  0.0096 * 0.0027  0.0291  0.0037  0.0586 *** 0.0012  0.0147 * 0.0007  
p-value (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.57)  (0.12)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.07)  (0.91)  
N 414  164  250  29  385  31  383  100  178  
Difference 0.0214 *** 0.0223 ** 0.0209 *** -0.0417   0.0243 *** 0.0367   0.0095 * -0.0020   0.0426 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.02)   (0.00)   (0.28)   (0.00)   (0.20)   (0.07)   (0.85)   (0.00)   
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5-day CAR 
High relative 
size 
Low relative 
size 
High 
BTMV 
Low 
BTMV 
High ROA Low ROA Diversifying Focussed 
All 0.0423 *** 0.0015  0.0120 *** 0.0220 *** 0.0223 *** 0.0141 *** 0.0181 *** 0.0138 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.67)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 273  273  273  271  273  274  436  386  
High trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.0616 *** 0.0036  0.0275 *** 0.0321 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0415 *** 0.0333 *** 0.0205 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.43)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 147  138  101  153  148  119  202  206  
Low trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.0197 ** -0.0007  0.0030  0.0088  0.0173 ** -0.0069  0.0049  0.0061  
p-value (0.02)  (0.90)  (0.59)  (0.26)  (0.02)  (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.28)  
N 126  135  172  118  125  155  234  180  
Difference 0.0419 *** 0.0042   0.0245 *** 0.0234 * 0.0093   0.0484 *** 0.0283 *** 0.0144  
p-value (0.00)   (0.53)   (0.01)   (0.05)   (0.37)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.11)  
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Table 2.6 Univariate Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR – Merger Wave 
This table presents the 5-day CAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced during high trailing 12-month no. of mergers (i.e., “on-
the-wave” period) versus those announced during low trailing 12-month no. of mergers (i.e., “off-the-wave” period) for the entire sample, and 
subsamples according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month no. of mergers is calculated as the total number of deals 
made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. A deal is made “on-the-wave” is one in which its trailing 12-month no. of mergers is more than 
the median and “off-the-wave” otherwise. The “With government involvement” subgroup includes either acquirers or targets with any state-
ownership, and “Without government involvement” subgroup includes acquirers or targets with zero state-ownership. The “Public Deals” subgroup 
includes deals targeting publicly-listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the “Private deals” subgroup. The “Payment incl. 
stock” and the “Payment without stock” subgroups are created depending on whether or not the deal is financed with at least some stock. The 
“Diversifying Deals” and the “Focussed Deals” subgroups are created according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry, 
with the same industry deals in the former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further categorize the top-tertile bidder size as deals with 
“High Bidder Size”, while the bottom-tertile bidder size as deals with “Low Bidder Size”. Same categorization method is used to classify deals 
with “High relative size”/ “Low relative size”, “High BTMV”/ “Low BTMV”, and “High ROA”/ “Low ROA”. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  
is used to calculate CAR. The mean CARs are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. Statistical tests for differences in means are also 
presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within 
each portfolio. 
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5-day CAR 
All 
With 
government 
involvement 
Without 
government 
involvement 
Public Private 
Payment 
incl. Stock 
Payment 
without 
stock 
High bidder 
size 
Low bidder 
size 
All 0.0161 *** 0.0205 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0169  0.0160 *** 0.0849 *** 0.0055 ** 0.0134 *** 0.0155 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
N 822  321  501  41  781  109  713  273  273  
High trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.0295 *** 0.0348 *** 0.0264 *** -0.0064  0.0307 *** 0.0937 *** 0.0137 *** 0.0181 *** 0.0428 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.89)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
N 400  148  252  13  387  79  321  157  104  
Low trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.0034  0.0083  -0.0001  0.0277  0.0016  0.0618 *** -0.0011  0.0071  -0.0014  
p-value (0.35)  (0.13)  (0.98)  (0.15)  (0.65)  (0.01)  (0.77)  (0.36)  (0.81)  
N 422  173  249  28  394  30  392  116  169  
Difference 0.0261 *** 0.0264 *** 0.0265 *** -0.0340   0.0291 *** 0.0319   0.0148 *** 0.0109   0.0442 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.36)   (0.00)   (0.27)   (0.00)   (0.29)   (0.00)   
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5-day CAR 
High 
relative size 
Low 
relative size 
High 
BTMV 
Low 
BTMV 
High ROA Low ROA Diversifying Focussed 
All 0.0423 *** 0.0015  0.0120 *** 0.0220 *** 0.0223 *** 0.0141 *** 0.0181 *** 0.0138 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.67)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 273  273  273  271  273  274  436  386  
High trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.0626 *** 0.0062  0.0385 *** 0.0320 *** 0.0257 *** 0.0450 *** 0.0329 *** 0.0257 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.22)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 152  135  105  145  146  120  208  192  
Low trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.0168 ** -0.0031  -0.0045  0.0104  0.0185 *** -0.0100 * 0.0045  0.0020  
p-value (0.04)  (0.50)  (0.38)  (0.18)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.38)  (0.69)  
N 121  138  168  126  127  154  228  194  
Difference 0.0458 *** -0.0093   0.0430 *** 0.0216 * 0.0072   0.0550 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0237 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.17)   (0.00)   (0.07)   (0.48)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   
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Table 2.7 Univariate Analysis for Bidder 3-year Post-announcement BHAR – Merger Momentum 
This table presents the 3-year post-announcement BHAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced during high trailing 12-month 
average CAR (i.e., hot merger market) versus those announced during low trailing 12-month average CAR (i.e., cold merger market) for the entire 
sample, and subsamples according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month average CAR is calculated as the average 5-
day CAR for all sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement and is used as a proxy for the hotness of the 
merger market. A deal is categorized as announced during “hot merger market” if its trailing 12-month average CAR is more than the median and 
“cold merger market” otherwise. The “With government involvement” subgroup includes either acquirers or targets with any state-ownership, and 
“Without government involvement” subgroup includes acquirers or targets with zero state-ownership. The “Public Deals” subgroup includes deals 
targeting publicly-listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the “Private deals” subgroup. The “Payment incl. stock” and the 
“Payment without stock” subgroups are created depending on whether or not the deal is financed with at least some stock. The “Diversifying Deals” 
and the “Focussed Deals” subgroups are created according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry, with the same 
industry deals in the former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further categorize the top-tertile bidder size as deals with “High Bidder 
Size”, while the bottom-tertile bidder size as deals with “Low Bidder Size”. Same categorization method is used to classify deals with “High 
relative size”/ “Low relative size”, “High BTMV”/ “Low BTMV”, and “High ROA”/ “Low ROA”. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 +
T
t
Rm,t] is used to calculate BHAR. The mean BHARs are reported and bootstrapped p-values (1000 replications) are shown in parentheses. 
Statistical tests for differences in means are also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within each portfolio.
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Post-announcement 
Return 
 
All 
With 
government 
involvement 
Without 
government 
involvement 
Public Private 
Payment 
incl. Stock 
Payment 
without 
stock 
High bidder 
size 
Low bidder 
size 
All -0.0216  -0.0434  -0.0075  -0.1660  -0.0140  0.3139 *** -0.0729 *** -0.1223 *** 0.1092 * 
p-value (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.82)  (0.11)  (0.61)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.07)  
N 822  321  501  41  781  109  713  273  273  
High trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.1212 *** 0.0709 * 0.1527 *** 0.1113  0.1215 *** 0.2300 *** 0.0955 *** -0.0328  0.4061 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.56)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.00)  
N 408  157  251  12  396  78  330  173  95  
Low trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
-0.1623 *** -0.1529 ** -0.1684 *** -0.2808 ** -0.1534 *** 0.5252 *** -0.2179 *** -0.2771 *** -0.0492  
p-value (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.55)  
N 414  164  250  29  385  31  383  100  178  
Difference 0.2835 *** 0.2239 *** 0.3211 *** 0.3921 * 0.2749 *** -0.2952 ** 0.3135 *** 0.2443 *** 0.4553 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.08)   (0.00)   (0.04)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
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Post-announcement 
Return 
High 
relative size 
Low 
relative size 
High 
BTMV 
Low 
BTMV 
High ROA Low ROA Diversifying Focussed 
All 0.0994 ** -0.0852 ** -0.0698  0.0210  0.0333  -0.1204 ** 0.0012  -0.0473  
p-value (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.59)  (0.40)  (0.02)  (0.97)  (0.19)  
N 273  273  273  271  273  274  436  386  
High trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
0.1998 *** 0.0332  0.1714 *** 0.1032 *** 0.0818 * 0.1009 ** 0.1695 *** 0.0739 ** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.38)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.03)  
N 147  138  101  153  148  119  202  206  
Low trailing 12-
month average 
CAR 
-0.0177  -0.2062 *** -0.2115 *** -0.0855  -0.0242  -0.2902 *** -0.1441 ** -0.1859 *** 
p-value (0.83)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.22)  (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
N 126  135  172  118  125  155  234  180  
Difference 0.2176 ** 0.2394 *** 0.3829 *** 0.1887 ** 0.1060   0.3910 *** 0.3137 *** 0.2598 *** 
p-value (0.02)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.02)   (0.18)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
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Table 2.8 Univariate Analysis for Bidder 3-year Post-announcement BHAR – Merger Wave 
This table presents the 3-year post-announcement BHAR univariate comparison analysis for deals announced during high trailing 12-month no. 
of mergers (i.e., “on-the-wave” period) versus those announced during low trailing 12-month no. of mergers (i.e., “off-the-wave” period) for the 
entire sample, and subsamples according to various bidder and deal characteristics. The trailing 12-month no. of mergers is calculated as the total 
number of deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. A deal is made “on-the-wave” is one in which its trailing 12-month no. of 
mergers is more than the median and “off-the-wave” otherwise. The “With government involvement” subgroup includes either acquirers or targets 
with any state-ownership, and “Without government involvement” subgroup includes acquirers or targets with zero state-ownership. The “Public 
Deals” subgroup includes deals targeting publicly-listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the “Private deals” subgroup. The 
“Payment incl. stock” and the “Payment without stock” subgroups are created depending on whether or not the deal is financed with at least some 
stock. The “Diversifying Deals” and the “Focussed Deals” subgroups are created according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the 
same industry, with the same industry deals in the former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further categorize the top-tertile bidder size 
as deals with “High Bidder Size”, while the bottom-tertile bidder size as deals with “Low Bidder Size”. Same categorization method is used to 
classify deals with “High relative size”/ “Low relative size”, “High BTMV”/ “Low BTMV”, and “High ROA”/ “Low ROA”. The equation BHARi =
∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The mean BHARs are reported and bootstrapped p-values (1000 replications) are shown 
in parentheses. Statistical tests for differences in means are also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, 
** and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within each portfolio. 
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Post-announcement 
Return 
All 
With 
government 
involvement 
Without 
government 
involvement 
Public Private 
Payment 
incl. Stock 
Payment 
without 
stock 
High bidder 
size 
Low bidder 
size 
All -0.0216  -0.0434  -0.0075  -0.1660  -0.0140  0.3139 *** -0.0729 *** -0.1223 *** 0.1092 * 
p-value (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.82)  (0.11)  (0.61)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.07)  
N 822  321  501  41  781  109  713  273  273  
High trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.1679 *** 0.1483 *** 0.1794 *** 0.2160  0.1663 *** 0.3100 *** 0.1329 *** -0.0230  0.4703 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.55)  (0.00)  
N 400  148  252  13  387  79  321  157  104  
Low trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
-0.2011 *** -0.2074 *** -0.1968 *** -0.3434 *** -0.1910 *** 0.3242 ** -0.2414 *** -0.2566 *** -0.1130  
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.18)  
N 422  173  249  28  394  30  392  116  169  
Difference 0.3690 *** 0.3557 *** 0.3762 *** 0.5594 *** 0.3573 *** -0.0142   0.3743 *** 0.2336 *** 0.5832 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.92)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
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Post-announcement 
Return 
High 
relative size 
Low 
relative size 
High 
BTMV 
Low 
BTMV 
High ROA Low ROA Diversifying Focussed 
All 0.1679 *** -0.2011 *** -0.0698  0.0210  0.0333  -0.1204 ** 0.0012  -0.0473  
p-value (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.21)  (0.59)  (0.40)  (0.02)  (0.97)  (0.19)  
N 273  273  273  271  273  274  436  386  
High trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
0.2399 *** 0.0827 ** 0.2169 *** 0.1595 *** 0.1201 *** 0.1862 *** 0.2086 *** 0.1238 *** 
p-value (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 152  135  105  145  146  120  208  192  
Low trailing 12-
month no. of 
mergers 
-0.0771  -0.2494 *** -0.2491 *** -0.1383 ** -0.0665  -0.3592 *** -0.1880 *** -0.2166 *** 
p-value (0.35)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
N 121  138  168  126  127  154  228  194  
Difference 0.3170 *** 0.3322 *** 0.4660 *** 0.2977 *** 0.1867 ** 0.5455 *** 0.3966 *** 0.3404 *** 
p-value (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.02)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
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Table 2.9 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR,  
Post-announcement and Total Window Returns 
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the overall sample. 
“Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the average 5-day CAR for all sample 
mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement. “Trailing 12-
month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of deals made in the 12 months prior 
to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index” is the change in the 
SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days prior to an 
announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the last announcement by the firm 
is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First merger dummy” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first announcement by the bidder in the 
past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three years” is the number of deals 
announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's 
stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period starting one year prior to an announcement. 
“With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if either side 
of a deal (acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and zero otherwise. “Private 
Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a private firm, 
and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment incl. stock” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with some stock; and zero 
otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value as measured one 
month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of the deal value to the 
market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal announcement. “BTMV” 
is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before the deal announcement. 
“ROA” is bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal announcement. 
“Diversifying” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is in a different 
industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC 
code, and zero otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 5-day 
CAR. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHARs. 
All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The p-values shown in parentheses 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” donates the number of 
observations.
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  Overall 
  
5-day CAR 
Post-
announcement 
Returns 
Total Window 
Returns 
Bidder's CAR   -0.6664  **   
   (0.013)    
Trailing 12-month average CAR 0.7751  *** 8.7380  *** 9.0622  *** 
 (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 -0.0004   1.9421  * 1.8965  * 
 (0.996)  (0.075)  (0.084)  
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index 0.0049   0.1589  *** 0.1612  *** 
 (0.337)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
CAR on bidder's last announcement 0.0710   -1.1206   -1.1287   
 (0.416)  (0.113)  (0.114)  
First merger dummy  0.0047   0.0315   0.1074   
 (0.661)  (0.769)  (0.747)  
Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years 0.0036   0.0275   0.0294   
 (0.574)  (0.617)  (0.593)  
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock  0.0024   -0.0852  ** -0.0841  ** 
 (0.718)  (0.018)  (0.022)  
Government involvement 0.0061   0.0467   0.0548   
 (0.341)  (0.440)  (0.371)  
Private target  -0.0002   -0.0850   -0.0848   
 (0.991)  (0.467)  (0.481)  
Subsidiary -0.0045   -0.0244   -0.0287   
 (0.792)  (0.819)  (0.794)  
Payment incl. stock 0.0452  *** 0.1575  * 0.1617  * 
 (0.007)  (0.068)  (0.056)  
Ln(MV)  -0.0062  * -0.1549  *** -0.1573  *** 
 (0.051)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Relative size 0.0019  ** 0.0092  ** 0.0106  ** 
 (0.029)  (0.037)  (0.017)  
BTMV 0.0141   -0.0526   -0.0267   
 (0.220)  (0.635)  (0.810)  
ROA 0.0012  * 0.0189  *** 0.0200  *** 
 (0.086)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Diversifying 0.0008   0.0128   0.0157   
 (0.889)  (0.797)  (0.752)  
Constant 0.0285   0.7738  *** 0.7712  *** 
  (0.358)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
N 822   822   822   
Adj-R2 0.120   0.124   0.140   
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Table 2.10 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR, 
Post-announcement and Total Window Returns – High Market Valuation 
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the high market 
valuation subsample. Hot market valuation is defined follow Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
(2009) using the top quarter of the monthly Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (i.e., 
SHComp) index detrended P/E ratio. “Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the 
average 5-day CAR for all sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days 
to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of 
deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on 
SHComp index” is the change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and 
ending three days prior to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the 
last announcement by the firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First 
merger dummy” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first 
announcement by the bidder in the past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three 
years” is the number of deals announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-
month BHAR on bidder's stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period starting one year 
prior to an announcement. “With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes 
the value of 1 if either side of a deal (acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and 
zero otherwise. “Private Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is 
targeted at a private firm, and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment 
incl. stock” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with 
some stock; and zero otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market 
value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of 
the deal value to the market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal 
announcement. “BTMV” is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before the 
deal announcement. “ROA” is bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal 
announcement. “Diversifying” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is 
in a different industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit 
Primary SIC code, and zero otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to 
calculate 5-day CAR. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to 
calculate BHARs. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The p-values 
shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance 
at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” 
donates the number of observations.
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  High Market Valuation 
  
5-day CAR 
Post-
announcement 
Returns 
Total Window 
Returns 
Bidder's CAR   -0.1637     
   (0.677)    
Trailing 12-month average CAR -0.7564   -10.7935   -10.7111   
 (0.509)  (0.131)  (0.140)  
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 0.4909  * 5.5481  *** 5.6808  *** 
 (0.100)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index -0.0178   0.0456   0.0394   
 (0.202)  (0.442)  (0.503)  
CAR on bidder's last announcement 0.0212   0.3895   0.3129   
 (0.922)  (0.696)  (0.742)  
First merger dummy  0.0519   -0.1253   -0.1262   
 (0.186)  (0.386)  (0.412)  
Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years 0.0229   -0.1163   -0.1181   
 (0.331)  (0.237)  (0.259)  
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock  0.0110   -0.1403  *** -0.1397  *** 
 (0.280)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Government involvement -0.0007   0.0073   0.0032   
 (0.968)  (0.920)  (0.966)  
Private target  -0.0002   -0.0162   -0.0219   
 (0.995)  (0.884)  (0.836)  
Subsidiary -0.0055   0.0428   0.0442   
 (0.868)  (0.694)  (0.669)  
Payment incl. stock 0.0703  ** 0.3579  ** 0.4025  *** 
 (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.007)  
Ln(MV)  -0.0156  * -0.0729  ** -0.0801  ** 
 (0.073)  (0.025)  (0.016)  
Relative size 0.0012   -0.0049   -0.0041   
 (0.371)  (0.303)  (0.438)  
BTMV -0.0161   0.3531  * 0.3953  * 
 (0.674)  (0.083)  (0.072)  
ROA 0.0003   0.0220  *** 0.0228  *** 
 (0.753)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Diversifying -0.0089   0.0961   0.0861   
 (0.537)  (0.132)  (0.194)  
Constant 0.0770   0.0266   0.0795   
  (0.310)   (0.919)   (0.773)   
N 158    158    158    
Adj-R2 0.074    0.285    0.307    
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Table 2.11 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR,  
Post-announcement and Total Window Returns – Low Market Valuation 
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the low market 
valuation subsample. Low market valuation is defined follow Bouwman, Fuller and Nain 
(2009) using the bottom quartier of the monthly Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite (i.e., 
SHComp) index detrended P/E ratio. “Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the 
average 5-day CAR for all sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days 
to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of 
deals made in the 12 months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on 
SHComp index” is the change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and 
ending three days prior to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the 
last announcement by the firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First 
merger dummy” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first 
announcement by the bidder in the past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three 
years” is the number of deals announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-
month BHAR on bidder's stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period starting one year 
prior to an announcement. “With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes 
the value of 1 if either side of a deal (acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and 
zero otherwise. “Private Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is 
targeted at a private firm, and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment 
incl. stock” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with 
some stock; and zero otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market 
value as measured one month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of 
the deal value to the market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal 
announcement. “BTMV” is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before the 
deal announcement. “ROA” is bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal 
announcement. “Diversifying” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is 
in a different industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit 
Primary SIC code, and zero otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to 
calculate 5-day CAR. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to 
calculate BHARs. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The p-values 
shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance 
at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” 
donates the number of observations.
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  Low Market Valuation 
  
5-day CAR 
Post-announcement 
Returns 
Total Window 
Returns 
Bidder's CAR   -0.3070    
   (0.749)    
Trailing 12-month average CAR -1.1532  51.1825 *** 46.7039 *** 
 (0.166)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 1.0786 ** -7.8646  -4.2729  
 (0.025)  (0.457)  (0.683)  
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index 0.0747 * -0.8495  -0.5459  
 (0.099)  (0.387)  (0.583)  
CAR on bidder's last announcement -0.1724  0.2663  -0.1683  
 (0.304)  (0.921)  (0.949)  
First merger dummy  0.0120  0.5046  0.5211 * 
 (0.554)  (0.108)  (0.092)  
Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years 0.0109  0.2220  0.2370  
 (0.400)  (0.192)  (0.157)  
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock  -0.0176  0.1819  0.2027  
 (0.502)  (0.587)  (0.556)  
Government involvement 0.0086  0.3046 * 0.3311 ** 
 (0.498)  (0.055)  (0.037)  
Private target  0.0226  -0.2055  -0.1987  
 (0.420)  (0.392)  (0.418)  
Subsidiary 0.0066  0.1598  0.1290  
 (0.800)  (0.466)  (0.558)  
Payment incl. stock 0.0014  -0.1553  -0.1711  
 (0.983)  (0.697)  (0.659)  
Ln(MV)  -0.0122 * -0.2284 *** -0.2491 *** 
 (0.056)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Relative size 0.0018  0.0099  0.0136  
 (0.311)  (0.385)  (0.228)  
BTMV 0.0361  -0.0861  -0.0202  
 (0.105)  (0.704)  (0.929)  
ROA 0.0029 * 0.0302 * 0.0355 ** 
 (0.057)  (0.092)  (0.044)  
Diversifying -0.0121  0.1381  0.1346  
 (0.273)  (0.363)  (0.374)  
Constant -0.0374  1.1124  0.9540  
  (0.481)   (0.176)   (0.232)   
N 180   180   180   
Adj-R2 0.046   0.152   0.174   
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Table 2.12 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR, 
 Post-announcement and Total Window Returns – High BTMV Bidders 
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the high BTMV 
bidders subsample. “BTMV” is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before 
the deal announcement. We categorize bidders with the top-tertile BTMV as “High BTMV 
Bidders”. “Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the average 5-day CAR for all 
sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement. 
“Trailing 12-month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of deals made in the 12 
months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index” is the 
change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days prior 
to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the last announcement by the 
firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First merger dummy” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first announcement by the bidder in the 
past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three years” is the number of deals 
announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's 
stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period starting one year prior to an announcement. 
“With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if either side 
of a deal (acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and zero otherwise. “Private 
Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a private firm, 
and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment incl. stock” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with some stock; and zero 
otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value as measured one 
month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of the deal value to the 
market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal announcement. “ROA” is 
bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal announcement. “Diversifying” 
is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is in a different industry to the 
bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code, and zero 
otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 5-day CAR. The 
equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHARs. All variables 
are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The p-values shown in parentheses are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” donates the number of observations.
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  High BTMV Bidders 
  
5-day CAR 
Post-
announcement 
Returns 
Total Window 
Returns 
Bidder's CAR   -0.6408     
   (0.303)    
Trailing 12-month average CAR 0.2695   20.0427  *** 19.5889  *** 
 (0.535)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 0.2610  * 1.3073   1.6586   
 (0.097)  (0.537)  (0.425)  
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index 0.0019   0.2870  *** 0.2935  *** 
 (0.882)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
CAR on bidder's last announcement 0.8230   -0.9494   -0.9657   
 (0.823)  (0.522)  (0.508)  
First merger dummy  -0.0096   0.0507   0.0684   
 (0.609)  (0.802)  (0.731)  
Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years -0.0049   0.0519   0.0590   
 (0.670)  (0.600)  (0.545)  
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock  0.0193   -0.2810  * -0.2748  * 
 (0.324)  (0.057)  (0.065)  
Government involvement 0.0127   0.0924   0.1092   
 (0.169)  (0.442)  (0.363)  
Private target  -0.0140   -0.2464   -0.2380   
 (0.521)  (0.193)  (0.221)  
Subsidiary -0.0040   -0.1801   -0.1884   
 (0.846)  (0.256)  (0.248)  
Payment incl. stock 0.0364   -0.0042   -0.0146   
 (0.177)  (0.982)  (0.938)  
Ln(MV)  -0.0062   -0.2492  *** -0.2569  *** 
 (0.175)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Relative size 0.0021   0.0184  * 0.0220  ** 
 (0.101)  (0.056)  (0.031)  
ROA 0.0035  *** 0.0310  *** 0.0335  *** 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  
Diversifying 0.0095   0.1536   0.1657   
 (0.291)  (0.135)  (0.107)  
Constant 0.0166   1.3940  *** 1.3886  *** 
 (0.706)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
N 273    273    273    
Adj-R2 0.157    0.126    0.148    
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Table 2.13 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Bidder 5-day CAR, 
Post-announcement and Total Window Returns – Low BTMV Bidders 
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the high BTMV 
bidders subsample. “BTMV” is bidder’s book to market value as measured one month before 
the deal announcement. We categorize bidders with the bottom-tertile BTMV as “Low 
BTMV Bidders”. “Trailing 12-month average CAR” is calculated as the average 5-day CAR 
for all sample mergers made in the 12 months prior and ending 3 days to an announcement. 
“Trailing 12-month no. of mergers” is calculated as the total number of deals made in the 12 
months prior to an announcement. “Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index” is the 
change in the SHComp value-weighted index starting one year and ending three days prior 
to an announcement. “CAR on bidder’s last announcement” is the last announcement by the 
firm is for the most recent deal within the past three years. “First merger dummy” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is the first announcement by the bidder in the 
past 3 years. “Number of mergers by firm in the last three years” is the number of deals 
announced by the bidder in the prior three years. “Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's 
stock” is the bidder’s BHAR during the period starting one year prior to an announcement. 
“With government involvement” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if either side 
of a deal (acquirer or target) contains any state-ownership, and zero otherwise. “Private 
Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is targeted at a private firm, 
and zero otherwise. “Subsidiary Deals” is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
deal is targeted at a subsidiary firm, and zero otherwise. “Payment incl. stock” is a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is financed at least with some stock; and zero 
otherwise. “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value as measured one 
month before the deal announcement. “Relative size” is the ratio of the deal value to the 
market value of the bidder as measured one month before the deal announcement. “ROA” is 
bidder’s return on assets as measured one year before the deal announcement. “Diversifying” 
is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the target is in a different industry to the 
bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code, and zero 
otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 5-day CAR. The 
equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHARs. All variables 
are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The p-values shown in parentheses are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” donates the number of observations. 
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  Low BTMV Bidders 
  
5-day CAR 
Post-
announcement 
Returns 
Total Window 
Returns 
Bidder's CAR   -1.2866  ***   
   (0.003)    
Trailing 12-month average CAR 1.6554  *** 3.7056   3.7181   
 (0.003)  (0.504)  (0.502)  
Trailing 12-month no. of mergers/1000 -0.3502  ** 3.7894  ** 3.7275  * 
 (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.054)  
Trailing 12-month return on SHComp index 0.0093   0.1167  ** 0.1135  ** 
 (0.263)  (0.020)  (0.022)  
CAR on bidder's last announcement 0.0244   -1.9571   -2.0440   
 (0.893)  (0.108)  (0.105)  
First merger dummy  0.0649  ** 0.0617   0.0090   
 (0.042)  (0.740)  (0.962)  
Number of mergers by firm in the last 3 years 0.0491  ** 0.0431   0.0113   
 (0.049)  (0.721)  (0.926)  
Trailing 12-month BHAR on bidder's stock  0.0033   -0.0596   -0.0616   
 (0.736)  (0.184)  (0.169)  
Government involvement 0.0024   0.0451   0.0457   
 (0.854)  (0.634)  (0.637)  
Private target  0.0884   0.0166   -0.0628   
 (0.184)  (0.952)  (0.811)  
Subsidiary 0.0830   0.0170   -0.0606   
 (0.207)  (0.949)  (0.808)  
Payment incl. stock 0.0851  *** 0.1962   0.1622   
 (0.003)  (0.128)  (0.189)  
Ln(MV)  -0.0070   -0.1025  ** -0.0959  ** 
 (0.266)  (0.013)  (0.020)  
Relative size -0.0004   0.0064   0.0074   
 (0.764)  (0.229)  (0.180)  
ROA 0.0001   0.0107  * 0.0113  * 
 (0.866)  (0.060)  (0.053)  
Diversifying -0.0021   0.0554   0.0502   
 (0.868)  (0.457)  (0.506)  
Constant -0.0738   0.1738   0.2390   
 (0.407)  (0.722)  (0.632)  
N 271    271    271    
Adj-R2 0.118    0.158    0.156    
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the scale of M&As increased dramatically in China, going from 
US$13.68 billion (162 deals) in 2001 to US$177.21 billion (2,771 deals) in 2010. This 
increase in merger activity has been accompanied by a surge in demand for financial services 
from investment banks. Among transactions for which advisory information was disclosed, 
investment banks advised on 17.6% of deals in 2011, which was up from 4.5% one year 
earlier.26 
 
The investment banking industry is highly hierarchical; for this reason, market share league 
tables are widely publicized by both the media and the investment banks themselves. In 
addition, the selection of investment banks by clients is driven primarily by their perceived 
reputation, and both academics and practitioners have come to view reputation as a measure 
of expertise. However, most earlier empirical studies of the US market fail to find support 
for this intuitive reputation-quality mechanism. Rather, the only positive relationship found 
between the reputation of the acquiring firm’s investment bank and the acquiring firm’s 
returns is for tender offers (Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003)) and public acquisitions (Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2012)); a negative or at best insignificant relationship is reported for 
M&As overall (Bowers and Miller (1990), Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991), McLaughin 
(1990) and (1992), Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and 
Ismail (2010)), which casts doubt on the reputational capital mechanism in merger advisory 
services.  
 
Motivated by both the conflicting findings in the financial intermediation literature and the 
rise of the Chinese investment banking industry, we aim to address the following questions 
                                                     
26  Source: ChinaVenture, China Investment Banking League Table & Report – 2010, China 
Investment Banking League Table & Report – 2011, and Annual Statistics & Analysis of China's 
M&As – 2010. 
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in this study: Does the reputational capital mechanism also fail in the Chinese domestic 
market for merger advisory services in the short run? If not, does investment bank reputation 
have a long-term effect on the outcomes of acquiring firms? Are top-tier investment banks 
simply employed as “execution houses” that undertake deals as instructed by their clients? 
How do top-tier investment banks influence the time to deal completion?  
 
To investigate the relationship between investment bank reputation and the quality of their 
merger advisory services and to examine the role of investment banks in Chinese domestic 
M&As, we employ a sample of public, private, and subsidiary M&As announced between 1 
January 2002 and 31 August 2010 that involve acquirers listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our study includes two important departures from previous 
research.  
 
The first important departure is that we argue that previous researchers do not document a 
significant relationship between investment bank reputation and bidder returns because they 
fail to consider the “equilibrium effect" between the total value and total number of 
transactions when measuring investment banks’ market shares as a proxy for expertise. For 
example, we find that in many of the yearly league tables that measure market share based 
on the total value of transactions, a significant proportion of the top-tier investment banks 
represents a small number of deals with extremely high transaction values. In this sense, the 
reputational measurement primarily captures the deals conducted by large bidders because 
large bidders are more capable of undertaking acquisitions with extremely high transaction 
values. In other words, measuring market shares based on the total value of transactions 
biases the reputation measure towards large bidders, which might explain the long-standing 
question of “why does the intuitive reputation-quality mechanism fail for M&As overall but 
hold for public acquisitions?” The reason is that public acquisitions are often conducted by 
large acquirers who have the ability to execute deals with high transaction values. 27 
                                                     
27 For instance, the average transaction value for public acquisitions in our sample is US$1083.88 
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Therefore, this measurement of advisor reputation is a more appropriate proxy for large 
acquirers than it is for smaller acquirers. Conversely, when the yearly league table is 
constructed using the total number of transactions as a measure of market capitalization, the 
top-tier investment banks are often associated with relatively small total transaction values, 
and as a result, measuring market shares based on the total number of transactions tends to 
bias reputation towards small bidders. 
 
Consequently, we argue that measuring reputation using either total value or total number of 
transactions alone does not give a truly accurate proxy for ability. To further explore this 
premise, we classify top-tier investment banks based on the total value of transactions they 
advised in the previous year and based on the total number of transactions they advised in 
the previous year. We find that the coefficients on both estimates are insignificant in their 
respective regressions.28 As a result, we argue that to construct a more appropriate proxy 
for expertise, we need to balance the reputational effect between large and small bidders – 
the so-called “equilibrium effect”. To account for this “equilibrium effect”, we first 
download from Thomson One Banker the yearly top-25 investment bank league tables 
according to the total value of transactions on which the banks advised for a sample of M&A 
transactions targeting China. In doing so, we focus on the top-25 advisors with the most 
significant market shares based on the total value of deals they advised. Then, to balance the 
reputational effect between large and small bidders, we re-rank these investment banks 
according to the total number of transactions they advised, and a deal is classified as being 
advised by a top-tier investment bank if its advisor is within the top-10 investment banks in 
the previous year’s league table. Indeed, we find strong support for our proposition. By 
accounting for the “equilibrium effect” when measuring advisor reputation, we find a 
positive effect of bidder investment bank reputation on bidder returns. This effect is 
                                                     
million, which is significantly larger than that for private acquisitions (US$325.59 million). 
28 The annual investment bank league tables based on the total value and total number of transactions 
that they advised in the previous year, as well as the results for their respective cross-sectional OLS 
regressions are available upon request. 
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economically significant: in a regression of bidder 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR(-1, +1)) on top-tier investment bank reputation, controlling for bidder- and deal-
specific characteristics and year effects, the coefficient for top-tier investment bank 
reputation is 2.98%.  
 
To further extend this study, we also examine the sources of top-tier gains. We find that the 
time from announcement to completion is significantly longer for acquisitions advised by 
top-tier investment banks than for those advised by their non-top-tier counterparts. This 
result supports the “diligent advisor” hypothesis proposed by Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012). Specifically, given that top-tier investment banks have more reputational 
capital at stake, they might take more time to carefully evaluate the terms of transactions and 
to negotiate favourable terms for their clients. Moreover, the deal completion rate is 
insignificantly correlated with investment bank reputation. The effect of reputation on deal 
completion likelihood seems to result from the trade-off between two of our proposed 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that top-tier investment banks are trustworthy and more 
skilled at turning away bad deals, even if their advisory fees are largely contingent on deal 
completion. (i.e., the “preventing poor deals” hypothesis). The second hypothesis is that top-
tier investment banks are more skilled at completing deals, especially deals involving greater 
difficulties in completion (i.e., the “better deal completion skills” hypothesis). Overall, our 
findings are in line with the “superior deal” hypothesis, meaning that the short-term 
improvement associated with certain investment banks stems from their diligence; their 
abilities to identify better targets with higher synergistic gains, negotiate favourable terms 
and facilitate smooth deal execution; and their trustworthiness in rejecting bad deals for their 
clients. We find that when the “equilibrium effect” is considered in the measurement of 
advisor quality, investment bank reputation is relevant to Chinese domestic M&A outcomes 
in the short term, which is inconsistent with prior research that shows no positive relation 
between various measures of advisor quality and M&A returns.  
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In addition to the significantly positive short-term effect of investment bank reputation on 
bidder returns, the second main departure from earlier research is that we further examine 
whether investment bank reputation influences bidder outcomes in the long term. To do so, 
we measure the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the twenty-four-month holding period 
after the deal announcement month (BHAR (0, 24)) and employ the use of bootstrapped t-
statistics to control for the possible positive skewness effect (Barber and Lyon (1997)). In a 
regression of bidder BHAR (0, 24) on top-tier investment bank reputation that controls for 
bidder- and deal-specific characteristics and year effects, we find that the coefficient for top-
tier investment bank reputation is 2.78% but insignificant at conventional levels. Similarly, 
Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) find an insignificant positive effect of acquirer advisor 
reputation on the 3-year BHARs of acquirers starting one month after the acquisition 
completion date adjusted by the BHARs on a reference portfolio. Our findings suggest that 
the short-run positive effect of investment bank reputation on bidder returns dissipates in the 
long run. This is puzzling; why would the reputation-quality mechanism hold in the short 
run but fail in the long run for financial advisory services in the Chinese domestic market? 
Given that we find the average bidder BHAR (0, 24) on transactions advised by top-tier 
investment banks to be significantly different from zero (15.8%) and insignificantly lower 
than that observed for deals advised by non-top-tier investment banks (24.1%), one plausible 
answer to this question is that the positive but insignificant reputational effect on bidder 
returns in the long term may not result from top-tier investment banks’ inability to conduct 
better mergers but rather from the complexity in the integration processes, which may cancel 
out the positive reputational effect in the long term.  
 
This study provides important contributions to the M&A and investment banking 
intermediation literature. First, to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the 
influence of investment bank reputation on bidder returns in Chinese M&As; previous 
studies have focussed primarily on the US and Australian markets. Second, we provide 
evidence of the importance of balancing the reputational effect between large and small 
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bidders when measuring financial advisor reputation, which entails taking into account the 
“equilibrium effect” between the total value and total number of transactions when 
constructing investment bank league tables. More specifically, we find that using either the 
total value or the total number of transactions alone does not yield a truly appropriate proxy 
for ability because it tends to bias the reputation measurement towards either large or small 
bidders. Third, based on our classification of top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks, we 
provide new evidence on the effect of financial advisor reputation on bidder outcomes. This 
is the first study to document a significantly positive short-term effect of bidder investment 
bank reputation on bidder returns in M&As and to show that top-tier investment bank 
improvements stem from their superior skills, diligence and trustworthiness. Finally, we find 
that the effect of bidder investment bank reputation on bidder outcomes is positive but 
insignificant in the long term and suggest that this result might be attributable to the 
complexity of the integration process, which may ultimately eradicate the positive 
reputational effect. 
 
Our results also have important real-world implications. For example, we provide support 
for the intuitive reputation-quality mechanism and present a novel methodology for the 
construction of financial advisor league tables for M&As. In doing so, we offer acquiring 
firms incentives and useful guidance in selecting the most appropriate investment banks for 
financial advisory services and encourage investment banks to act in the best interest of their 
clients to protect their reputational capital. 
 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and methodology, and reports the 
summary statistics. Section 3.4 examines the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder 
short- and long-term returns, deal completion and time to resolution. Finally, Section 3.5 
concludes the study.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework for Reputation, Price and Quality Model 
 
The reputation, price, and quality model was first introduced in the markets for products and 
for raising capital. Regarding product markets, Shapiro (1983) suggests that a firm sells its 
product to customers repeatedly and develops “a good reputation if consumers believe its 
products to be high quality.” In addition, Klein and Leffler (1981) and Allen (1984) imply 
that the desire to build a good reputation provides firms offering high-quality products with 
greater incentive to provide these high-quality goods in future. This incentive exists because 
firms can sell higher-quality products at higher prices (i.e., prices above the average cost of 
production) and consequently generate greater future cash flows. 
 
In capital raising, financial intermediaries act as information producers or middlemen whose 
function is to certify the value of securities for issuers. Although issuing firms have more 
private information regarding the value of their respective securities than financial 
intermediaries do, financial intermediaries have an incentive to build reputations for 
providing accurate valuation information because they come to the market much more often 
than issuers do. Hence, differing abilities to provide accurate valuation information will 
result in variations in reputational capital among financial intermediaries (Beatty and Ritter 
(1986), Booth and Smith (1986), and Titman and Trueman (1986)). 
 
Although there is no clear definition of investment bank reputation in M&As, we believe 
that models of reputation, price and quality in both product markets and capital raising can 
provide useful guidance for studying reputation building by investment banks that advise on 
M&As, for two reasons.  
 
First, as suggested by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), the quality of investment bank 
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services is ex-ante unobservable, and banks must sell their services to clients repeatedly, 
similar to competitors in product markets. Second, as in capital raising, investment banks 
help their clients to identify potential targets (bidders) and to evaluate stand-alone and 
combined values. In addition, investment banks go beyond information valuation and assist 
clients by proposing methods for obtaining synergies. (Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003)) Indeed, 
Chemmanur and Fulgjieri (1994) model the relationship among reputation, quality and price 
specifically for equity underwriting services and find that high-reputation investment banks 
provide better quality services and charge higher fees. The authors also suggest that their 
findings could be extended to other situations in financial markets in which investment banks 
act as intermediaries.  
 
3.2.2 Role of Investment Banks in M&As  
 
To understand the possible sources of correlation between reputation, price and quality, it is 
important to understand the role that advisors play in M&A deals. Prior studies suggest that 
financial advisors perform two distinct roles in M&As (McLaughlin (1990) and (1992)).  
 
First, investment banks help to identify potential targets (bidders) and/or to evaluate stand-
alone and combined values of bidder and target; in doing so, investment banks help to 
structure mergers with higher expected synergies for a given bidder-target pair. Second, 
investment banks provide their clients with strategic advice in takeover contests. This 
strategic advice is intended to benefit their clients at the expense of the clients’ opponents 
(Brealey and Myers (2000)). For instance, strategic advice for bidders includes the 
construction of offers that ensure deal completion at the lowest possible offer price. For 
target firms, strategic advice varies from the deployment of takeover defences to the search 
for alternative suitors to increase target firms’ takeover premiums.  
 
If investment banks perform both roles well, they will improve their respective reputations 
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and market shares by attracting more and bigger clients in the future and will collect larger 
fees. However, the actual level of investment bank involvement in acquisitions can vary 
significantly across transactions, although it generally falls into one of three categories: 
bank-initiated, client-initiated, or fixated-client acquisitions. 
 
In bank-initiated acquisitions, the investment bank is involved in identifying potential targets 
(bidders) and providing strategic advice. In client-initiated acquisitions, the client proposes 
an acquisition but relies on the investment bank to determine whether the deal is worth 
pursuing. Hence, in both of these categories, investment banks are in charge of both deal 
selection and negotiation. In fixated-client acquisitions, the acquirer selects the target, and it 
is the responsibility of the investment bank to ensure deal completion at the lowest possible 
offer price. 
 
Given the variation in involvement levels, the two most well-known hypotheses are used to 
explain the systematic differences in acquisition outcomes. 
 
1) Skilled-advice hypothesis: certain investment banks possess the ability to select deals 
(for bank-initiated acquisitions) or to negotiate deals (for bank-initiated, client-initiated, 
and fixated-client acquisitions). However, the difference between top-tier and non-top-
tier investment banks stems from the ability to identify bad deals combined with the 
trustworthiness to turn them down. The term “skilled-advice” thus includes three 
qualities of investment banks: the ability to identify better targets (bidders), the ability to 
negotiate favourable terms, and the trustworthiness to turn away value-destructing 
acquisitions.  
 
2) Deal completion hypothesis: because investment banks’ advisory fees are contingent 
upon deal completion, their main incentive is to ensure deal completion rather than to 
create value for their clients (for bank-initiated, client-initiated, and fixated-client 
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acquisitions). 
 
3.2.3 Measure of Investment Bank Reputation 
 
Earlier researchers have proposed several different measures of reputation. Carter and 
Manaster (1990) measure reputation based on an investment bank’s position in tombstone 
advertisements for IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) employ market share as a continuous 
measure of reputation. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) find that continuous market share and 
tombstone rankings are highly correlated in the IPO market. Other researchers classify 
investment bank reputation into various tiers, usually two (Bowers and Miller (1990); 
Servaes and Zenner (1996), Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003), Ismail (2010), and Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2012)) or three (Rau (2000) and Saunders and Srinivasan (2001)), 
based on their share of the market for corporate takeovers. Market share is measured as the 
investment bank’s share of the total value of transactions or the total number of transactions 
in the previous year, in the year of the transaction, or across the entire sample period. In 
addition to tier classifications, Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) consider the relative reputations 
of the target advisor (TREP) and the bidder advisor (BREP) based on their respective market 
shares in the year of the takeover. Bao and Edamns (2011) argue that prior studies that 
measure quality based on market share or prestige and correlate that measure of quality with 
investment bank performance based on M&A returns will find significant results only if their 
chosen measures are truly accurate proxies of ability. Bao and Edamns (2011) employ a 
fixed-effect analysis instead. 
 
3.2.4 The Effect of Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder (Target) 
Returns in M&As 
 
The effect of investment bank reputation on bidder (target) returns in M&As has received a 
fair amount of attention in the prior literature. Bowers and Miller (1990) find that high-
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reputation investment banks have the ability to identify better mergers because the combined 
wealth gain to the acquirer and the target is larger when either the bidder or the target 
employs a first-tier investment bank. However, first-tier investment banks do not provide 
any bargaining advantage that allows capturing a greater share of the synergy gains. 
 
Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991) conclude that investment bank reputation has a positive 
influence on the likelihood of deal completion and on investment banks market share, but 
not on their clients’ stock returns. For example, they find that deals advised by Drexel 
Burnham Lambert (a non-top-tier advisor) outperform those advised by bulge-bracket 
advisors in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns. 
 
McLaughlin (1992) reports that bidders employing top-tier investment banks pay 
significantly higher premiums and enjoy lower abnormal returns in tender offers. However, 
the author argues that even if investment banks are motivated by fee income, they might not 
want to increase the acquisition price because doing so would reduce the value of their 
reputation capital and would not win future mandates. 
 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) investigate the role of investment banks in M&As in the US 
market between 1981 and 1992 and find that bidders are more likely to employ investment 
banks for transactions that involve a hostile bids or large transaction values, as well when 
the bidder has less prior acquisition experience. In contrast, targets are more likely to retain 
investment banks when the contest is complex (e.g., when it involves litigation or the use of 
a poison pill) and when either the target or bidder is large. They show no benefit to hiring an 
advisor or a top-tier advisor compared with executing a deal in-house. However, they caveat 
their conclusion by acknowledging that “it is not certain that the (deal characteristics) 
affecting investment banking choice are exogenous. For example, it is possible that 
investment banks influence the form of payment or the decision to pursue the acquisition.” 
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Rau (2000) suggests that financial advisors have strong deal completion incentives because 
their advisory fees are partially contingent on deal completion and that advisors’ reputations 
depend on the number of deals they complete. Moreover, he finds that top-tier financial 
advisors do not construct better mergers for bidders as measured by their cumulative 
abnormal returns. Nevertheless, in tender offers, the acquirers advised by top-tier investment 
banks earned higher abnormal returns than did those advised by non-top-tier banks, and the 
reason for this might be that investment banks’ incentives to act in their clients’ interests are 
far stronger in public acquisitions, where “honest” advice to withdraw from a deal is widely 
reported. 
 
On the contrary, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) show that investment bank reputation is 
negatively correlated with bidder abnormal returns in pubic acquisitions. They find that top-
tier investment banks are more likely to complete deals and that the time to completion for 
top-tier investment banks is much shorter than that for lower-tier investment banks. The deal 
completion rate is unlikely to be driven by the value of the advisory fees; however, increasing 
the number of advisors on either side of the deal adds complexity, and in this case, the time 
to deal completion becomes significantly longer and a greater portion of the advisory fees is 
contingent upon deal completion. 
 
Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) employ a relative reputation measurement in their investigation 
of tender offers in US from 1981 to 1994 and find that the reputation of the bidder’s 
investment bank is positively related to the probability of bid success. They provide evidence 
to suggest that bidder returns, total synergy gains, and the proportion of total synergies 
accruing to the bidder increase with the relative reputation of the bidder’s investment bank. 
In addition, bidders that retain more prestigious investment banks are more likely to 
withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers. 
 
Bao and Ismail (2010) document a significant investment bank fixed effect on the 
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announcement returns of M&As. By regressing cumulative abnormal returns on bank fixed 
effects for all investment banks that advised on at least 10 deals over 1980-2007 while 
controlling for time effects, they find that the inter-quartile range of bank fixed effects is 
1.26%, compared with a full sample average return of 0.72%. They find that their results 
remain significant after controlling for the component of returns attributable to the acquirer 
and hence support the skilled advice hypothesis. In addition, they suggest that clients do not 
chase past returns in M&As due either to rational lock-in or to an inefficient failure to learn 
because differences in average returns across investment banks are persistent over time and 
are predictable based on prior performance. 
 
Finally, Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) use a large and comprehensive sample of US 
acquisitions from 1996 to 2009 and find that top-tier investment banks deliver higher bidder 
returns than non-top-tier banks do, but only in public acquisitions. They argue that this result 
arises because investment banks’ incentives to protect their reputational capital is more 
pronounced in public acquisitions, given that the deal is closely followed by the market and 
the media, listed targets have greater bargaining power, and public acquisitions involve 
increased complexity. In addition, they find that the top-tier investment bank improvements 
stem from their ability to identify more synergetic combinations and to obtain a larger share 
of the synergies for their clients.    
 
On the whole, the prior findings on the relationship between investment bank reputation and 
bidder returns in M&As have been controversial and cast doubt on the reputation-quality 
mechanism in the market for corporate control. 
 
3.2.5 Hypotheses Development 
 
Investment banks have been considered information-producing intermediaries in the context 
of M&As. In theory, more reputable investment banks should provide higher quality services 
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and charge higher fees. Although most prior studies have consistently found that more 
reputable investment banks receive higher fees than their less reputable counterparts do 
(McLaughlin (1990), Saunders and Srinivasan (2001), and Walter, Yawaon and Yeung 
(2008)), the relationship between investment bank reputation and the quality of services 
provided has been less clear. Most previous studies suggest that investment bank reputation 
has a negative effect or, at best, no effect on bidder returns. For example, Michel, Shaked 
and Lee (1991) find that investment bank reputation has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of deal completion and on bank market share but not on client returns. McLaughlin (1992) 
reports that bidders that employ top-tier investment banks in tender offers pay significantly 
higher premiums and enjoy lower abnormal returns. Servaes and Zenner (1996) conclude 
that clients are more likely to employ an investment bank when the deal is more complex 
but gain no benefit from hiring a top-tier advisor.  
 
However, more recent work on this subject has revealed a positive relationship between 
bidder investment bank reputation and bidder returns in both tender offers and public deals, 
as well as a bank fixed effect in M&As overall. Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) employ a relative 
reputation measurement and find that in tender offers, this measurement is positively related 
to the probability of bid success, bidder returns, total synergy gains, and the proportion of 
total synergies accruing to the bidder. They also discover that bidders with more prestigious 
investment banks are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers. 
Bao and Edmans (2011) reveal a significant investment bank fixed effect in M&A 
announcement returns and find that certain banks persistently outperform others over time 
and that future bank performance can be predicted based on past performance. Additionally, 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) find that top-tier investment banks deliver higher 
bidder returns than do non–top-tier banks only in public acquisitions, suggesting that 
reputation is more pronounced in public acquisitions and that such acquisitions require 
greater skill and effort. The authors also demonstrate that the improvement associated with 
top-tier banks is due to their ability to identify more synergetic combinations and to obtain 
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a larger share of synergies for their bidder clients. We focus on the more recent findings and 
develop our hypotheses based on a variation of the model developed by Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994). In our model, high-quality investment banks are more skilled at reducing 
the adverse impact of information asymmetry for their acquirer clients and charge higher 
advisory fees. Assuming that investors immediately discount for the advisory fees at deal 
announcement, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I – “superior deal” hypothesis: Investment bank reputation is positively related 
to bidder returns in the short term, with no long-term reversal. 
 
In addition, Bao and Edmans (2011) state that an investment bank can complete more deals 
either by advising acquirers to overpay for target firms to win bidding auctions and overcome 
target management resistance or by skilfully negotiating regulatory and antitrust hurdles. 
The authors suggest that a bidder that has concerns about deal completion, due either to 
managerial self-interest or to a desire to create value for shareholders, may consider the 
likelihood of deal completion to be an important characteristic of investment banks. 
Similarly, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) state that the ability to complete deals is 
important from an acquirer’s perspective if it considers the acquisition to be an important 
component of its long-run strategy. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II – “better deal completion skills” hypothesis: Investment bank reputation is 
positively related to the likelihood of deal completion. 
 
Unlike Rau’s (2000) conclusion that investment banks can either “focus on completing the 
deal” or “prevent poor deals”, Bao and Edmans (2011) suggest that high-quality banks are 
skilled across multiple dimensions and thus clients may not have to choose between these 
two objectives when selecting advisory banks. Thus, it is also likely that top-tier investment 
banks are more skilled at identifying value-destroying deals and advising against them. In 
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light of these considerations, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis III – “preventing poor deals” hypothesis: Investment bank reputation is 
negatively related to the likelihood of deal completion. 
 
Moreover, as suggested by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), investment banks are 
largely in charge of the negotiation process and thus should have a significant impact on the 
duration of negotiations; however, the predicted relationship between the two is less clear. 
One could argue that because top-tier investment banks have more reputational capital, they 
might take more time to carefully evaluate the terms of transactions and to negotiate 
favourable terms for their clients. However, one could also argue that top-tier investment 
banks possess superior skills and are therefore able to complete deals more efficiently. Based 
on these two arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis IV – “diligent advisor” hypothesis: Investment bank reputation is positively 
related to the length of time between a deal’s announcement and its resolution/completion. 
 
Hypothesis V – “skilled advisor” hypothesis: Investment bank reputation is negatively 
related to the length of time between a deal’s announcement and its resolution/completion. 
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description  
 
We collect a sample of Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 
August 2010 from Thomson One Banker.29 The original sample contains 12,968 deals. 
Deals involving leveraged buyouts, spin offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, 
repurchases and privatizations are excluded, leaving us with 8,335 transactions. Among 
those transactions, we include only successful and unsuccessful deals (leaving us with 3,172 
deals) and require that the bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, which results in a sample of 1,702 deals. We next exclude deals with undisclosed 
transaction values and deals worth less than US$1 million, which yields a sample of 1,187 
transactions. Finally, we require that the bidders have non-missing DataStream codes and 
that the bidder advisor be reported by Thomson One Banker, which results in a final sample 
of 246 deals. Of these M&As, 69 bidders were advised by the top-tier investment banks, and 
177 bidders were advised by non-top-tier investment banks. 
 
We collect a number of informational items regarding the firms and deals from Thomson 
One Banker, including the name, nationality, public status, ultimate parent public status, 
DataStream code and primary industry (as measured by the four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification code) for each acquirer and target; announcement date; effective date; 
withdrawn date; acquirer’s financial advisor; method of payment; deal status; and transaction 
value. Other information relating to the acquirer’s share price, market value, market-to-book 
value, leverage, funds from operations and common shares outstanding, as well as the value-
weighted Shanghai composite index, are obtained from Thomson DataStream. 
 
                                                     
29 Our sample period selection is based on the fact that Chinese domestic M&As started to emerge 
rapidly in 2002. 
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3.3.2 Measure of Advisor Reputation 
 
We first download from Thomson One Banker the yearly top-25 financial advisor league 
tables according to the total value of transactions on which they advised for a sample of 
M&A transactions targeting China during the period 1 January 2001 to 1 January 2009. The 
following criteria are used to construct the league tables: 1) deal size must be US$1 million 
or higher; 2) deals that do not disclose transaction size are excluded; and 3) equity carve-
outs, exchange offers, and open market repurchases are excluded. A number of informational 
items are obtained from the league tables, including the following: 1) rank; 2) financial 
advisor name; 3) ranking value including net debt of target in US$ million; 4) market share; 
and 5) number of deals.  
 
Next, to balance the reputational effect between large and small bidders, we re-rank these 
investment banks according to the number of deals they advised in each year. Table 3.1 
presents the annual top-10 investment bank rankings for all top-tier investment banks. We 
classify the top-10 investment banks as top-tier investment banks and others as non-top-tier 
investment banks. A deal is classified as advised by a top-tier investment bank if its advisor 
is within the top-10 investment banks in the previous year’s league table.   
 
This binary classification is used in the spirit of Fang (2005), who argues that the binary 
classification is justified for two reasons. First, economically, this classification captures the 
two-tiered structure of Wall Street that is widely acknowledged by both the academic 
literature and the financial press. Second, econometrically, this classification is preferable 
because the use of a continuous measure would require the variable to capture reputation 
precisely and to have a constant effect on the dependent variables.  
 
As shown in Table 3.1, there are 34 different top-tier investment banks in our sample period. 
A top-tier investment bank is represented by 1 if it is ranked within the top-10 investment 
banks in a particular year and by 0 otherwise. The most frequent top-tier investment banks 
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involved in Chinese domestic M&As in our sample are Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, 
Goldman Sachs & Co, and China International Capital Co. Unlike prior researchers, who 
find that reputational ranking is stable across years in the US M&A market (e.g., Rau (2000) 
and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)), we find little stability in the annual rankings 
across our sample period for Chinese domestic M&As. For instance, we find that 25 of our 
34 (73.53%) top-tier investment banks are listed in the annual top-10 investment bank 
rankings fewer than four times during the nine-year sample period, which motivates us to 
use the annual investment bank ranking rather than the average investment bank ranking for 
the entire sample period. In addition, for top-tier investment banks that appear in the annual 
top-10 investment bank rankings twice, we observe that 80% of them are listed as top-tier 
investment banks in adjacent years. This two-year stability suggests although our ranking is 
calculated on an annual basis, it captures a reasonable amount of stability in investment bank 
reputation. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1] 
 
Following Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), we also track M&As among investment 
banks themselves to assign the correct reputation to each deal in the sample. For example, 
Huatai Securities Co., Ltd, a top-tier investment bank in 2009, was acquired by United 
Securities Co., Ltd., a non-top-tier investment bank in 2009, to create Huatai United 
Securities Co., Ltd. on 25 August 2009. Hence, we classify deals advised by Huatai United 
Securities Co., Ltd. before 25 August 2010 as advised by a top-tier investment bank, and 
after 25 August 2010 as advised by a non-top-tier investment bank, based on the previous 
year’s league table. 
 
In cases in which multiple investment banks advised on one deal, the deal is classified as 
advised by a top-tier investment bank if at least one of the advisors ranks within the top-10 
group. This approach is standard in prior literature (Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), 
and Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). 
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3.3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.3.1 Short-Term Event Study Methodology 
 
For short-term analysis, we follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event study 
methodology to calculate CARs for a three-day period (-1, +1) surrounding the 
announcement date supplied by Thomson One Banker. We calculate the normal returns of 
the acquirer and the market as follows: 
ri = ln(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
) 
 
Where ri is the daily normal return of firm i. Pi, t and Pi, t-1 Pm, t refer to the daily price index 
for firm i at day t and day t-1, respectively.  
rm = ln(
Pm,t
Pm,t−1
) 
 
where rm is the daily normal return of SHComp index. Pm, t and Pm, t-1 refer to the daily price 
index for the SHComp index at day t and day t-1, respectively.  
 
We note that various methodological approaches are available for the estimation of short-
term abnormal return (AR), including the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) recommended 
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the holding period abnormal return (HPAR) advocated 
by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and the market model suggested by Brown and Warner 
(1985). Given the limitations associated with models such as the CAPM (Roll (1977)) and 
the inclusion of frequent bidders in our sample, we follow Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) and estimate AR using the modified market adjusted model, where AR is defined as 
anything earned above the market return each day, such that the expected return of a stock 
is assumed to be that earned by the market. Hence, the AR on any stock i is determined by 
the difference between its return and the simultaneous return on the market portfolio: 
ARi,t = ri,t − rm,t 
 
 144 
 
Thus, the modified market adjusted model focuses on whether the returns on a given stock 
during the event window are significantly different from the returns on the market at the 
same time (Ma (2004)). Because the market plays an important role in potential firm 
misvaluation, we believe that the market-adjusted model is particularly appropriate for 
estimating ARs in our study. In addition, the modified market adjusted model is consistent 
with the CAPM if all securities have systematic risk of unity (Brown and Warner (1980)).  
 
Finally, we summate ARs to give the 3-day cumulative AR (CAR (-1, +1)) surrounding the 
announcement date: 
CARi = ∑ ARi
t=+1
t=−1
 
 
T-statistics are used to test whether the null hypothesis holds, that is, whether the mean CAR 
is equal to zero for a sample of n firms. The conventional formula to compute t-statistics is 
as follows:  
tCARi =
∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1
(σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) /√n)
 
 
where ∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1  refers to the sample mean and σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) refers to the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviation for the sample of n firms. To assess the strength of the evidence 
against the null hypothesis, we convert t-statistics into probabilities (i.e., p-values), which 
are presented in the results section. The larger the p-value, the weaker the evidence that the 
mean CAR is different from zero; and vice versa. 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Long-Term Methodology 
 
To determine the long-term effect of investment bank reputation on bidder performance, we 
intended to use two of the most well-known models for measuring bidder performance over 
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the long run, the Calendar-Time Portfolio approach (CTPA) and the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR), to overcome the model selection problem. However, because 
some of the portfolio sample sizes in our long-term bidder returns univariate analysis are 
relatively small for top-tier investment banks, we encounter a number of problems when 
implementing the CTPA. Thus, in our case, the BHAR approach is more appropriate for 
assessing long-term bidder performance. In addition, the BHAR approach is widely used in 
the recent literature and is advocated by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) for its accurate 
measurement of the abnormal returns experienced by an investor.  
 
We follow the BHAR approach employed by Buchheim et al. (2001) and measure the returns 
over twenty-four months after the deal announcement month (24-month BHAR). The BHAR 
is computed as the difference between the compounded actual return and the compounded 
predicted return: 
BHARi,t = ∏[1 + Ri,t] −
T
t=0
∏[1 + Rm,t]
T
t=0
 
 
where Ri,t and Rm,t refer to the monthly returns of acquiring firm i and the value-weighted 
SHComp index, respectively, at month t. 
 
Regarding the computation of t-statistics, we note that the BHAR approach is associated 
with a potential positive-skewness problem, whereby it can produce statistically significant 
results even when there is none due to the short-run movement effect. Hence, we implement 
the skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistics procedure used by Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) to compute the statistical significance of BHAR. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is 
given by the formula below: 
tsa = √n (S +
1
3
γ̂S2 +
1
6n
γ̂) 
 
where 
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S =
BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t
σ(BHARt)
 
 
γ̂ =
∑ (BHARit − BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t)
3n
i=1
nσ(BHARt)3
 
 
3.3.4 Empirical Models  
 
Our empirical models aim to test how bidder investment bank reputation affects bidder 
merger outcomes in both the short and long terms; how bidder investment bank reputation 
affect the likelihood of deal completion; and how bidder investment bank reputation affect 
the length of time between deal announcement and deal completion or withdrawal.  
 
3.3.4.1 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank Reputation on 
Bidder CAR or BHAR 
 
In addition to the short- and long-term univariate analyses of the effect of bidder investment 
bank reputation on bidder returns, we examine the advisor reputation-client return 
relationship by conducting cross-sectional regression analysis. This is critical because the 
univariate comparisons could be misleading due to their failure to account for any 
confounding effects (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). We perform multivariate 
regressions that control for various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics to reveal the net 
effect of investment reputation on the variables of interest. Our main variable of interest is 
the Top-Tier Dummy, and all variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. Bidder CARs and 
BHARs are examined in the following multivariate framework:  
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CARs or BHAR =  α + β1 × Top − Tier Dummy + β2 × Ln (Size) 
                          + β3 × Book − to − Market + β4 × Run − Up + β5 × Sigma 
                          + β6 × Leverage + β7 × Cash Flows − to − Equity 
                          + β8 × Relative Size + β9 × Payment incl. Stock Dummy 
       + β10 × Diversifying Deals Dummy                        
                                                  + β11 × Tender Offer Dummy  
+ β12 × State − Owned Dummy      
                                             + β13 × Public Deals Dummy + ∑ γi × Year Dummy + εi 
 
3.3.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank Reputation on 
Deal Completion 
 
We examine whether the top-tier investment banks are employed simply as “execution 
houses” to complete M&As for their clients. To do so, we run the regressions controlling for 
various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics to reveal the net effect of investment 
reputation on deal completion. Our main variable of interest is the Top-Tier Dummy, and all 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. The effect of investment bank reputation on deal 
completion is examined in the following multivariate framework:  
 
Deal completion =  α + β1 × Top − Tier Dummy + β2 × Ln (Size) 
                          + β3 × Book − to − Market + β4 × Run − Up 
+ β5 × Sigma + β6 × Leverage   
                                             + β7 × Cash Flows − to − Equity +  β8 × Relative Size  
        + β9 × Payment incl. Stock Dummy 
                          + β10 × Diversifying Deals Dummy 
                                                   + β11 × Public Deals Dummy + ∑ γi × Year Dummy + εi 
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3.3.4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank Reputation on Time 
to Resolution 
 
We examine the length of time between deal announcement and deal completion or 
withdrawal. This is particularly interesting because the investment banks are largely in 
charge of the negotiation process; thus, we would expect that they have a significant impact 
on the acquisitions’ time to resolution. We run the regressions controlling for various bidder- 
and deal-specific characteristics to reveal the net effect of investment reputation on the time 
to resolution. Our main variable of interest is the Top-Tier Dummy, and all variables are 
defined in Appendix 3.1. The effect of investment bank reputation on time to resolution is 
examined in the following multivariate framework:  
 
Time to resolution =   α +  β1 × Top − Tier Dummy + β2 × Ln (Size) 
                           + β3 × Book − to − Market + β4 × Run − Up 
+ β5 × Sigma + β6 × Leverage 
                                               + β7 × Cash Flows − to − Equity +  β8 × Relative Size 
          + β9 × Payment incl. Stock Dummy 
                                                    + β10 × Diversifying Deals Dummy 
+ β11 × Tender Offer Dummy 
         + β12 × State − Owned Dummy 
         + β13 × Public Deals Dummy + εi 
 
3.3.5 Sensitivity Tests 
 
For robustness reasons, regression results are given after controlling for the year effect, and 
standard errors are reported after controlling for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. We 
winsorize bidder abnormal returns and continuous independent variables at the 1st and 99th 
and 2nd and 98th percentiles to control for potential outliers. To ensure the reliability of our 
results, the short-run event window is extended from 3 days to 5 days around the 
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announcement date (see Tables 3.12 and 3.14), and the long-run event window is shortened 
from 24 months to 12 months after the announcement month (see Tables 3.13 and 3.16). As 
a further check, we follow Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) and rerun our returns 
analysis using a probit model where the dependent variable is one if bidder return is positive 
and zero otherwise (see Tables 3.7 and 3.15, and Tables 3.9 and 3.17). We find that the 
results largely support our main findings, although some coefficients lose their significance 
at conventional levels. 
 
3.3.6 Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the main characteristics of our sample ranked by calendar year. 
The sample comprises all successful and unsuccessful mergers announced in the Chinese 
market between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010 that disclose advisory information and 
involve acquirers that are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges.  
 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
 
We find that both the total number and total value of deals increase dramatically beginning 
in 2005 and peak in 2008, followed by a slight decline in 2009 and a rapid decline in 2010 
as a result of the global economic slowdown. Nevertheless, the total number, total value and 
average value of deals advised by top-tier investment banks are significantly larger than their 
non-top-tier counterparts in 2010, which indicates the increasing demand and importance of 
investment banking advisory services in China. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the industry distribution of M&As for the entire sample and 
separately for top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks. These data indicate that Chinese 
domestic M&As are concentrated primarily in the machinery and business equipment, 
financial and utilities sectors. In addition, top-tier investment banks are most active in the 
financial, utilities and petroleum industry sectors. This result is interesting because M&As 
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in these industry sectors are often associated with greater difficulty and complexity. 
 
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics including the mean, median, and number of 
observations of various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for the entire sample and 
separately for deals with top-tier financial advisors and non-top-tier financial advisors. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. Statistical tests for differences between the means and 
equality of medians for each characteristic for the top-tier and non-top-tier financial advisor 
categories are also presented. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3] 
 
Panel A presents statistics relating to bidder characteristics. The mean (median) acquirer size 
for the entire sample is $US2584.79 million ($US365.57 million). Acquirers advised by top-
tier investment banks ($US5690.15 million) are significantly larger than those advised by 
non-top-tier investment banks ($US1374.22 million). Previous studies also find that the 
mean acquirer size for top-tier investment banks is larger than that for non-top-tier banks 
(Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)) and that bidder announcement returns are 
negatively related to acquiring firm size (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)). 
 
The mean (median) book-to-market ratio for acquirers is 0.30 (0.27) in our overall sample. 
The mean book-to-market ratio of acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks (0.38) 
exhibits significantly higher book-to-market ratio (0.27), which is opposite to the trend found 
in Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). Earlier literature shows that acquirers with higher 
book-to-market ratios experience higher announcement period returns (Dong et al. (2006)). 
 
Both the mean and median acquirer sigmas in our sample are 0.026. The mean sigma for 
acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks (0.023) is significantly lower than that for 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier investment banks (0.026). The same result is found in 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). Moreover, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) 
suggest that high sigmas generate lower announcement period returns in stock acquisitions. 
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The average run-up for the overall sample is 8.8%, and the average acquirer stock price run-
up does not seem to differ between the top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks. This result 
is consistent with that of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). In addition, Rosen (2006) 
suggests that the acquirer stock price run-up is negatively related to acquirer returns in the 
short run. 
 
The mean (median) acquirer leverage for the entire sample is 0.42 (0.34). The difference 
between the average leverage of acquirers for the two tiers of investment banks is 
insignificant (0.33 versus 0.45). Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) find a positive 
relationship between acquiring firm leverage and acquirer gains. 
 
Acquirers in our sample exhibit a mean (average) cash flow-to-equity value of 0.45 (0.16). 
The difference between the average acquirer cash flow-to-equity values for the two 
categories of investment banks is insignificant (0.11 versus 0.58). However, the median cash 
flow-to-equity value for top-tier investment banks (0.219) is significantly higher than that 
for non-top-tier investment banks (0.138). High free cash flow induces empire-building 
acquisitions (Jensen 1986)). In addition, Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) show a negative 
relationship between bidder returns and the cash-flow-to-equity ratio. 
 
State-owned acquirers represent only 4.9% of our sample and none of them employs a top-
tier investment bank.  
 
Panel B presents statistics for deal characteristics. The mean (median) deal value for the 
entire sample is $US405.73 million ($US165.82 million). In contrast to prior studies, the 
mean deal value does not seem to differ between the top-tier and non-top-tier investment 
banks ($US502.77 million versus $US367.90 million, respectively). However, the median 
deal value for top-tier investment banks ($US 281.91 million) is significantly higher than 
that for non-top-tier investment banks ($US134.00 million). Prior works find that both the 
mean and median deal values for top-tier investment banks are higher than those for non-
top-tier investment banks (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). 
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The mean (median) relative size of targets for the entire sample is 17.0% (5.2%). Like 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), we find that the mean for this measure does not 
differ across the two tiers of investment banks (15.7% versus 17.5%). Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) find that acquirer returns decrease with the relative size of the target in 
public acquisitions, whereas the opposite is true for private and subsidiary acquisitions. 
 
Public deals represent 10.6% of our sample. Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos 
(2012), we find that top-tier investment banks (17.4%) are more likely to work on public 
acquisitions than their non-top-tier counterparts (7.9%).  
 
Diversifying deals represent 47.6% of our sample. We find that top-tier investment banks 
(39.1%) work on significantly fewer diversifying deals than their non-top-tier counterparts 
(50.8%). Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that investors respond negatively to 
diversifying acquisitions. However, Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest diversification 
discount is more likely to be a premium when exogenous characteristics that predict the 
decision to diversify is controlled, thus, diversification is a value enhancing strategy for those 
firms that actually pursue it. 
 
Tender offers represent only 2.0% of our sample. Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012), we find that top-tier investment banks (5.8%) work on significantly more 
tender offers than their non-top-tier counterparts do (0.6%).  
 
Acquisitions whose payments include stock represent 68.7% of the overall sample. The 
percentage of top-tier investment banks (71.0%) that advise on acquisitions involving stock 
payments is insignificantly different from that of non-top-tier banks (68.7%). Travlos (1987) 
shows that acquirers offering stock in public acquisitions experience lower returns.  
 
The mean 3-day CAR experienced by acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks is 6.7%, 
which is significantly higher than that experienced by clients advised by non-top-tier 
investment banks (2.9%). The mean 3-day CAR experienced by all acquirers in our sample 
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is 3.9%.  
 
The mean 24-month BHAR does not differ between the groups of investment banks (15.8% 
for acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks and 24.1% for acquirers advised by non-
top-tier banks). For the overall sample, the mean 24-month BHAR for acquirers is 21.8%. 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents the short- and long-run univariate comparison analyses for acquirer 
returns under top-tier and non-top-tier investment portfolios. In addition, we present the 
multivariate regression analyses of acquirer short- and long-term performance on investment 
bank reputation, deal completion on investment bank reputation, and time to bid resolution 
on investment bank reputation. 
 
3.4.1 Univariate Analyses 
 
This section presents the short- and long-run univariate comparison analyses for acquirer 
abnormal returns by bidder- and deal-specific characteristics under top-tier and non-top-tier 
investment banks portfolios. 
 
3.4.1.1 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder CAR 
 
Table 3.4 reports the short-term univariate analysis that examines the relationship between 
the reputations of bidders’ investment banks and bidder returns in various portfolios. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. The average 3-day CAR for acquirers advised by top-
tier and non-top-tier investment banks are computed under a variety of portfolios. Statistical 
tests for the differences in means between top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks for 
each portfolio are presented. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
 
For the overall sample, the mean 3-day CAR for acquirers is 3.9% and is significantly 
positive. The mean 3-day CAR for acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks (6.7%, p-
value=0.000) is significantly higher than that for acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
investment banks (2.9%, p-value=0.000). Prior works document a positive announcement 
effect for acquirers and suggest that merger activities in the Chinese stock market are 
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considered profitable in the aggregate (Chi, Sun and Young (2011) and Zhou et al. (2012)). 
 
We define small, medium and large acquirers as the first, second and third tertile of the 
sample, respectively. For small acquirers, the mean 3-day CAR is 4.4% and significantly 
positive. The mean bidder announcement returns of small acquirers advised by top-tier 
investment banks is significantly higher than that for acquirers advised by non-top-tier banks. 
This outperformance holds for medium and large acquirers. Hence, our results indicate that 
deals advised by top-tier investment banks significantly outperform those advised by non-
top-tier investment banks irrespective of the size of the acquirer.  
 
Additionally, we find that the difference between the number of deals advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier banks is largest when the acquirer is small, whereas the difference is 
smallest when the acquirer is large. Although small bidders experience the highest 
announcement period abnormal returns when they employ top-tier advisors, they are also the 
least likely to be advised by top-tier advisors. Large bidders are the most likely to be advised 
by top-tier investment banks, and the large bidders that are not advised by top-tier investment 
banks experience the lowest (and insignificant) announcement abnormal returns among our 
sample portfolios. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that the reputational effect is more pronounced for large bidders 
and that it is important to account for the “equilibrium effect” when measuring financial 
advisors’ reputations. If the equilibrium effect is not controlled for, the difference between 
the abilities of small and large bidders to employ prestigious investment banks would be 
larger because the bidder-advisor matching problem would be so severe, and the conclusions 
reached under our proposed framework for examination would thus be less meaningful.  
 
We define small, medium and large relative size as the first, second and third tertile of the 
sample, respectively, where relative size is measured as the target’s market value of equity 
divided by the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the announcement. We 
find that acquirers experience significantly positive announcement abnormal returns if they 
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employ top-tier investment banks, and the returns increase with relative size. However, for 
transactions advised by non-top-tier investment banks, only large-relative-size transactions 
create significant gains for bidding firms’ shareholders. Additionally, bidders advised by top-
tier investment banks outperform their counterparts significantly if the relative size is large 
or medium, whereas the outperformance remains insignificant for small-relative-size deals. 
Our results further show that the number of deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier banks 
is similar across the different categories of relative size.  
 
These results indicate that the difference between the abilities of top-tier and non-top-tier 
investment banks to generate higher announcement returns is more pronounced when the 
size of the target is comparable to or larger than that of the bidder. In other words, investment 
bank reputation has a greater effect on bidder announcement returns for acquisitions with 
larger relative sizes. These results provide an early indication that top-tier investment banks 
possess superior skills because it is generally more difficult to negotiate favourable terms 
and to capture a larger share of the gains for the bidder in transactions with large relative 
size, due to the greater bargaining power of the target firms in such transactions. 
 
We define small, medium and large deal value as the first, second and third tertile of the 
sample, respectively. We find that as the deal value increases, the market reaction to deal 
announcements becomes more favourable, especially with respect to deals advised by top-
tier investment banks. However, the outperformance of top-tier investment banks compared 
with non-top-tier investment banks only becomes significant for transactions with large deal 
values. In addition, we observe that the difference between the number of deals advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier banks is the largest for small-value deals and the smallest for large-
value deals. 
 
Ismail (2010) posits that investment bank incentives differ between large deals and small 
deals because higher merger premiums are paid in large deals than in small deals, which 
results in losses for the acquirers in large deals. However, our results do not support such a 
difference in incentives, given our finding that large deals are associated with the highest 
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acquirer announcement returns if top-tier investment banks are employed. Indeed, 
McLaughlin (1990) suggests that although financial advisors are motivated by the greater 
contingency fees earned by completing larger deals, they may not want to increase 
acquisition prices to complete deals because this type of behaviour would reduce their 
reputational capital. Moreover, we find that bidder announcement returns are insignificantly 
different from zero for small deals regardless the type of advisor used, which suggests that 
bidders might overpay investment banks when the deal value is relatively small. Therefore, 
we argue that reputational capital matters for investment bank advisory services, especially 
when deal values are sufficiently large. 
 
When acquisitions are stratified by the target’s public status, we find that bidders gain an 
average of 4.4% three days around the merger announcement date in private acquisitions, 
whereas they lose insignificantly in public acquisitions. For public acquisitions, the mean 3-
day CAR for acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks is significantly positive at 4.2% 
but insignificantly higher than that for acquirers advised by non-top-tier investment banks. 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) report that top-tier financial advisors deliver higher 
bidder returns than their non-top-tier counterparts in public acquisitions only, whereas we 
observe the same trend for private acquisitions but not for public acquisitions. The mean 
acquirer 3-day CAR for private acquisitions advised by top-tier investment banks is 3.8% 
higher than that for private acquisitions advised by non-top-tier investment banks at a 1% 
significance level. We note that the insignificant outperformance of top-tier advisors 
compared with non-top-tier advisors in public acquisitions might arise due to the small 
sample size. Nevertheless, our results indicate that top-tier financial advisors deliver higher 
bidder gains than their non-top-tier counterparts do. In contrast to many previous studies, we 
suggest that the positive reputational effect on bidder returns in private acquisitions arises 
because we appropriately account for the “equilibrium effect" between the total value and 
total number of transactions conducted by investment banks when measuring investment 
bank reputation and hence the difference between the ability of small and large bidders to 
employ prestigious investment banks is adjusted. 
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In terms of the method of payment, the overall bidder 3-day CAR for payment-includes-
stock acquisitions is significant at 5.7%. The mean bidder CAR improvement for payment-
includes-stock acquisitions that are advised by top-tier investment banks (8.0%, p-
value=0.000) is significantly larger than that for payment-includes-stock acquisitions 
advised by their non-top-tier counterparts (4.8%, p-value=0.000). For cash-only deals, the 
average bidder abnormal returns are insignificantly different than zero. However, bidders 
enjoy significantly positive abnormal returns of 3.6% three days around the merger 
announcement if top-tier investment banks are employed, which is significantly higher than 
those enjoyed by bidders advised by their non-top-tier counterparts. 
 
Because almost 90% of the deals in our sample are targeted at private firms, the positive 
CAR improvement associated with payment-includes-stock deals could be driven by gains 
from private acquisitions. Chang (1998) suggests that more significant underpayment is 
likely to occur in private acquisitions because fewer firms compete for private targets and 
hence the bidding firms obtain higher returns. The CAR improvement could also arise 
because stock payments for private acquisitions convey positive information to the market 
regarding the value of the bidding firms or because there is improved monitoring in the 
newly combined firms due to the presence of blockholders (Draper and Paudyal (2006)). 
Alternatively, as suggested by Black et al. (2013), the CAR improvement could arise because 
bidders are able to buy low and then experience gains by riding the upward trend in the 
Chinese stock market. Black et al. (2013) state that this scenario is most likely to be case in 
China because the market is in a growth and development phase. Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, we find that payment-includes-stock acquisitions significantly outperform cash-
only deals for both top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. 30  Additionally, because top-tier 
investment banks generate significantly higher bidder returns than their non-top-tier 
counterparts do irrespective of the method of payment used, we argue that this result might 
stem from top-tier investment banks’ capacity to evaluate the stand-alone and combined 
                                                     
30 The univariate analyses of announcement returns obtained by acquirers advised by top-tier or non-
top-tier investment banks in payment-includes-stock and cash-only acquisitions are available upon 
request. 
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values of the bidding and target firms more precisely; from their ability to propose favourable 
methods to obtain synergies; or from their superior skill in following the market timing 
strategy to capitalize on market upturns, as suggested by Black et al. (2013). 
 
Previous studies have found that corporate diversification destroys value and that bidder 
wealth increases when the target is in a related line of business (Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)). However, this is not the case in China. We find that 
bidder 3-day CAR is positive and significant, irrespective of the industry relatedness of the 
bidding and target firms. Moreover, the mean 3-day CAR for acquirers advised by top-tier 
investment banks is significantly higher than that for acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
investment banks for both focussed and diversifying acquisitions. Interestingly, we observe 
that although diversification can be used as a proxy for information asymmetry, bidders in 
focussed deals are more likely to seek advice from top-tier investment banks than from non-
top-tier banks. 
 
Overall, our short-term univariate analyses suggest that overall, top-tier investment banks 
are associated with significantly higher bidder abnormal returns than their non-top-tier 
counterparts are and that such outperformance is robust to various bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics. Thus, there is initial support for our first hypothesis – the “superior deal” 
hypothesis. 
 
3.4.1.2 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder BHAR 
 
Table 3.5 reports the long-term univariate analysis that examines the relationship between 
the reputations of bidders’ investment bank and bidder returns in various portfolios. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. The average 24-month BHAR for acquirers advised 
by top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks are computed under a variety of portfolios. 
Statistical tests for the difference in means between top-tier and non-top-tier investment 
banks for each portfolio and bootstrapped p-values are presented. 
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[Insert Table 3.5] 
 
For the overall sample, the mean bidder BHAR two years post-announcement is 21.8% and 
is significantly different from zero. We find that although Chinese acquirers continue to 
create value for their shareholders irrespective of the tier of advisor used, the significant 
outperformance of top-tier relative to non-top-tier investment banks diminishes over the long 
term. In other words, our results suggest that more prestigious banks do not help clients 
generate more wealth gains over the long term. 
 
In terms of acquirer size, we find that for deals conducted by small and medium acquirers, 
the means of acquirer 24-month BHAR are positive and significantly different from zero 
regardless the tier of advisor used. For these deals, top-tier advisors do not appear to 
significantly outperform their-non-top-tier counterparts. As the size of the acquirer increases, 
the BHAR shows a decrease for clients advised by both top-tier and non-top-tier investment 
banks. Acquirers experience insignificantly negative returns if their market capitalization is 
within the upper tertile of our sample. It is well documented in previous literature that 
shareholders earn better returns from small acquirers. For example, Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2004) document a negative size effect on bidder returns and find it is persistent 
over time. Roll (1986) argues that small bidders earn higher profits in acquisitions because 
the managers of large bidders may suffer from hubris and overpay their targets. Moreover, 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) suggest that the incentives of managers in small firms are better 
aligned with their shareholders, whereas the opposite is true for large firms. Nevertheless, 
other explanations might also exist to explain the underperformance of large bidders relative 
to small bidders. For example, the agency costs of free cash flow, which occur when a firm 
no longer has growth opportunities, are more likely to affect large firms than small firms. 
 
For acquisitions advised by top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks, the mean 24-month 
BHAR increases as the relative size of target to bidder increases. Deals advised by both top-
tier and non-top-tier investment banks generate significantly positive BHAR for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders if the relative size of the deal is large. Because the majority of our 
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acquisitions are targeted at private or subsidiary firms, our findings are in line with many 
prior works. For example, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find a positive relationship 
between the target’s relative size and the acquiring firm’s stock performance in private and 
subsidiary acquisitions. In addition, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that excess post-
acquisition period returns to acquirer shareholders is the most negative for high-relative-size 
deals if stock financing is used, whereas the returns are the most positive if cash financing 
is used. Overall, our results indicate that after controlling for the relative size of the deal, the 
positive reputational effect of top-tier investment banks dissipates over time. 
 
In terms of deal value, we find that the mean acquirer 24-month BHAR is insignificantly 
positive if top-tier investment banks are used but that it is significantly positive if non-top-
tier banks are used. Moreover, our results show that the mean acquirer post-announcement 
returns for top-tier investment banks significantly underperform their non-top-tier 
counterparts for medium-deal-value transactions. 
 
Regardless of the tier of investment bank used, the mean acquirer 24-month BHAR is 
insignificantly negative for public acquisitions but significantly positive for private 
acquisitions. We argue that because public targets are associated with greater bargaining 
power relative to unlisted firms, it is more difficult for bidding firms to capture gains in 
public acquisitions (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Officer (2007)). In addition, 
public acquisitions require more regulatory and shareholder approvals and may involve 
fighting antitakeover defences. Furthermore, it is generally more difficult for acquirers to 
obtain any post-deal indemnification for hidden or undisclosed obligations of public targets 
due to their dispersed ownership (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). Moreover, we 
find that the mean BHARs two year post-takeover announcement for acquirers advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks differ insignificantly after controlling for the 
target’s listing status. 
 
The means of the two-year post-announcement abnormal returns are significantly positive 
and insignificant for payment-includes-stock and cash-only deals, respectively. Our results 
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indicate that the short-term outperformance of payment includes stock deals persists over 
the long term. Additionally, we find that regardless of whether the deal is financed with stock, 
the means of 24-month BHAR do not differ significantly between the tiers of investment 
banks.  
 
The means of acquirer 24-month BHAR for diversifying acquisitions are significantly 
positive except for the portfolio advised by top-tier investment banks. Bidders experience 
insignificant post-announcement returns on focussed acquisitions. These results are contrary 
to those of many prior studies, such as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Matsusaka 
(1993), which find a negative impact of diversifying acquisitions on acquirer stock price. 
Although our results do not offer support for the “diversification discount”, they are in line 
with those of Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), who find no diversification 
discount effect after controlling for the potential endogeneity problems associated with firm 
diversification. Finally, we note that there is no significant difference between the means of 
acquirer 24-month BHAR for acquisitions advised by top-tier and non-top-tier investment 
banks after controlling for the industry relatedness of the bidding and target firms. 
 
In sum, the results of our long-term univariate analyses offer further support for the “superior 
deal” hypothesis, which maintains that investment bank reputation is positively related to 
bidder returns in the short term with no long-term reversal, given that we find no significant 
difference between bidder post-announcement returns for deals advised by top-tier and non-
top-tier investment banks after controlling for various bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics. 
 
3.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 
This section presents the multivariate regression analyses for investment bank reputation on 
bidder short- and long-run abnormal returns, deal completion likelihood and deal resolution 
duration.  
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3.4.2.1 Multivariate Regression Analyses (OLS and Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder CAR 
 
In the short-term univariate analyses, we find a significantly positive effect of investment 
bank reputation on bidder returns. However, the univariate analysis may be misleading 
because it does not account for any confounding effects. Verbeek (2008:7&46) suggests that 
OLS is the most significant technique in econometrics and that its true nature is algebraic 
rather than statistical. In addition, OLS helps effectively predict the value of the dependent 
variable when given the values of the explanatory variables. 
 
Hence, we re-examine the relationship between investment bank reputation and bidder 
announcement returns using a multivariate OLS regression analysis. More specifically, we 
estimate the relationship between bidder CAR and investment bank reputation while 
controlling simultaneously for various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics that have 
been found to affect bidder returns. The results are presented in Table 3.6. In regression (1), 
p-values are reported based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In regression 
(2), coefficients are suppressed as a result of controlling for year fixed effects, and p-values 
are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year 
fixed effects, and its p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and bidder clustering given the presence of repeated bidders in our sample. Our main 
variable of interest is the Top-tier dummy, and all variables are defined in Appendix 3.1.  
 
[Insert Table 3.6] 
 
We find that the coefficient on the Top-tier dummy is positive and significant at conventional 
levels in all three regressions. After controlling for year fixed effects, we find that the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the top-tier investment bank dummy is associated with a 
2.98% CAR improvement, ceteris paribus. Although our reputational measurement takes 
into account the capability of small and large bidders to employ top-tier investment banks, 
it is worth noting that our results may still suffer from endogeneity of bidder-advisor 
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matching and self-selection bias. To solve these problems, we follow Gulobov, Petmezas 
and Travlos (2012) and implement the Heckman two-stage procedure for our sample. Our 
instrumental variable is No. of IB, which is the number of investment banks employed by 
the bidder in a transaction. We argue that bidders employ more than one bank in a transaction 
tend to have more financial resources, thus are more capable of employing a top-tier 
investment bank, but the correlation between the number of investment banks employed by 
the bidder and bidder CARs is less clear. We find that the No. of IB variable is a highly 
significant and positively related to the hiring of a top-tier investment bank. The pseudo-R2 
of the first-stage equation suggests that the model explains 17.7% of the choice between the 
tiers of investment banks. From the first-stage equation, we construct an inverse Mills ratio 
and add it as an additional regressor to the second-stage equation. The coefficient on this 
endogeneity control (or selection term) is positive but statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.31 Thus, we suggest that the coefficient estimates for bidder CARs 
shown in Table 3.6 are reliable. Furthermore, we find that the signs on the control variables 
are generally in line with those in the existing literature (e.g., Gulobov, Petmezas and Travlos 
(2012)), except for the payment-includes-stock dummy. 
 
As a further check, we examine the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder CAR 
using a probit model where the dependent variable is one if bidder returns are positive and 
zero otherwise. The results are presented in Table 3.7. We find that the coefficient on the 
Top-tier dummy is positive and significant at conventional levels in all three regressions. 
After controlling for year fixed effects, the top-tier investment banks are associated with a 
76.7% higher probability of obtaining a positive 3-day CAR for bidding firms’ shareholders, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
[Insert Table 3.7] 
 
Overall, our multivariate results confirm the positive and significant investment bank 
                                                     
31 The results for the first- (selection) and second- (outcome) stage equations are available upon 
request. 
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reputational effect on bidder CAR found in the univariate analyses. Our findings are in line 
with the superior deal hypothesis, such that in Chinese domestic M&As, bidders advised by 
top-tier investment banks experience higher short-term abnormal returns than those advised 
by their non-top-tier counterparts. Moreover, bidders advised by top-tier investment banks 
are found to complete a significantly higher (lower) proportion of mergers for which the 
short-term abnormal returns earned by the bidders are positive (negative). 
 
3.4.2.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses (OLS and Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder BHAR 
 
In the long-term univariate analyses, we find that the significant and positive effect of 
investment bank reputation on bidder returns disappears over time. However, given that the 
univariate analysis does not take into account any confounding effects, this result may be 
misleading. Therefore, we re-examine the relationship between investment bank reputation 
and long-term bidder returns in multivariate OLS regression analysis. More specifically, we 
estimate the relationship between bidder BHAR and investment bank reputation while 
controlling for various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics that are found to affect bidder 
returns. The results are presented in Table 3.8. In regression (1), p-values are reported based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In regression (2), coefficients are 
suppressed as a result of controlling for year fixed effects, and p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year fixed effects, and its 
p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering 
given the presence of repeated bidders in our sample. Our main variable of interest is the 
Top-tier dummy, and all variables are defined in Appendix 3.1.  
 
[Insert Table 3.8] 
 
We find that the coefficient on the Top-tier dummy is positive but insignificant at 
conventional levels in all three regressions. In addition, the significant predictors of BHAR 
are bidder size, leverage, and relative size; their signs are generally in line with those in the 
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existing literature. 
 
As a further check, we examine the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder BHAR 
using a probit model where the dependent variable is one if the long-term bidder abnormal 
return is positive and zero otherwise. The results are presented in Table 3.9. We find that the 
coefficient on the Top-tier dummy is negative but insignificant at conventional levels in all 
three regressions.  
 
[Insert Table 3.9] 
 
Overall, we confirm the primary results obtained in the univariate analysis, which indicate 
that the significant and positive effect of investment bank reputation on bidder returns 
disappears in the long term. In other words, the long-term abnormal returns experienced by 
bidders advised by the two tiers of investment banks are insignificantly different. 
Additionally, our results suggest that the retention of top-tier investment banks is not 
associated with a higher or lower probability of securing long-term positive bidder returns 
on Chinese domestic M&As. 
 
3.4.2.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank Reputation on 
Deal Completion 
 
We scrutinize the probability of deal completion when a bidder hires a top-tier financial 
advisor compared with when a bidder hires a non-top-tier financial advisor. To do so, we 
regress financial advisor reputation on acquisition outcome and control for various bidder- 
and deal-specific characteristics that are known to affect the likelihood of deal completion. 
The results are presented in Table 3.10. In regression (1), p-values are reported based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In regression (2), coefficients are suppressed 
as a result of controlling for year fixed effects and p-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year fixed effects, and its p-values 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering given the 
 167 
 
presence of repeated bidders in our sample. Our main variable of interest is the Top-tier 
dummy, and all variables are defined in Appendix 3.1. 
 
[Insert Table 3.10] 
 
Previous research has suggested that the effect of advisor reputation on the likelihood of deal 
completion is ambiguous. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that the ability to 
complete deals is important from an acquirer’s perspective if the acquirer considers the 
acquisition to be an important component of its long-run strategy or if bid success signals a 
superior ability on the part of investment banks; therefore, there is a positive correlation 
between investment bank reputation and bid success (i.e., the “better deal completion skills” 
hypothesis). Other authors suggest that investment banks have strong incentives to complete 
deals because M&A advisory fees are contingent on deal completion (e.g., McLaughlin 
(1990)). If this is the case, a negative correlation between advisor reputation and bid success 
would be observed because bulge-bracket banks are less likely to leverage their reputation 
to obtain advisory fees (i.e., the “preventing poor deals” hypothesis). 
 
We find in all three regressions that there is no effect of investment bank reputation on deal 
completion. With respect to the control variables, we find that bidder size and relative size 
are positively related to the deal completion rate, whereas sigma has a negative effect on bid 
success. 
 
In summary, our findings are inconsistent with those obtained by Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012), who suggest a negative correlation between advisor reputation and the 
likelihood of deal completion in subsidiary acquisitions. Our results seem to stem from the 
trade-off between the “better deal completion skills” and “preventing poor deals” hypotheses. 
That is, the effect of reputation on the deal completion rate may be due to the ability of top-
tier investment banks to play multiple roles, meaning that in certain situations, they act to 
complete deals as directed by bidding firms’ management, whereas in other situations, they 
are trustworthy and contribute to the refusal of deals that are bad for their clients. 
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3.4.2.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank Reputation on Time 
to Resolution 
 
Investment banks are largely in charge of the negotiation process and hence should exert 
significant influence over the time to the deal completion; however, the predicted direction 
of the relationship between investment bank reputation and time to resolution is not so clear 
(Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012)). On the one hand, if investment bank reputation is 
positively related to the length of time to deal resolution, the “diligent advisor” hypothesis 
is supported. Under this hypothesis, top-tier investment banks take more time to carefully 
evaluate the terms of transactions and to negotiate favourable terms for their clients because 
they have more reputational capital at stake. On the other hand, if investment bank reputation 
is negatively related to the length of time to deal resolution, the “skilled advisor” hypothesis 
is supported. Under the “skilled advisor” hypothesis, top-tier investment banks are able to 
complete deals more quickly due to their superior skills and expertise.  
 
We examine the relationship between investment bank reputation and time-to-resolution 
under multivariate OLS regression analysis while controlling for various bidder- and deal-
specific characteristics that have been found to affect bidder returns. The results are 
presented in Table 3.11. In regression (1), p-values are reported based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In regression (2), p-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering, given the presence of repeated bidders 
in our sample. Our main variable of interest is the Top-tier dummy, and all variables are 
defined in Appendix 3.1.  
 
[Insert Table 3.11] 
 
We find that in both regressions, the coefficient on the top-tier dummy is positive and 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels, suggesting that top-tier investment 
banks are associated with longer deal durations. In terms of the time between deal 
announcement and deal completion, we repeat the analysis for the subsample of completed 
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deals and find that the coefficient on the top-tier dummy is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level.32 Our results are in line with the “diligent advisor” 
hypothesis. Hence, we suggest that the gains associated with top-tier investment banks stem 
from their diligence because top-tier banks tend to take more time to carefully evaluate the 
terms of transactions and to negotiate favourable terms for their clients. 
                                                     
32 Regression results are available upon request. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Contrary to most earlier empirical studies, which fail to support for the intuitive reputation-
quality mechanism, we find a significantly positive effect of bidder investment bank 
reputation on bidder returns in the short run. After controlling for year fixed effects, top-tier 
investment banks are associated with a 2.98% CAR improvement for bidders. We argue that 
our results arise because we successfully account for the “equilibrium effect" between the 
total value and the total number of transactions conducted by investment banks when 
measuring their market shares as a proxy for reputation. In doing so, we account for the 
difference between the abilities of small and large bidders to employ prestigious investment 
banks. More specifically, measuring the market share based on the total value of transactions 
biases the reputation towards large bidders, which might provide an answer to the long-
standing puzzle, “why does the intuitive reputation-quality mechanism fail for mergers 
overall but hold for public acquisitions?” 
 
In addition, we examine the sources of top-tier gains. We find that the time between 
announcement and completion is significantly longer for acquisitions advised by top-tier 
investment banks than for acquisitions advised by their non-top-tier counterparts. This result 
seems to support the “diligent advisor” hypothesis, leading us to suggest that the gains 
associated with top-tier investment banks in Chinese domestic M&As stems from top-tier 
investment banks taking more time to carefully evaluate the terms of transactions and to 
negotiate favourable terms for their clients. 
 
Moreover, we find that investment bank reputation has an insignificant impact on deal 
completion rate. This might result from the trade-off between the “preventing poor deals” 
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and “better deal completion skills” hypotheses. Specifically, given our finding that bidders 
advised by top-tier investment banks complete a significantly greater proportion of mergers 
with positive announcement returns than bidders advised by their non-top-tier counterparts 
do, deal completion may not be top-tier advisors’ primary motivation; rather, top-tier 
advisors are trustworthy and systematically turn away deals that are value-destroying for 
clients, even when their advisory fees are largely contingent upon deal completion. 
Nevertheless, high-quality investment banks are skilled across multiple dimensions, and in 
other circumstances, they might be directed by bidding firms’ management to utilize their 
superior skills to overcome the resistance of target management or regulatory hurdles to 
successfully complete an acquisition. 
 
Additionally, we examines the effect of bidder investment bank reputation on bidder returns 
in the long run and find this effect to be insignificant. We suggest that the eradication of the 
positive relationship between investment bank reputation and bidder returns in the long term 
does not signal that top-tier investment banks are no different from their non-top-tier 
counterparts in terms of the ability to provide advisory services. Rather, it could be that long-
term acquirer performance depends more on the firm’s intrinsic value and on the complexity 
of the integration progress after deal completion. 
 
Overall, our findings support the “superior deal” hypothesis, which holds that investment 
banks with greater prestige are associated with superior bidder abnormal returns in the short 
term with no long-term reversal. Combining the results related to deal completion and 
duration, our study indicates that, at least in Chinese domestic M&As, top-tier investment 
banks are more diligent, more skilled in terms of identifying targets with higher synergy 
gains, better at negotiating favourable terms to facilitate smooth deal execution, and more 
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trustworthy with regard to turning down bad deals for their clients. Furthermore, given that 
we find that the stability of top-tier investment banks is relatively low in China and that 
investment bank reputation serves as a good indicator for the quality of investment bank 
services, we argue that Chinese acquirers most likely undertake domestic M&As to chase 
better performance because if this were not the case, Chinese acquirers would be in “lock-
in” relationships with their respective investment banks and the top-tier rankings of 
investment banks would be more stable. 
 
Because this is the first study to examine the reputational effects of investment banks in 
China, our study provides numerous future research opportunities in a wide range of areas, 
including investment banking contracts and fees, the sources of top-tier improvement, the 
wealth effects of top-tier bankers compared with non-top-tier bankers, and the determinants 
and wealth effects of employing investment banks compared with executing deals in-house. 
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Table 3.1 Annual Top-Tier Investment Bank Ranking and Stability 
This table shows the annual top-10 investment bank ranking for all top-tier investment banks and their stability from 2001 to 2009. The ranking is 
based on first downloading the yearly top-25 financial advisors league tables according to the total transaction values on which they announced 
advising for a sample of M&A transactions targeting China from Thomson One banker, followed by re-ranking these top-25 investment banks 
according to the number of deals they advised in each year. Credit is allocated fully to each eligible bidder firm advisors in the case of multiple 
advisors for a single transaction. Equity carveout, exchange offers, and open market repurchases are excluded. There are 34 different top-tier 
investment banks in our sample period. A top-tier investment bank is represented by 1 if it is ranked within the top-10 investment banks in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise. The most frequent top-tier investment banks involved in Chinese domestic M&As in our sample are Morgan 
Stanley, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs & Co, and China International Capital Co.
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Top-Tier Financial Advisor 
Year Number of Years  
Classified as  
Top-Tier Advisor 
% of Time  
Classified as  
Top-Tier Advisor  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Morgan Stanley 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 88.89% 
JP Morgan 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 66.67% 
Goldman Sachs & Co 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 66.67% 
China International Capital Co 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 6 66.67% 
ING 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 44.44% 
Haitong Securities Co Ltd 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 44.44% 
Somerley Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 44.44% 
HSBC Holdings PLC 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 33.33% 
BNP Paribas SA 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 33.33% 
UBS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 33.33% 
Citi 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 33.33% 
CITIC 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 33.33% 
Deutsche Bank 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 33.33% 
CLSA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
DBS Group Holdings 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
Rothschild 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
Guotai Junan Securities 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 22.22% 
Guosen Securities Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 22.22% 
Huatai Securities Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 22.22% 
GF Securities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 22.22% 
Southwest Securities Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 22.22% 
Credit Suisse 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.11% 
Standard Chartered PLC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.11% 
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Yu Ming Investment Management 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.11% 
Bank of China Ltd 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.11% 
Societe Generale 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.11% 
Anglo Chinese Corp Finance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11.11% 
China Galaxy Securities Co 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11.11% 
South China Capital Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11.11% 
Investec 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11.11% 
Everbright Securities Co Ltd 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11.11% 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics by Year and Industry Sector 
This table summarizes the main characteristics of merger deals in our sample. The sample includes all successful and unsuccessful merger deals 
in the Chinese market announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where all acquirers are listed companies on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. In Panel A, merger activities are classified according to whether the deals are advised by or not advised by top-tier 
financial advisors by calendar years, with the corresponding number of deals and value of transaction shown. Value of transaction is denominated 
in US$1 million at the currency rate of 2010. In panel B, all M&A deals are classified according to Fama-French 17 industry classifications and 
ranked by the corresponding deal number and proportion. In addition, the number of deals with top-tier financial advisors and those with non-top-
tier financial advisors are reported for each industry sector.
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Panel A: Number, Total and Average Value for the Whole Sample, Deals with Top-tier and Non-top-tier Financial Advisors by Year 
Year Total 
Number 
of Deals 
Total Number  
of Deals 
with Top-Tier 
Financial 
Advisors 
Total Number 
Of Deals with 
Non-Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
Total Value 
of Deals 
Total Value  
of Deals  
with Top-Tier 
Financial 
Advisors 
Total Value 
 of Deals with Non-
Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
Average Value of 
Deals 
with Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
Average Value of 
Deals with Non-
Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
2002 4 2 2 472.53  390.97  81.56  195.48  40.78  
2003 13 1 12 837.20  189.61  647.59  189.61  53.97  
2004 11 3 8 3129.73  114.28  3015.45  38.09  376.93  
2005 3 0 3 223.73  0.00  223.73  0.00  74.58  
2006 19 10 9 7155.52  4293.07  2862.45  429.31  318.05  
2007 37 3 34 13856.25  609.01  13247.23  203.00  389.62  
2008 68 10 58 33452.42  2932.34  30520.07  293.23  526.21  
2009 64 24 40 29030.89  15991.65  13039.24  666.32  325.98  
2010 27 16 11 14389.62  10972.89  3416.73  685.81  310.61  
Sum 246 69 177 102547.89  35493.84  67054.05  2700.86  2416.73  
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Panel B: Industry Distribution for the Whole Sample, Deals with Top-tier and Non-top-tier Financial Advisors 
Ranking No. of Deals % Industry Sector Sector Number No. of Deals 
With Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
No. of Deals 
With Non-Top-Tier 
Financial Advisors 
1 33 13.41 Other 17 26 7 
2 25 10.16 Machinery and Business Equipment 11 8 17 
3 23 9.35 Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials 16 8 15 
4 21 8.54 Utilities 14 9 12 
5 17 6.91 Steel Works Etc 9 3 14 
6 16 6.50 Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 7 5 11 
7 15 6.10 Transportation 13 6 9 
8 14 5.69 Chemicals 6 5 9 
9 14 5.69 Food 1 3 11 
10 12 4.88 Construction and Construction Materials 8 2 10 
11 12 4.88 Textiles, Apparel & Footware 4 1 11 
12 10 4.07 Mining and Minerals 2 3 7 
13 9 3.66 Automobiles 12 2 7 
14 9 3.66 Oil and Petroleum Products 3 5 4 
15 7 2.85 Retail Stores 15 2 5 
16 5 2.03 Consumer Durables 5 0 5 
17 4 1.63 Fabricated Products 10 0 4 
Sum 246 100.00   88 158 
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Table 3.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes the bidder- and deal- specific characteristics for a sample of successful and unsuccessful merger deals in the Chinese market 
announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where all acquirers are listed companies on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. Panel A and B present the mean, median, and number of observations for bidder- and deal-characteristics for the whole sample, deals 
with top-tier investment banks and non-top-tier investment banks, respectively. We define “Top-Tier” as those deals advised by at least one 
investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and the others are classified as “Non-Top-Tier”. “Size” is the bidder’s market 
value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-
market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is 
the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days 
before the deal announcement; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period 
beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term 
debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the 
deal announcement from DataStream; “SOE acquirer” is a deal whose bidder is a state-owned company; “Deal value” is the value of the deal from 
Thomson One Banker in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity divided by the 
bidder's market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Public deal” is the acquisition of a publicly listed 
firm; “Diversifying deal” is a deal where the bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker; “Tender offer” is a tender offer deal; “Payment incl. stock” is a deal 
whose consideration includes stock; “3-day CAR”/“5-day CAR” is the three-day/five-day event window CAR(-1, +1)/ CAR(-2, +2) where day 0 
is the announcement day; “12-month BHAR”/“24-month BHAR” is the BHAR calculated over a 12-month/24-month period after the deal 
announcement month. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CARs. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  
is used to calculate BHARs. The results of statistical tests for differences in means and the equality of medians for each characteristic between top-
tier and non-top-tier investment bank category are also presented. “N” donates the number of observations in each portfolio.  
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Panel A: Bidder Characteristics 
 All Sample (1) Top-Tier (2) Non-Top-Tier (3) Difference (2)-(3) 
 Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N p-value p-value 
          Mean Median 
Size 2584.787  365.565  246 5690.152  765.590  69 1374.220  310.287  177 0.001  0.000  
Book-to-market 0.301  0.272  237 0.383  0.285  64 0.271  0.259  173 0.031  0.197  
Sigma 0.026  0.026  243 0.023  0.023  67 0.026  0.027  176 0.003  0.006  
Run-up 0.088  0.026  243 0.122  0.079  67 0.075  -0.004  176 0.348  0.032  
Leverage 0.419  0.341  245 0.330  0.325  69 0.453  0.371  176 0.431  0.634  
Cash flows-to-equity 0.447  0.155  245 0.105  0.219  69 0.581  0.138  176 0.496  0.009  
SOE acquirer 0.049  - 246 0.000  - 69 0.068  - 177 0.027  - 
Panel B: Transaction Characteristics 
Deal value 405.731  165.820  246 502.771  281.910  69 367.902  134.000  177 0.201  0.002  
Relative size 0.170  0.052  244 0.157  0.051  67 0.175  0.053  177 0.692  0.301  
Public deals 0.106  - 246 0.174  - 69 0.079  - 177 0.030  - 
Diversifying deal 0.476  - 246 0.391  - 69 0.508  - 177 0.099  - 
Tender offers 0.020  - 246 0.058  - 69 0.006  - 177 0.009  - 
Payment incl. stock 0.687  - 246 0.710  - 69 0.678  - 177 0.627  - 
3-day CAR 0.039  0.033  244 0.067  0.060  67 0.029  0.016  177 0.005  0.002  
24-month BHAR 0.218 0.072  244 0.158 0.025  67 0.241  0.099  177 0.373  0.162  
5-day CAR 0.050  0.030  244 0.082  0.044  67 0.039  0.024  177 0.017  0.014  
12-month BHAR 0.230 0.048  244 0.227 0.067  67 0.232 0.042  177 0.959  0.939  
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Table 3.4 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder  
3-day CAR 
This table presents the results of the mean 3-day CARs for bidders advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier investment banks for various portfolios. The sample contains all Chinese 
domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. We define “Top-Tier” as those 
deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league 
table and the others are classified as “Non-Top-Tier”. The variables “Bidder size”, “Relative 
size”, and “Deal value” are categorized as small, medium, or large, depending on whether 
they belong to the first, second, or third tertile of the sample. The variable “Bidder size” is 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Relative size” is the 
target’s market value of equity divided by the bidder’s market value of equity one month 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Deal value” is the value of the deal from 
Thomson One Banker in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Public 
deal”/Private deal” is the acquisition of a publicly listed/unlisted firm; “Payment incl. 
stock”/“Payment excl. stock” is a deal whose consideration includes/excludes stock; 
“Focussed deal”/”Diversifying deal” is a deal where the bidder’s industry equals/differs 
from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker; “3-day CAR” is the three-
day event window CAR(-1, +1) where day 0 is the announcement day; the equation CARi =
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The results of statistical tests for the differences 
in means for top-tier versus non-top-tier investment banks for each portfolio are presents. 
The p-values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations in 
each portfolio. 
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 All sample (1) Top-tier (2)  Non-top-tier (3)  Difference (2)-(3)  
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
 3-day CAR 3-day CAR 3-day CAR 3-day CAR 
All sample 0.039*** 0.067*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
N 244 67 177  
Small size acquirer 0.044*** 0.105*** 0.034*** 0.071** 
P-value (0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.031) 
N 79 11 68  
Medium size acquirer 0.045*** 0.077*** 0.034*** 0.043* 
P-value (0.000) (0.004) (0.007) (0.087) 
N 81 21 60  
Large size acquirer 0.030*** 0.050*** 0.016 0.034* 
P-value (0.002) (0.000) (0.290) (0.073) 
N 84 35 49  
Small relative size 0.022** 0.038** 0.015 0.023 
P-value (0.020) (0.005) (0.210) (0.248) 
N 82 24 58  
Medium relative size 0.023** 0.052** 0.011 0.041* 
P-value (0.038) (0.013) (0.394) (0.093) 
N 82 24 58  
Large relative size 0.073*** 0.121*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
N 82 20 62  
Small deal value 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.013 
P-value (0.344) (0.254) (0.527) (0.646) 
N 82 13 69  
Medium deal value 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.045*** 0.026 
P-value (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.270) 
N 81 22 59  
Large deal value 0.058*** 0.085*** 0.040** 0.045* 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.061) 
N 82 32 50  
Public deal -0.001 0.042*** -0.032 0.074 
P-value (0.971) (0.008) (0.423) (0.128) 
N 24 10 14  
Private deal 0.044*** 0.072*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 220 57 163  
Payment incl. stock 0.057*** 0.080*** 0.048*** 0.032* 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) 
N 168 48 120  
Payment excl. stock 0.000 0.036*** -0.011 0.047*** 
P-value (0.958) (0.007) (0.200) (0.006) 
N 76 19 57  
Focussed deal 0.032*** 0.060*** 0.019*** 0.041** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.016) 
N 128 41 87  
Diversifying deal 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.039*** 0.041* 
P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.066) 
N 116 26 90  
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Table 3.5 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder 
24-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of the mean 24-month BHARs for bidders advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier investment banks for various portfolios. The sample contains all Chinese 
domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. We define “Top-Tier” as those 
deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league 
table and the others are classified as “Non-Top-Tier”. The variables “Bidder size”, “Relative 
size”, and “Deal value” are categorized as small, medium, or large, depending on whether 
they belong to the first, second, or third tertile of the sample. The variable “Bidder size” is 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Relative size” is the 
target’s market value of equity divided by the bidder’s market value of equity one month 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Deal value” is the value of the deal from 
Thomson One Banker in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Public 
deal”/Private deal” is the acquisition of a publicly listed/unlisted firm; “Payment incl. 
stock”/“Payment excl. stock” is a deal whose consideration includes/excludes stock; 
“Focussed deal”/”Diversifying deal” is a deal where the bidder’s industry equals/differs 
from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker; “24-month BHAR” is the 
BHAR calculated over a 24-month period after the deal announcement month. The equation 
BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The results of statistical 
tests for the differences in means for top-tier versus non-top-tier investment banks for each 
portfolio are presents. The p-values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 
5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number 
of observations in each portfolio. 
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 All sample (1) Top-tier (2)  Non-top-tier (3)  Difference (2)-(3)  
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
 24-month BHAR 24-month BHAR 24-month BHAR 24-month BHAR 
All sample 0.218*** 0.158*** 0.241*** -0.083 
P-value (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.373) 
N 244 67 177  
Small size acquirer 0.534*** 0.692* 0.509*** 0.183 
P-value (0.001) (0.080) (0.000) (0.495) 
N 79 11 68  
Medium size acquirer 0.281*** 0.284** 0.178** 0.106 
P-value (0.001) (0.011) (0.012) (0.420) 
N 81 21 60  
Large size acquirer -0.066 -0.086 -0.053 -0.033 
P-value (0.145) (0.171) (0.417) (0.722) 
N 84 35 49  
Small relative size -0.011 -0.058 0.084 -0.142 
P-value (0.412) (0.516) (0.183) (0.209) 
N 82 24 58  
Medium relative size 0.143** 0.169 0.133 0.036 
P-value (0.036) (0.160) (0.112) (0.809) 
N 82 24 58  
Large relative size 0.470*** 0.387* 0.497*** -0.110 
P-value (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.579) 
N 82 20 62  
Small deal value 0.229*** 0.439 0.172** 0.267 
P-value (0.009) (0.107) (0.043) (0.201) 
N 80 17 63  
Medium deal value 0.265*** 0.011 0.361*** -0.350** 
P-value (0.000) (0.888) (0.000) (0.027) 
N 80 22 58  
Large deal value 0.155*** 0.103 0.181** -0.078 
P-value (0.009) (0.239) (0.021) (0.534) 
N 86 28 58  
Public deal -0.141 -0.206 -0.094 -0.112 
P-value (0.354) (0.132) (0.706) (0.717) 
N 24 10 14  
Private deal 0.258*** 0.222** 0 .270*** -0.048 
P-value (0.000) （0.015) (0.000) (0.621) 
N 220 57 163  
Payment incl. stock 0.309*** 0.268** 0.325*** -0.057 
P-value (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.615) 
N 168 48 120  
Payment excl. stock 0.018 -0.121 0.064 -0.185 
P-value (0.788) (0.211) (0.436) (0.227) 
N 76 19 57  
Focussed deal 0.075 0.103 0.062 0.041 
P-value (0.109) (0.155) (0.304) (0.682) 
N 128 41 87  
Diversifying deal 0.376*** 0.244 0.414*** -0.170 
P-value (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) (0.298) 
N 116  26  90   
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Table 3.6 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder 3-day CAR  
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regression analyses of bidder 3-day 
CAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. The 
sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 
August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
The dependent variable is “3-day CAR”, which is the three-day event window CAR(-1, +1) 
where day 0 is the announcement day; the equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to 
calculate CAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy variable equals to one 
for deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s 
league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market 
value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of 
US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided 
by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock 
over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily 
returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the 
deal announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and 
current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long 
term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” 
is calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity 
divided by the bidder's market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose 
consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals 
where the bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of 
the four digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One 
Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender 
offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for 
deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-
values reported for regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls 
for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 3-day CAR  3-day CAR  3-day CAR  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.0074 -0.0510 -0.0510 
 (0.856) (0.315) (0.392) 
Top-tier 0.0406*** 0.0298* 0.0298* 
 (0.007) (0.061) (0.073) 
Ln(size) -0.0025 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.616) (0.988) (0.990) 
Book-to-market 0.0057 0.0102 0.0102 
 (0.778) (0.625) (0.627) 
Run-up -0.0307 -0.0463** -0.0463* 
 (0.132) (0.025) (0.055) 
Sigma 0.0058 0.0279** 0.0279** 
 (0.419) (0.013) (0.019) 
Leverage -0.0006 0.0055 0.0055 
 (0.922) (0.280) (0.305) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0057 0.0040 0.0040 
 (0.473) (0.642) (0.645) 
Relative size 0.0502*** 0.0623*** 0.0623*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Payment incl. stock 0.0494*** 0.0652*** 0.0652** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) 
Diversifying deal -0.0051 -0.0077 -0.0077 
 (0.705) (0.575) (0.610) 
Tender offer 0.1050*** 0.1030** 0.1030*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.009) 
State-owned acquirer 0.0402 0.0341 0.0341 
 (0.126) (0.176) (0.249) 
Public deal -0.0689** -0.0574* -0.0574* 
 (0.029) (0.078) (0.080) 
    
N 235 235 235 
Ajusted-R2 0.180 0.245 0.245 
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Table 3.7 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Positive Bidder 3-day CAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional probit regression analyses of positive bidder 
3-day CAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “Positive 3-day CAR”, which is the three-day event 
window CAR(-1, +1) where day 0 is the announcement day; and equals to one if it is positive 
and zero otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The 
main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at 
least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero 
otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the 
currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period 
beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from 
DataStream over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal 
announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current 
portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long term 
debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is 
calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity 
divided by the bidder's market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose 
consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals 
where the bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of 
the four digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One 
Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender 
offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for 
deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-
values reported for regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls 
for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 Positive  
3-day CAR 
Positive  
3-day CAR 
Positive  
3-day CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.3050 
(0.669) 
-0.9840 
(0.297) 
-0.9840 
(0.315) 
Top-tier 0.7420*** 0.7670*** 0.7670*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ln(size) -0.1070 -0.0922 -0.0922 
 (0.218) (0.311) (0.323) 
Book-to-market -0.2010 -0.2180 -0.2180 
 (0.468) (0.456) (0.454) 
Run-up -0.4920* -0.7570** -0.7570** 
 (0.100) (0.018) (0.031) 
Sigma 0.1170 0.4230** 0.4230** 
 (0.401) (0.029) (0.032) 
Leverage 0.2560 0.3380* 0.3380* 
 (0.222) (0.059) (0.065) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0399 0.0334 0.0334 
 (0.698) (0.234) (0.233) 
Relative size 0.6360 0.8280** 0.8280* 
 (0.144) (0.046) (0.052) 
Payment incl. stock 0.4280* 0.8120*** 0.8120** 
 (0.053) (0.006) (0.015) 
Diversifying deal -0.1200 -0.1630 -0.1630 
 (0.562) (0.465) (0.491) 
State-owned acquirer 0.6900 0.5460 0.5460 
 (0.173) (0.271) (0.336) 
Public deal -0.7810** -0.6040 -0.6040 
 (0.044) (0.167) (0.173) 
    
N 230 230 230 
Pseudo-R2 0.1261 0.1836 0.1836 
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Table 3.8 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder 24-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regression analyses of bidder 24-month 
BHAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “24-month BHAR”, which is the BHAR calculated 
over a 24-month period after the deal announcement month. The equation BHARi =
∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, 
which is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one investment bank 
within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the 
natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; 
“Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 days and 
ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard 
deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the 
period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” is 
calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total 
capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from 
operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's 
market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose consideration 
includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the 
bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four 
digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and 
zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender offers and zero 
otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose bidder 
is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy variable equals to 
one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-values reported for 
regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (2) 
controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year-fixed 
effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, 
** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 24-month BHAR 24-month BHAR 24-month BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
 
Top-tier 
0.6640** 
(0.040) 
0.0278 
1.2220*** 
(0.005) 
0.0720 
1.2220*** 
(0.009) 
0.0720 
 (0.736) (0.413) (0.421) 
Ln(size) -0.1190*** -0.1320*** -0.1320*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Book-to-market 0.0970 0.1140 0.1140 
 (0.559) (0.477) (0.486) 
Run-up 0.0219 0.0964 0.0964 
 (0.858) (0.432) (0.450) 
Sigma 0.0385 -0.0995 -0.0995 
 (0.444) (0.189) (0.227) 
Leverage 0.1360** 0.1130* 0.1130* 
 (0.044) (0.076) (0.083) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0830 0.0930 0.0930 
 (0.271) (0.191) (0.199) 
Relative size 0.5410*** 0.4900*** 0.4900*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Payment incl. stock 0.0131 -0.0547 -0.0547 
 (0.891) (0.635) (0.670) 
Diversifying deal 0.0689 0.0622 0.0622 
 (0.354) (0.413) (0.411) 
Tender offer -0.1790 -0.2220 -0.2220 
 (0.345) (0.309) (0.371) 
State-owned acquirer -0.2540 -0.1290 -0.1290 
 (0.193) (0.545) (0.615) 
Public deal -0.0636 -0.132 -0.132 
 (0.745) (0.473) (0.491) 
    
N 235 235 235 
Adjusted-R2 0.281 0.343 0.343 
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Table 3.9 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Positive Bidder 24-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional probit regression analyses of positive bidder 
24-month BHAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics. The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 
January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable is “Positive 24-month BHAR”, which is 
the BHAR calculated over a 24-month period after the deal announcement month; and equals 
to one if it is positive and zero otherwise. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 +
T
t
Rm,t] is used to calculate BHAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of 
the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days 
before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the 
bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 
days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-
term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term 
debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from operations divided by 
common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” 
is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals whose consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a 
dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder industry differs from that of the 
target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is 
a dummy variable equals to one for tender offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” 
is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero 
otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed 
firms and zero otherwise. The p-values reported for regression (1) are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 
1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes 
the number of observations.
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 Positive  
24-month BHAR 
Positive  
24-month BHAR 
Positive  
24-month BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.5580 
(0.447) 
0.2630 
(0.776) 
0.2630 
(0.810) 
Top-tier -0.1460 -0.0358 -0.0358 
 (0.500) (0.877) (0.882) 
Ln(size) -0.1500* -0.1370 -0.1370 
 (0.078) (0.130) (0.171) 
Book-to-market 0.0632 0.1840 0.1840 
 (0.831) (0.517) (0.526) 
Run-up -0.0566 -0.0184 -0.0184 
 (0.848) (0.955) (0.959) 
Sigma 0.0819 -0.1200 -0.1200 
 (0.550) (0.520) (0.568) 
Leverage 0.1210 0.1110 0.1110 
 (0.124) (0.154) (0.190) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0600 0.0836 0.0836 
 (0.595) (0.476) (0.485) 
Relative size 0.5640 0.5400 0.5400 
 (0.133) (0.141) (0.159) 
Payment incl. stock 0.2180 0.2040 0.2040 
 (0.312) (0.445) (0.507) 
Diversifying deal 0.2700 0.3230 0.3230 
 (0.153) (0.109) (0.123) 
State-owned acquirer 0.2370 0.5450 0.5450 
 (0.621) (0.294) (0.407) 
Public deal -0.0538 -0.2110 -0.2110 
 (0.886) (0.590) (0.607) 
    
N 230 227 227 
Pseudo-R2 0.0934   0.1332   0.1332 
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Table 3.10 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Deal Completion 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional probit regression analyses of deal 
completion on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “Deal completion”, which is a dummy variable equals 
to one for completed acquisitions and zero otherwise. The main variable is “Top-tier”, which 
is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one investment bank within 
the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural 
logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is 
the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days 
before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the 
bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 
days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-
term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term 
debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from operations divided by 
common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” 
is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals whose consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a 
dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder industry differs from that of the 
target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is 
a dummy variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. 
The p-values reported for regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Regression (3) controls for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of 
observations.
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 Deal completion Deal completion Deal completion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
 
0.9530 
(0.264) 
0.6220 
(0.595) 
0.6220 
(0.656) 
Top-tier 0.0878 0.2380 0.2380 
 (0.728) (0.365) (0.367) 
Ln(size) 0.2380** 0.2430** 0.2430* 
 (0.022) (0.042) (0.063) 
Book-to-market 1.0830*** 1.1490*** 1.1490*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Run-up -0.8140** -0.6110 -0.6110 
 (0.033) (0.127) (0.142) 
Sigma -0.6570*** -0.7430*** -0.7430*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.1080 -0.1060 -0.1060 
 (0.298) (0.430) (0.446) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0154 0.0126 0.0126 
 (0.167) (0.260) (0.262) 
Relative size 0.9860* 0.9950* 0.9950* 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.064) 
Payment incl. stock -0.3560 -0.1180 -0.1180 
 (0.178) (0.710) (0.798) 
Diversifying deal 0.2750 0.3310 0.3310 
 (0.226) (0.169) (0.190) 
Public deal 0.3670 0.3410 0.3410 
 (0.526) (0.556) (0.560) 
    
N 219 192 192 
Pseudo-R2 0.2049 0.1951 0.1951 
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Table 3.11 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Time to Resolution 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regression analyses of time to 
resolution on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “Time to resolution”, which is the time it takes from 
the announcement until the completion or withdrawal from the deal. The main variable is 
“Top-tier”, which is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one 
investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; 
“Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to 
the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 
2010; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity 
one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 
days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the 
standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over 
the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” 
is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term 
debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to 
the deal announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from 
operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's 
market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose consideration 
includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the 
bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four 
digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and 
zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender offers and zero 
otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose bidder 
is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy variable equals to 
one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-values reported for 
regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The p-values 
reported for regression (2) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, 
** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 Time to resolution Time to resolution 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 658.6000*** 658.6000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Top-tier 83.6800** 83.6800* 
 (0.044) (0.068) 
Ln(size) -44.9600*** -44.9600** 
 (0.005) (0.015) 
Book-to-market -137.5000*** -137.5000*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Run-up 65.0200 65.0200 
 (0.264) (0.280) 
Sigma -21.7800 -21.7800 
 (0.459) (0.521) 
Leverage -8.5530 -8.5530 
 (0.644) (0.672) 
Cash flows-to-equity 14.5700 14.5700 
 (0.571) (0.574) 
Relative size 46.1200 46.1200 
 (0.435) (0.444) 
Payment incl. stock 98.6200** 98.6200** 
 (0.027) (0.044) 
Diversifying deal -14.1300 -14.1300 
 (0.684) (0.691) 
Tender offer -131.200** -131.200* 
 (0.042) (0.094) 
State-owned acquirer 64.9900 64.9900 
 (0.478) (0.496) 
Public deals 27.2000 27.2000 
 (0.632) (0.643) 
   
N 235 235 
Adjusted-R2 0.185 0.185 
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Table 3.12 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder 
5-day CAR 
This table presents the results of the mean 5-day CARs for bidders advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier investment banks for various portfolios. The sample contains all Chinese 
domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. We define “Top-Tier” as those 
deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league 
table and the others are classified as “Non-Top-Tier”. The variables “Bidder size”, “Relative 
size”, and “Deal value” are categorized as small, medium, or large, depending on whether 
they belong to the first, second, or third tertile of the sample. The variable “Bidder size” is 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Relative size” is the 
target’s market value of equity divided by the bidder’s market value of equity one month 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Deal value” is the value of the deal from 
Thomson One Banker in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Public 
deal”/Private deal” is the acquisition of a publicly listed/unlisted firm; “Payment incl. 
stock”/“Payment excl. stock” is a deal whose consideration includes/excludes stock; 
“Focussed deal”/”Diversifying deal” is a deal where the bidder’s industry equals/differs 
from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker; “5-day CAR” is the five-
day event window CAR(-2, +2) where day 0 is the announcement day; the equation CARi =
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The results of statistical tests for the differences 
in means for top-tier versus non-top-tier investment banks for each portfolio are presents. 
The p-values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations in 
each portfolio. 
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 All sample (1) Top-tier  
(2)  
Non-top-tier (3)  Difference 
(2)-(3)  
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 
All sample 0.050*** 0.082*** 0.039*** 0.043** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) 
N 244  67  177   
Small size acquirer 0.064*** 0.125*** 0.054*** 0.071* 
P-value (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.077) 
N 79  11  68   
Medium size acquirer 0.057*** 0.109*** 0.039*** 0.070** 
P-value (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.041) 
N 81  21  60   
Large size acquirer 0.031** 0.052*** 0.016 0.036 
P-value (0.019) (0.001) (0.422) (0.173) 
N 84  35  49   
Small relative size 0.022** 0.029* 0.019 0.010 
P-value (0.044) (0.080) (0.174) (0.660) 
N 82  24  58   
Medium relative size 0.021 0.055** 0.008 0.047 
P-value (0.136) (0.038) (0.658) (0.132) 
N 82  24  58   
Large relative size 0.107*** 0.176*** 0.085*** 0.091*** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
N 82  20  62   
Small deal value 0.007 0.006 0.008 -0.002 
P-value (0.456) (0.746) (0.501) (0.958) 
N 82  13  69   
Medium deal value 0.063*** 0.083*** 0.055*** 0.028 
P-value (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.369) 
N 81  22  59   
Large deal value 0.082*** 0.112*** 0.062** 0.050 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.139) 
N 82  32  50   
Public deal 0.015 0.041 -0.003 0.044 
P-value (0.663) (0.115) (0.953) (0.128) 
N 24  10  14   
Private deal 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.042*** 0.047** 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
N 220  57  163   
Payment incl. stock 0.074*** 0.105*** 0.062*** 0.043* 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) 
N 168  48  120   
Payment excl. stock -0.002 0.024* -0.011 0.035* 
P-value (0.802) (0.059) (0.326) (0.091) 
N 76  19  57   
Focussed deal 0.035*** 0.066*** 0.021 0.045* 
P-value 0.002 (0.000) 0.143 (0.052) 
N 128  41  87   
Diversifying deal 0.067*** 0.106*** 0.056*** 0.050* 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) 
N 116  26  90   
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Table 3.13 Univariate Analysis – Investment Bank Reputation on Bidder 
12-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of the mean 12-month BHARs for bidders advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier investment banks for various portfolios. The sample contains all Chinese 
domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. We define “Top-Tier” as those 
deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league 
table and the others are classified as “Non-Top-Tier”. The variables “Bidder size”, “Relative 
size”, and “Deal value” are categorized as small, medium, or large, depending on whether 
they belong to the first, second, or third tertile of the sample. The variable “Bidder size” is 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Relative size” is the 
target’s market value of equity divided by the bidder’s market value of equity one month 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Deal value” is the value of the deal from 
Thomson One Banker in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Public 
deal”/Private deal” is the acquisition of a publicly listed/unlisted firm; “Payment incl. 
stock”/“Payment excl. stock” is a deal whose consideration includes/excludes stock; 
“Focussed deal”/”Diversifying deal” is a deal where the bidder’s industry equals/differs 
from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker; “12-month BHAR” is the 
BHAR calculated over a 12-month period after the deal announcement month. The equation 
BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The results of statistical 
tests for the differences in means for top-tier versus non-top-tier investment banks for each 
portfolio are presents. The p-values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 
5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number 
of observations in each portfolio. 
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 All sample 
 (1) 
Top-tier 
 (2)  
Non-top-tier  
(3)  
Difference  
(2)-(3)  
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
 12-month BHAR 12-month BHAR 12-month BHAR  12-month BHAR 
All sample 0.230***  0.227***  0.232***  -0.005 
P-value   (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.959) 
N 244  67  177   
Small size acquirer 0.378***  0.369 0.379***  -0.010 
P-value (0.001)  (0.157)  (0.003)  (0.975) 
N 79  11  68   
Medium size acquirer 0.281***  0.438***  0.226***  0.212 
P-value (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.171) 
N 81  21  60   
Large size acquirer 0.043 0.055 0.035 0.020 
P-value (0.352)  (0.344)  (0.613)  (0.828) 
N 84  35  49   
Small relative size -0.011 -0.006 -0.013 0.007 
P-value (0.713)  (0.911)  (0.721)  (0.912) 
N 82  24  58   
Medium relative size 0.101*  0.109 0.098 0.011 
P-value (0.056)  (0.196)  (0.142)  (0.924) 
N 82  24  58   
Large relative size 0.595*** 0.620*** 0.587*** 0.033 
P-value (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.901) 
N 82  20  62   
Small deal value   0.227** 0.193* 0.236* -0.043 
P-value (0.040)  (0.094)  (0.086)  (0.872) 
N 80 17 63   
Medium deal value 0.210***  0.207 0.211***  -0.004        
P-value (0.001)  (0.116)  (0.003)  (0.980) 
N 80 22 58  
Large deal value 0.250***  0.262**  0.244***  0.018 
P-value (0.000)  (0.045)  (0.001)  (0.891) 
N   86 28 58      
Public deal 0.023  0.071 -0.012 0.083 
P-value (0.868)  (0.613)  (0.957)  (0.771) 
N 24  10  14   
Private deal 0.253*** 0.254***  0.253*** 0.001 
P-value (0.000)  （0.002)  (0.000)  (0.992) 
N 220  57  163   
Payment incl. stock 0.336*** 0.322***  0.342***  -0.020 
P-value (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.889) 
N 168 48 120  
Payment excl. stock -0.004 -0.0152 0.000 -0.0152 
P-value (0.920)  (0.768)  (0.997)  (0.857) 
N 76  19  57   
Focussed deal 0.100**  0.195** 0.056 0.139 
P-value (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.265)  (0.141) 
N 128  41  87   
Diversifying deal 0.374***  0.276** 0.402***  -0.126 
P-value (0.000)  (0.032)  (0.000)  (0.526) 
N 116  26  90   
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Table 3.14 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder 5-day CAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regression analyses of bidder 5-day 
CAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. The 
sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 
August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
The dependent variable is “5-day CAR”, which is the five-day event window CAR(-2, +2) 
where day 0 is the announcement day; the equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to 
calculate CAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy variable equals to one 
for deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s 
league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market 
value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of 
US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided 
by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock 
over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily 
returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the 
deal announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and 
current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long 
term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” 
is calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity 
divided by the bidder's market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose 
consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals 
where the bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of 
the four digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One 
Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender 
offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for 
deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-
values reported for regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls 
for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 5-day CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.0325 -0.0248 -0.0248 
 (0.545) (0.697) (0.731) 
Top-tier 0.0463 ** 0.0374* 0.0374* 
 (0.022) (0.082) (0.095) 
Ln(size) -0.00749 -0.0041 -0.0041 
 (0.258) (0.556) (0.597) 
Book-to-market 0.0004 0.0072 0.0072 
 (0.986) (0.781) (0.781) 
Run-up -0.0551** -0.0771*** -0.0771** 
 (0.047) (0.006) (0.013) 
Sigma 0.0023 0.0301** 0.0301* 
 (0.809) (0.048) (0.058) 
Leverage -0.0040 0.0036 0.0036 
 (0.561) (0.517) (0.534) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0047 0.0030 0.0030 
 (0.628) (0.782) (0.783) 
Relative size 0.0713*** 0.0866*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Payment incl. stock 0.057*** 0.0799*** 0.0799** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) 
Diversifying deal 0.0072 0.0055 0.0055 
 (0.682) (0.755) (0.770) 
Tender offer 0.0954** 0.1070* 0.1070* 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.069) 
State-owned acquirer -0.0087 -0.0169 -0.0169 
 (0.809) (0.594) (0.647) 
Public deal -0.0487 -0.0336 -0.0336 
 (0.276) (0.474) (0.497) 
    
N 235 235 235 
Ajusted-R2 0.186 0.253 0.253 
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Table 3.15 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Positive Bidder 5-day CAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional probit regression analyses of positive bidder 
5-day CAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “Positive 5-day CAR”, which is the five-day event 
window CAR(-2, +2) where day 0 is the announcement day; and equals to one if it is positive 
and zero otherwise. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The 
main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at 
least one investment bank within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero 
otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the 
currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period 
beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from 
DataStream over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal 
announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current 
portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long term 
debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is 
calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity 
divided by the bidder's market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose 
consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals 
where the bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of 
the four digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One 
Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender 
offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for 
deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-
values reported for regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-
values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls 
for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 Positive  
5-day CAR 
Positive  
5-day CAR 
Positive  
5-day CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.0705 
(0.926) 
-1.4910 
(0.133) 
-1.4910 
(0.157) 
Top-tier 0.3720* 0.4070* 0.4070* 
 (0.094) (0.080) (0.098) 
Ln(size) -0.0055 0.0306 0.0306 
 (0.950) (0.740) (0.751) 
Book-to-market -0.0325 -0.0409 -0.0409 
 (0.924) (0.909) (0.910) 
Run-up -0.139 -0.359 -0.359 
 (0.646) (0.286) (0.335) 
Sigma -0.0341 0.210 0.210 
 (0.813) (0.305) (0.314) 
Leverage -0.0363 -0.0125 -0.0125 
 (0.613) (0.865) (0.871) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0726 0.0626 0.0626 
 (0.573) (0.647) (0.648) 
Relative size 1.4790*** 1.5810** 1.5810** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
Payment incl. stock 0.3270** 0.7360*** 0.7360** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.028) 
Diversifying deal 0.2740 0.3460 0.3460 
 (0.170) (0.101) (0.113) 
State-owned acquirer 0.3550 0.2360 0.2360 
 (0.462) (0.639) (0.688) 
Public deal -0.1660 0.0055 0.0055 
 (0.658) (0.990) (0.990) 
    
N 230 227 227 
Pseudo-R2 0.0924 0.1335 0.1335 
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Table 3.16 Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Bidder 12-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regression analyses of bidder 12-month 
BHAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 January 2002 and 
31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The dependent variable is “12-month BHAR”, which is the BHAR calculated 
over a 12-month period after the deal announcement month. The equation BHARi =
∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, 
which is a dummy variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one investment bank 
within the top 10 of the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the 
natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; 
“Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year 
prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 days and 
ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard 
deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the 
period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” is 
calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total 
capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from 
operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Relative size” is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's 
market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Payment incl. stock” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose consideration 
includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the 
bidder industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four 
digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and 
zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is a dummy variable equals to one for tender offers and zero 
otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose bidder 
is a state-owned company and zero otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy variable equals to 
one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms and zero otherwise. The p-values reported for 
regression (1) are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (2) 
controls for year-fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed and their p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year-fixed 
effects and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, 
** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of observations.
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 12-month BHAR 12-month BHAR 12-month BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
 
Top-tier 
0.2490 
(0.316) 
-0.0134 
0.4890 
(0.153) 
-0.0109 
0.4890 
(0.147) 
-0.0109 
 (0.881) (0.917) (0.919) 
Ln(size) -0.0280 -0.0321 -0.0321 
 (0.354) (0.335) (0.359) 
Book-to-market 0.1870 0.2030 0.2030 
 (0.186) (0.160) (0.159) 
Run-up 0.1330 0.1620 0.1620 
 (0.164) (0.134) (0.159) 
Sigma -0.0529 -0.1030* -0.1030* 
 (0.214) (0.089) (0.099) 
Leverage 0.0004 0.0025 0.0025 
 (0.993) (0.957) (0.957) 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.0103 0.0087 0.0087 
 (0.927) (0.941) (0.941) 
Relative size 0.6750*** 0.6760*** 0.6760*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Payment incl. stock 0.1330* 0.1110 0.1110 
 (0.057) (0.322) (0.355) 
Diversifying deal 0.0642 0.0382 0.0382 
 (0.388) (0.620) (0.621) 
Tender offer -0.2290 -0.3110 -0.3110 
 (0.234) (0.201) (0.259) 
State-owned acquirer -0.2870** -0.2620 -0.2620 
 (0.048) (0.123) (0.150) 
Public deal -0.0823 -0.0974 -0.0974 
 (0.627) (0.579) (0.581) 
    
N 235 235 235 
Adjusted-R2 0.232 0.252 0.252 
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Table 3.17 Multivariate Regression Analysis (Probit) – Investment Bank 
Reputation on Positive Bidder 12-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional probit regression analyses of positive bidder 
12-month BHAR on investment bank reputation and other bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics. The sample contains all Chinese domestic M&As announced between 1 
January 2002 and 31 August 2010, where bidders are listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. The dependent variable is “Positive 12-month BHAR”, which is 
the BHAR calculated over a 12-month period after the deal announcement month; and equals 
to one if it is positive and zero otherwise. The equation BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 +
T
t
Rm,t] is used to calculate BHAR. The main variable is “Top-tier”, which is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals advised by at least one investment bank within the top 10 of 
the previous year’s league table and zero otherwise; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of 
the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Book-to-market” is the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 100 days and ending 6 days 
before the deal announcement from DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the 
bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the period beginning 100 
days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-
term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term 
debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from operations divided by 
common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Relative size” 
is the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Payment incl. stock” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals whose consideration includes stock; “Diversifying deal” is a 
dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder industry differs from that of the 
target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and zero otherwise; “Tender offer” is 
a dummy variable equals to one for tender offers and zero otherwise; “State-owned acquirer” 
is a dummy variable equals to one for deals whose bidder is a state-owned company and zero 
otherwise; “Public deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for acquisitions of publicly listed 
firms and zero otherwise. The p-values reported for regression (1) are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Regression (2) controls for year-fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed and their p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Regression (3) controls for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 
1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes 
the number of observations.
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 Positive  
12-month BHAR 
Positive  
12-month BHAR 
Positive  
12-month BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  -0.3220 
(0.643) 
-0.7360 
(0.424) 
-0.7360 
(0.480) 
Top-tier -0.0193 -0.0378 -0.0378 
 (0.928) (0.872) (0.878) 
Ln(size) 0.0514 0.0737 0.0737 
 (0.525) (0.410) (0.447) 
Book-to-market 0.1670 0.0194 0.0194 
 (0.534) (0.944) (0.944) 
Run-up 0.5550* 0.5400* 0.5400 
 (0.065) (0.088) (0.112) 
Sigma 0.0945 0.290 0.290 
 (0.485) (0.118) (0.136) 
Leverage -0.0118 0.0078 0.0078 
 (0.873) (0.913) (0.917) 
Cash flows-to-equity -0.0180* -0.0217** -0.0217** 
 (0.086) (0.034) (0.035) 
Relative size -1.0360* -1.1860* -1.1860* 
 (0.089) (0.075) (0.083) 
Payment incl. stock -0.5410** -0.3430 -0.3430 
 (0.012) (0.233) (0.331) 
Diversifying deal 0.01430 0.1230 0.1230 
 (0.941) (0.568) (0.579) 
State-owned acquirer 0.9910 0.7640 0.7640 
 (0.120) (0.251) (0.265) 
Public deal -0.0658 0.0614 0.0614 
 (0.862) (0.877) (0.881) 
    
N 230 218 218 
Pseudo-R2 0.1231   0.1569   0.1569 
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Appendix 3.1 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Dependent Variables and Advisor Reputation 
CAR (-1, +1) or  
CAR (-2, +2) 
Cumulative abnormal return of the bidding firm’s stock in the three- (or five-) day event 
window (-1,+1) (or (-2, +2)) where 0 is the announcement day. The returns are calculated 
using the market adjusted model. 
BHAR (0, 12) or  
BHAR (0, 24) 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return of the bidding firm twelve- (or twenty-four-) months 
after the announcement month. Following Buchheim et al. (2001), the returns are 
measured as ‘the difference between the compounded actual return and the compounded 
predicted return’. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (SSECI) is used as a 
proxy for market return. 
Top-Tier  
 
Dummy variable: one for transactions with its advisors matched to one of the top-10 
financial advisors ranked by the value of deals announced, followed by the number of 
deals on which they announced in the previous year targeting China (see Table 3.1). 
Panel B: Bidder Characteristics 
Size Bidder market value of equity four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement from 
DataStream in US$ million at the currency rate of 2010. 
Book-to-market  Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at one year prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Book-to-Market ratio is from DataStream. 
Run-up  Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm’s stock over the period 
beginning 100 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date from DataStream. 
Sigma  
 
Standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market adjusted daily returns from DataStream 
over period beginning 100 and ending 6 days before deal announcement. 
Leverage  
 
Leverage is calculated as (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long 
Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) at 
one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Leverage ratio is from DataStream. 
Cash flows-to-
equity  
Cash Flows-to-Equity is calculated as the funds from operations divided by the common 
equity at one year before the deal announcement. Both funds from operations and 
common equity are from DataStream. 
State-owned 
acquirer 
Dummy variable: one for transactions with its acquirer being a state-owned company, 
and zero otherwise. 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Deal value Value of the transaction from Thomson One Banker in US$ million at the currency rate 
of 2010. 
Public deal  
 
Dummy variable: one for acquisitions of publicly listed firms on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, zero otherwise. 
Relative size  
 
Target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity one moth 
prior to the announcement from DataStream. 
Diversifying deal  Dummy variable: one for cross-industry transactions, zero for same industry transactions. 
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 Industries are defined at the two-digit SIC level from Thomson One Banker. 
Payment incl. stock 
Tender offer 
Dummy variable: one for deals in which the consideration includes stock, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable: one for tender offers, zero otherwise. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
China’s increasing economic power shows no signs of abating. At a time when most 
developed economies staggered from the aftermath of the global financial crisis, China’s 
GDP increased by 10.3%, reaching a value of US$5.87 trillion in 2010 and overtaking Japan 
as the second largest economy in the world.33 
 
Among the many signs of China’s development is a surge in the number of Chinese firms 
seeking to buy overseas assets. Armed with more than US$3 trillion in foreign currency 
reserves, China is on a worldwide shopping spree. China’s successfully completed CBMAs 
with disclosed transaction value grew from US$0.87 billion (20 deals) in 2000 to US$30.03 
billion (100 deals) in 2014.34  This substantial increase in outbound activities has been 
backed by the “go global” policy, which was first spelled out in China’s tenth five year plan 
(2001– 2005) and continued to remain as a key national strategy. Additionally, the increase 
in CBMA actives have been driven by a number of factors, including resource-seeking 
(Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008)), favourable exchange rates that occurred after the RMB 
exchange rate reform (Black et al. (2012)), and favourable valuations resulting from the 
global financial crisis. In this chapter, we aim to examine how these factors impact the wealth 
creation of Chinese firms acquiring overseas. Given that a significant proportion of CBMAs 
are undertaken by SOE firms, which are potentially incentivized and managed differently 
from typical firms in a market-oriented economy, it would be doubtful if the mainstream 
theories and empirical findings derived from the western economies are applicable in China; 
thus, China serves as unique testing ground and is particularly interesting for research 
purposes.  
                                                     
33 Source: BBC News Business - China overtakes Japan as world's second-biggest economy, 14 
February 2011. 
34 Source: Thomson One Banker. 
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The industry preference has raised major concerns from western countries regarding China’s 
intentions for natural resource-related sectors. In addition, these deals are usually high 
profile and proposed by state-owned enterprises (SOE), which causes foreigners to worry 
about whether resource-related deals affect national interests or confer unfair advantages on 
the acquired firms. Hence, Chinese bidders engaged in resource-related deals are 
experiencing more outright failures and inflated prices than are bidders in other sectors. To 
ensure the successful completion of natural resource-related deals, bidding firms are required 
to carefully plan, manage and present all deal rationales to all stakeholders (politicians, 
media, communities and employees) to alleviate their fears regarding, for example, the 
bidders’ commercial and economic motivations, their plans for the future, who they are, and 
what role, if any, the Chinese government plays in their decision making. 
 
Motivated by the various concerns over China’s dominance and by the scarcity of literature 
in resource-related sectors, we aim to employ the most up-to-date dataset on Chinese 
outbound activities to empirically examine the short- and long-term wealth effects of 
successful resource-related M&As and to compare those wealth effects with the wealth 
effects in other sectors. 
 
Over the last three decades, the spectacular growth of China’s export sector and massive 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have resulted in an enormous store of foreign 
exchange reserves, which puts upward pressure on the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate. In 
addition, for more than ten years, China kept its RMB fixed at RMB8.25: US$1, which 
generated much criticism from the international community. In particular, many in the 
international community claimed that the severe undervaluation of the RMB gave China an 
unfair trade advantage and argued that China should float its currency.  
 
On July 21, 2005, China officially revalued its currency to RMB8.11: US$1 and modified 
the exchange rate system. The government announced that “the RMB will be no longer 
pegged to the US dollar” and that “China will reform the exchange rate regime by moving 
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into a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of currencies”.35 
 
Since the July 21st decision, the nominal exchange rate of RMB has strengthened by 24%.  
Even more strikingly, according to calculations by The Economist, the real exchange rate of 
RMB has strengthened by almost 50% since 2005.36 The real exchange rate takes into 
account the price movements in each country as well as the competitiveness of Chinese firms, 
which is assessed based on their unit labour costs. Thus, the real exchange rate of RMB can 
increase, even if its nominal exchange rate remains the same. The combined effect of 
increases in the RMB exchange rate and increases in Chinese unit labour costs is to drive up 
China’s outbound merger activity. According to data from Thomson Reuters, the value of 
CBMAs remained insignificant until 2005, when it surpassed the 10 billion US dollars mark 
for the first time.37 
 
Indeed, in a study of all successful CBMAs worldwide from 1990 to 2007, Erel, Liao and 
Weisbach (2012) find that the imperfect integration of capital markets across countries can 
cause a merger in which a higher-valued acquirer purchases a relatively inexpensive target 
following changes in exchange rates. The findings of that study mirror prior findings relating 
to US dollar exchange rates and net FDI inflows in the United States (Froot and Stein 
(1991)).38 
 
If changes in exchange rates can influence the relative wealth of acquiring and target firms, 
it is plausible to suggest that changes in exchange rates could also potentially affect wealth 
                                                     
35 Source: People's Bank of China, Public announcement, 2005. 
36 Source: The Economist, The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate, Nominally Cheap or Really Dear? Nov 
4th 2010. 
37 Source: A Brave New World, The Climate for Chinese M&A Abroad, Economists Intelligence 
Unit, 2010. 
38 Froot and Stein (1991) find that a depreciation of the US dollar increases the relative wealth 
position of foreign investors and lowers their relative cost of capital, which allows them to bid more 
aggressively for assets. 
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creation in acquisitions. However, this topic seems to be ignored in earlier literature. To our 
knowledge, the only study that examines the relationship between the Chinese RMB 
exchange rate and bidder returns is that by Black et al. (2013). Those authors propose that 
RMB appreciation could benefit acquiring firms’ shareholders if the acquiring firms can 
make acquisitions more cheaply abroad, but fail to find any support for this proposition. The 
results of that study could be limited due to small sample size (43 CBMAs) because the 
authors only consider acquirers that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. We construct a more comprehensive dataset that comprises 111 CBMAs 
conducted by all Chinese acquirers listed on every stock exchange to assess whether any 
wealth effect resulting from the substantial appreciation of the RMB can be transformed into 
significant wealth gains for acquiring firms’ shareholders in both the short and long terms. 
 
Additionally, the ongoing economic woes following the global financial crisis in 2008 have 
opened up attractive investment opportunities around the world. Declining valuations and 
bid premiums for western firms in the wake of the European and US debt crises have 
decreased the relative cost of acquisition for Chinese buyers, which in turn has prompted an 
increasing number of Chinese buyers to look for possible acquisition targets overseas.39 
 
The financial crisis has not only yielded some significant bargains from distressed 
economies but also made Chinese policymakers aware that amassing their foreign reserves 
in the bonds of over-indebted Western governments would not create the highest returns for 
hard-working Chinese citizens. In addition, China still needs an enormous amount of 
foreign-sourced raw materials, technologies and managerial know-how. The financial crisis 
could prove to be the point at which many Chinese companies emerge as true equals of 
established multinational companies, gaining competitiveness and allowing China to 
become a truly world-class economy. 
 
                                                     
39 Source: Leveling the M&A Playing Field, MSLGROUP China, July 2013. 
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Furthermore, cash-strapped western companies are well aware of China’s intensions and 
Chinese companies’ deep pockets, given that Chinese companies are often highly liquid with 
large amounts of free cash or good access to local financing. Although western firms have 
changed their attitudes towards Chinese investment and now view such investment in a more 
favourable light, investments in natural resource-related sectors remain sensitive.40 
 
We find that in 2009, when most advanced economies remain mired in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, the number of completed CBMAs reached a record high, accounting 
for 25 deals in our sample. Almost half of these deals were targeted at firms in economically 
distressed countries, such as the United States, Canada and Australia.  
 
Given that Chinese companies are better positioned than firms in economically distressed 
countries and benefit from lower cost of acquisition, managers from Chinese companies are 
likely to be more opportunistic during the crisis. For example, Chinese managers may be 
concerned that as economic conditions improve, they will be put at a disadvantage relative 
to their competitors and that targets will be less willing to sell to Chinese firms as other 
financing becomes available. Hence, the financial crisis could lead managers to succumb to 
the temptation to acquire abroad without careful planning, which may result in value-
destroying deals for their shareholders. 
 
Although it is unquestionably interesting to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis 
on the performance of Chinese acquirers, no academic work has been performed in this area. 
We aim to fill this gap in the literature by comparing the short- and long-term abnormal 
returns of Chinese acquirers engaged in CBMAs during the pre-crisis period with those of 
Chinese acquirers engaged in CBMAs during the post-crisis period.  
 
                                                     
40 Source: A Brave New World, the Climate for Chinese M&A Abroad, Economists Intelligence Unit 
2010. 
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With the above-described research topic in mind, we examine data obtained from Thomson 
One Banker regarding a sample of 111 successfully completed CBMAs announced between 
1 January 2002 and 31 January 2011 that were undertaken by Chinese acquirers listed on all 
stock exchanges. We categorize our sample according to the following characteristics: 
whether the target operates in the energy and materials sectors (“Resource-Related Target”) 
or in any other sector (“Non-Resource-Related Target”); whether the deal was announced 
before RMB appreciation (“Before Currency Appreciation”) or after RMB appreciation 
(“After Currency Appreciation”);41 and whether the deal was announced before the global 
financial crisis (“Before Financial Crisis”) or after the global financial crisis (“After 
Financial Crisis”).42 In addition, we measure the value created for the acquiring firms’ 
shareholders as the short-term CAR calculated with the market-adjusted model such that a 
CBMA is considered to be value-enhancing if it generates a significantly positive CAR. To 
assess whether a merger generates wealth over a longer time horizon, we measure the value 
created for acquiring firms’ shareholders using the BHAR approach, as advocated by Barber 
and Lyon (1997).  
 
Based on our univariate analyses, we find that CBMAs involving resource-related targets 
generate positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.98% in the short-run, but 
insignificantly outperforming those targeting non-resource-related targets. In the long term, 
CBMAs involving resource-related targets generate insignificant returns for bidding firms’ 
shareholders. Nevertheless, we find that bidding firms’ shareholders earn significantly 
higher returns of 24.4% in deals targeting resource-related firms compared with deals 
targeting non-resource-related firms. On the whole, our results suggest that although 
resource-related deals may promote national interests, they do not do so at the expense of 
shareholder wealth, indeed, they are significantly less value-destroying than their 
counterparts over the long term. 
                                                     
41 We classify the Currency Appreciation period as the period after the RMB exchange rate reform 
on 21 July 2005. 
42 We classify the Financial Crisis period as the period after Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection on 15th September, 2008. 
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Regarding the effect of RMB appreciation on Chinese cross-border acquirers’ performance, 
we find over the short term, acquirers earn significant announcement abnormal returns of 
1.40% after currency appreciation, which is 2.86% significantly superior to those earned 
before currency appreciation. Over the longer time horizon, although acquirers experience 
significantly negative returns of -13.01% after RMB appreciation, their returns before and 
after currency appreciation are shown to be insignificantly different. Therefore, we suggest 
that the increase in relative wealth and lower cost of capital for acquirers resulting from 
currency appreciation plays a more prominent role in wealth generation in the short term 
than in the long term. 
 
Regarding the impact of the global financial crisis, our results show that on average, 
acquirers engaged in CBMAs after the financial crisis gain significant wealth of 1.79% in 
the short term, which is 2.08% significantly higher than that gained before the crisis. 
However, the long-term analysis fails to show any significant difference between acquirer 
returns before and after the financial crisis. Our results indicate that in the long term, the 
wealth destruction associated with managerial risk taking is likely to offset the wealth 
creation derived from the lower cost of acquisition for CBMAs conducted during the 
financial crisis period. 
 
We employ multivariate regression analyses to control for any confounding effects in the 
univariate comparisons and thereby reveal the net effects of resource-related deals, currency 
appreciation and the financial crisis on acquirer returns. All regressions are controlled for 
year fixed effects with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. 
Our multivariate results are similar to those obtained from the univariate analyses. We 
observe that firms acquiring resource-related targets are associated with insignificant CAR 
and BHAR improvement at conventional levels. Nonetheless, focussed resource-related 
acquisitions are favoured by the market, especially in the short term. Deals announced after 
currency appreciation increase bidders’ announcement and long-term returns significantly, 
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whereas deals conducted during financial crisis period lead to substantial wealth destruction 
for acquiring firms’ shareholders two years post-acquisition. 
 
In sum, our multivariate regression results indicate that although resource-related cross-
border deals promote national interests, they are not value-destroying for shareholders in 
either the short or long run. Indeed, such deals are especially value-enhancing if the bidding 
and target firms are in the same line of business. Currency appreciation increases the relative 
wealth and lowers the cost of capital for acquirers, which helps them gain significantly 
higher abnormal returns, both around the deal announcement and two years post-merger. 
The wealth destruction associated with higher managerial risk taking significantly outweighs 
the benefit of the lower cost of acquisition experienced by acquirers during the financial 
crisis and leads to underperformance of CBMAs conducted by these firms over the long term. 
 
Our work has several important contributions. First, by employing the most up-to-date 
dataset of Chinese CBMAs, we empirically examine the difference in bidder performance 
between resource-related and non-resource related industries to ascertain whether political 
interests in acquiring resources and shareholder value creation are mutually achievable. 
Second, this is the first study that documents a significant positive correlation between 
currency appreciation and acquirer performance in China. Third, our results add to the 
empirical literature on behavioural finance by demonstrating that acquiring firms’ 
managerial opportunism was significantly enhanced during the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, our work helps investors gain a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese 
acquirers’ performance in CBMAs over the last decade and might help alleviate western 
concerns about further Chinese outbound investments. 
 
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature. 
Section 4.3 describes the data and methodology, and reports the summary statistics. Section 
4.4 presents the univariate analyses and the multivariate regression results. Finally, Section 
4.5 concludes this chapter and outlines ideas for future research.   
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Motivations behind M&As: Neoclassical and Behavioural 
Explanations 
 
4.2.1.1 Neoclassical Explanations 
 
Neoclassical theories imply that merger activity is driven by economic rationales, such as 
economies of scale or other synergies, and should thus bring about measurable wealth gains 
post-merger. These theories emphasise that technology, economic and regulatory shocks to 
an industry allow firms within and across a particular industry to respond to the shocks and 
effectively improve their allocation of assets through M&As. Such shocks can also lead to 
merger clusters, which occur in waves.43 
 
Perhaps one of the earliest economic rationales for merger activity is provided by Coase 
(1937), who argues that changes in technology mitigate the cost of organizing transactions 
across space and result in larger firms. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that merger waves always occur during economic booms 
because during such periods, firms’ cash flows and fundamental values increase and 
financial constraints are reduced, bringing asset prices closer to their fundamental values. 
Harford (1999) supports this argument by showing that firms with higher cash reserves are 
more active in the M&A market. Harford (2005) further finds that merger waves are likely 
to be preceded by external shocks, including shocks stemming from changes in firm 
valuation and from periods of industry deregulation.  
 
With regard to regulation, corporate law theory proposes that the laws regulating investor 
protection determine merger activity. La Porta et al. (1997) and (1998) suggest that countries 
                                                     
43 The Art of Capital Restructuring, Behavioural Effects in M&As, Jens Hagendroff, P387. 
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with better shareholder protection have more valuable stock markets and more active 
markets for corporate control than countries with weaker shareholder protection do. 
However, Roe (2003) argues that the activity of the market for corporate control is not 
determined by laws and regulations but by social consensus and political will. Regardless of 
the exact determinants of merger activity, it is widely recognized that the overall institutional 
context is one reason for mergers to occur.  
 
Despite the undisputed correlation between merger activity and the economic rationales 
presented by the above-referenced literature, empirical post-merger performance does not 
always reconcile with the theoretical implications of these rationales, which raises questions 
about the assumption of rational economic agents under the traditional finance paradigm.  
 
4.2.1.2 Irrational Managers 
 
The behavioural theories of M&As relax the underlying assumption of the traditional finance 
paradigm, which maintains that economic agents (i.e., managers and investors) act rationally 
in an efficient market. Rather, behavioural theories are based on more realistic behavioural 
assumptions and account for irrational managerial and investor behaviour in the market for 
corporate control.  
 
When the assumption of managerial rationality is relaxed, executive hubris and self-
attribution bias arise and act to promote merger activities. The hubris hypothesis was initially 
developed by Roll (1986) and proposes that managers overestimate their abilities to identify 
and extract potential synergies from M&As. Hence, overconfident managers are likely to 
overvalue the net present value of acquisitions and overpay for their targets, which in turn 
leads to poor post-merger performance of the acquiring firms.  
 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) relate the acquisition premium to managerial overconfidence 
and find that superior corporate performance, higher executive compensation and praise for 
CEOs in the financial press are positively correlated to higher acquisition premiums. They 
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also show that higher premiums are negatively correlated to post-merger abnormal returns. 
Consequently, the authors argue that hubris causes overinvestment and has a negative impact 
on firm performance.  
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find that acquiring firm announcement returns are 
positive for the first merger but decrease for subsequent mergers. Their results suggest that 
managerial hubris grows along the sequence of mergers. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use 
the number of mergers completed over a short period of time as a proxy for managerial 
overconfidence. They show that managers who engage in multiple transactions are likely to 
suffer from cognitive bias and inflated beliefs in their own abilities. When managers’ first 
deals generate positive wealth creation for shareholders, managerial overconfidence 
magnifies and turns into self-attribution bias because managers ultimately believe that their 
initial success was due to their ability to identify a superior target and to their effective 
management during the post-merger integration process. 
 
However, Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2009) argue that underperformance in subsequent 
mergers does not sufficiently explain managerial hubris. This underperformance could also 
be due to economic reasons; for example, rational managers are risk-averse and are thus 
more likely to pay higher premiums for a target to ensure that the deal is completed 
successfully. Nevertheless, there is no reason why hubris and economic rationales cannot 
coexist in practice. 
 
4.2.1.3 Irrational Investors 
 
Although the irrational managerial behaviour approach sheds some light on the disparity 
between the theoretical implications of ex-ante motivations and their ex-post effects, this 
approach does not explain why mergers come in waves, nor does it explain the difference 
between the performance of cash and stock mergers. This leads us to explore the irrational 
investor behaviour approach, which argues that when investors are not fully rational, 
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securities market arbitrage is imperfect, which causes securities prices to deviate from their 
fundamental values over sustained periods. Rational managers are assumed to perceive this 
mispricing and to respond to it.  
 
Merger waves driven by overvaluation were first noted by Nelson (1959), who finds a strong 
correlation between merger activity and the state of the capital market. Moreover, prior 
literature suggests that relative mispricing across international securities markets is also 
possible, which implies that an increase in an acquirer’s stock market valuation will lead to 
an increase in CBMA volume (Froot and Dabora (1999) and Baker, Foley and Wurgler 
(2004)).   
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a market timing hypothesis of M&As, which suggests 
that managers are rational and that their perceptions of mispricing drive acquisition activities. 
In essence, they argue that “mergers are a form of arbitrage by rational managers acting in 
irrational markets.” If managers perceive their firms to be overvalued, they tend to conduct 
acquisitions not for synergy reasons but to preserve some of the temporary excess value for 
shareholders by purchasing undervalued targets using their overvalued stock. This in turn 
provides a cushioning effect for the drop in the acquirer’s share price and leaves shareholders 
with more hard assets per share. Alternatively, if a deal’s value proposition caters to investor 
appetites, which causes the combined entity to be overvalued, managers tend to conduct the 
deal to gain a cushioning effect even if a higher premium is likely to be paid. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Vishanathan (2005) support the market timing hypothesis by 
showing that firms with higher market-to-book ratios have a tendency to acquire those with 
lower market-to-book ratios.  
 
Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) argue that although managerial decisions based on 
market timing may increase firm value in the short run, the long-run value of the firm may 
be lower as prices correct. Empirical evidence of this argument is found in the work of 
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Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009), which shows that although acquirers’ announcement 
returns are higher in high-valuation markets than in low-valuation markets, the opposite 
wealth effect occurs over the long term. Additionally, they find that the long-term 
underperformance of acquirers is driven by firms that undertake deals near the end of the 
merger wave and suggest that management herding behaviour causes late movers to engage 
in low-quality deals. Given the notion proposed by Persons and Warther (1997) that ex ante 
uncertainty can only be determined by ex post performance, managerial herding can be 
viewed as a rational behaviour rather than as late movers making bad decisions, in the sense 
the that positive experience of early movers encourages others to follow, and this herding 
effect ends when the ex post performance of recent movers is sufficiently poor. 
 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that although theoretical works differentiate between the 
irrational managerial behaviour approach and the irrational investor behaviour approach, in 
practice, there is no reason why both channels of irrationality cannot operate at the same 
time. 
 
4.2.1.4 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory is used to explain the persistent underperformance of acquiring firms in 
M&As. Agency theory posits that mergers offer private benefits to acquiring firms’ managers 
and lead to value-destroying deals for acquirers’ shareholders. Jensen (1986) proposes a free 
cash flow hypothesis whereby managers intentionally accumulate excess cash to insulate 
them from monitoring by external markets and make value-destroying investment decisions. 
In line with the free cash flow hypothesis, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms are more 
likely to conduct M&As and that these deals are value-decreasing for shareholders overall, 
as reflected in negative announcement returns and the subsequent poor operating 
performance of the combined firm.  
 
It is also important to note the key distinction between agency theory and the hubris 
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hypothesis. Agency theory proposes that managers suffer from moral hazard or opportunism 
and desire to increase their personal undiversified risk or to increase the scope of their 
authority at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. In contrast, the hubris hypothesis proposes 
that managers are overconfident and engage in good-faith mismanagement that is value 
decreasing; in other words, managers do not deliberately jeopardize shareholders’ wealth 
through merger activities. 
 
4.2.1.5 Executive Compensation 
 
Though most agency theories and hubris hypotheses that explain M&As cannot be 
reconciled, there is one exception – executive compensation. 
 
On the one hand, executive compensation can be viewed as a corporate governance 
instrument that helps curb managerial opportunism and align managerial interests with those 
of the shareholders. For example, Bliss and Rosen (2001) suggest that performance-based 
compensation for bank CEOs is likely to lead to fewer acquisitions, and Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Raman (2001) show that performance-based compensation is linked with higher 
announcement returns in M&As. 
 
On the other hand, executive compensation can be viewed as providing feedback to CEOs, 
and higher compensation is likely to signal to CEOs that they are successful and to boost 
managerial overconfidence. For instance, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find a positive 
correlation between acquisition premiums and the gap between the highest CEO pay and the 
next-highest officer pay. Moreover, Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2007) find that higher-
paid CEOs, as proxied by “CEO centrality”, are more likely to conduct value decreasing 
M&As. Although they explain their results by suggesting that more powerful CEOs are less 
likely to be disciplined by the board (agency theory), there is another potential explanation 
for this observation: more powerful CEOs are likely to be overconfident and engage in good-
faith mismanagement that destroys shareholder value.  
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4.2.2 Additional Motivations for CBMAs  
 
In theory, CBMAs occur for the same reasons that domestic mergers do; however, national 
boundaries add an extra element to the calculus of CBMAs because they are associated with 
an additional set of frictions that can either impede or facilitate their progress, including 
cultural and geographic differences, governance-related differences, and imperfect 
integration of capital markets across countries (i.e., through changes in exchange rates or 
stock market valuations in the local currency) (Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012)).    
 
Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2013) suggest that different languages and religions, as well 
as longstanding feuds between countries, can increase the contracting costs in CBMAs. The 
physical distance can also increase the costs and decrease the likelihood of mergers (Rose 
(2000)). In addition, corporate governance arguments suggest that firms in countries with 
better legal or accounting standards tend to acquire those in countries with lower-quality 
governance (Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris, Brisley and Cabolis (2008)). Differences in 
the level of market development can also promote CBMAs by encouraging firms in 
developed markets to acquire those in emerging markets to benefit from the weaker 
contracting environments (Chari, Quimet and Tesar (2011)).  
 
Another important factor in cross-border mergers is valuation. Erel, Liao and Weisbach 
(2012) find that country-level valuation changes, such as changes in currency movements 
and differences in country-level stock market performance, affect mergers by making 
otherwise economically sensible mergers more attractive. Therefore, CBMAs should not be 
viewed as pure financial arbitrage. Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) also suggest two possible 
(and not mutually exclusive) explanations for differences between the pre-merger country-
level stock market performances of merging firms. One explanation is that the different in 
stock market returns could affect the relative wealth of the two countries, motivating firms 
in the wealthier country to purchase firms in the poor country. This could occur either 
because the increase in wealth lowers the potential cost of capital for acquirers (Froot and 
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Stein (1991)) or because the imperfect integration of capital markets renders firms in 
countries with poorer-performing stock markets relatively inexpensive compared with 
acquirers’ other potential investments. The other explanation is that either overpricing of the 
acquiring firm or underpricing of the target firm could generate potential gains for the 
acquiring firm (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). Following Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009), 
Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) perform a similar test to distinguish between these 
explanations and find that the relative wealth explanation better illustrates the relation 
between valuation differences and CBMAs than the mispricing explanation; their results 
indicate that valuations do not revert to their true values post-merger.  
 
4.2.3 Existing Literature on CBMA Performance 
 
Despite the fact that an increasing amount of international merger activity involves acquirers 
from emerging countries, most prior literature focuses on the wealth effect of acquirers in 
the developed countries, though the empirical evidence on this value creation remains 
inconclusive. 
 
Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) investigate shareholder wealth creation for 195 foreign 
firms that targeted US firms between 1983 and 1992 and a control sample of 112 US CBMAs 
over the same period. Their results indicate that although foreign acquirers experience 
significant positive announcement returns when purchasing US targets, US acquirers that 
buy targets in other countries do not experience similar gains. In addition, they find that 
acquirer announcement returns are not related to the relative size of target to acquirer, to the 
extent of the acquirer’s overseas exposure, or to the target's R&D intensity. Acquirer 
announcement returns also do not exhibit any industry factor and are not affected by the 
value of the foreign currency. Nevertheless, they find support for the hypotheses that 
competition among bidding firms for a single target decreases the returns to the acquirers 
and that the 1986 Tax Act has not led to any gains for foreign buyers of US firms.  
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Martynova and Renneboog (2008) employ a sample of 2419 European CBMAs from 1993 
to 2001 and find that the acquirer abnormal return over a three-day event window around the 
announcement date is 0.47 and statistically significant. They also find that a shared language, 
a common border between the acquirer and the target, and shareholder rights improvement 
for the acquirer and the target all exert a positive impact on acquirer returns, whereas acquirer 
size and hostile bids have a negative impact on acquirer returns.  
 
Chari, Quimet and Tesar (2011) study 346 CBMAs from developed countries to emerging 
countries between 1986 and 2006 and find that the developed-market acquirers experience 
significant three-day announcement returns of 1.16% on average. They suggest that this 
wealth gain is positively correlated with the asymmetry between developed and emerging 
market institutions and with the intangibility of the target industries’ assets. 
 
Benou, Gleason and Madura (2007) examine the wealth effect of 503 high-tech CBMAs 
conducted by US acquirers during the period 1985 to 2001. They find that investor 
perception of high-tech deals is more positive when these deals have more tangible assets 
(less information asymmetry) and more media attention and are advised by top-tier 
investment banks. However, on average, US acquirers experience positive but insignificant 
announcement returns when purchasing high-tech firms overseas.  
 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007) study the acquiring firm’s shareholder wealth effect for a 
sample of 9733 CBMAs from both Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon countries between 
1981 and 2002. They find that the average acquirer wealth gain over a twenty-one day event 
window around the merger announcement is 0.6% and that this wealth gain varies when a 
different event window is used. Three years post-merger, acquirers from the US and Europe 
experience a 19% loss in market value compared with a portfolio of non-merging firms in 
their size decile and two-digit industry; acquirers in Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
experience a 16% loss; and acquirers in four Scandinavian countries experience a 15% loss. 
They suggest that although their results indicate that some mergers are driven by economic 
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rationales, a fair amount of CBMAs in continental Europe are driven by the managerial 
discretion and/or hubris hypotheses. Moreover, their results indicate that corporate 
governance institutions in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries promote better 
investment performance than those in Europe, when one’s attention is confined to mergers. 
 
Kuipers, Miller and Patel (2009) examine the effect of legal environments and corporate 
governance structures across different countries on both target and acquirer announcement 
returns for a sample of successful CBMAs involve foreign acquirers and US targets between 
1982 and 1991. They find that the average CAR during the two-day announcement window 
before announcement is highly significant at 23.1% for US targets and a similarly significant 
-0.92% for foreign acquirers. Their results indicate that the incentive mechanisms created by 
the degree of shareholder-creditor rights protection and legal enforcement in the acquirer’s 
country help to explain the observed variation in target, acquirer and portfolio returns.  
 
Bris and Cabolis (2008) analyze the effects of changes in corporate governance on firm value 
by examining 506 CBMAs that acquired 100% of the target shares. They find that target 
firms gain a significant abnormal return of 14.20%, whereas acquirers experience a 
significant abnormal return of −1.12% five days around the merger announcement. In 
addition, the authors suggest that the better the shareholder protection and accounting 
standards are in the acquirer’s country, the higher the merger premiums are for CBMAs 
relative to matching domestic acquisitions. 
 
In the above literature, the targets are from both developed and emerging countries and 
acquirers are mainly from developed countries. Another stream of studies focuses on 
CBMAs made by acquirers in emerging countries: Gubbi et al. (2010) look at 425 CBMAs 
carried out by Indian acquirers during the period 2000 to 2007 and report that Indian 
acquirers on average earn significantly positive abnormal returns of 2.58% over the eleven-
day event window around the merger announcement. They also report that higher value is 
generated for acquirers when the target firms are located in advanced countries and 
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institutional environments, given that country markets that promise higher-quality resources 
are more strongly complementary to the existing capabilities of acquiring firms in emerging 
economies.  
 
Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine acquirer announcement returns in 433 CBMAs conducted 
by 58 emerging-market multinationals between 1991 and 2004 and find that CBMAs not 
only do not generate value for acquirers but are value destroying for more than half of the 
transactions. They further suggest that target size, target diversification, and private status of 
the target are positively correlated with acquirer announcement returns, whereas high-tech 
and focussed deals are negatively correlated with acquirer returns. Aybar and Ficici (2009) 
also find that the percentage of shares acquired in the target firm and cultural distance 
positively affect acquirer value creation, whereas international experience and enhanced 
corporate governance do not. 
 
Bhagat, Malhotra and Zhu (2011) look at the characteristics and performance of acquirers in 
698 CBMAs made by firms in emerging countries from 1991 to 2008 and find that emerging-
country acquirers experience a positive and a significant market response of 1.09% on the 
announcement day. They further find that acquirer returns are positively correlated with 
(better) corporate governance measures in the target country. 
 
4.2.4 The Emergence of China and Motivations behind Chinese CBMAs  
 
The economic reforms introduced by China in 1978 were founded on openness to commerce 
with the rest of the world. Since that time, China’s export sectors have served as a remarkable 
engine for China’s spectacular growth. In addition, the Chinese government has displayed a 
welcoming political policy towards foreign investors, termed the “Invite In” policy, which 
is intended to attract foreign direct investment to fuel the growth of China’s industrial 
machine with necessary capital. Foreign investors have responded well to this policy, 
injecting tens of billions of dollars into China to take advantage of its favourable taxation, 
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legislation and financing, as well as its cheap labour force; investors that produce export 
goods have received the lion’s share. 44  In the meantime, China has accumulated huge 
amounts of foreign exchange reserves, which exerts upward pressure on the foreign 
exchange rate of its currency, the RMB, and fuels demands from the western world that 
China appreciates the RMB against dollar. To alleviate this pressure, the Chinese 
government has actively tried to utilize its foreign exchange reserves in CBMAs.  
 
Moreover, to ensure that China’s reformed and market-oriented economic system continues 
to flourish, the government recognizes that encouraging Chinese companies to invest 
overseas is as critical as attracting foreign direct investment and thus launched the “go global” 
policy in 1999. The “go global” policy has three main purposes: first, it aims to alleviate the 
pressure to appreciate the RMB; second, it aims to sustain the resources necessary for 
China’s growth over the medium to long term; and third, it aims to support local companies’ 
efforts to gain competitiveness through the appropriation of foreign technology and the 
assimilation of modern business practices (Gu and Reed (2010)). 
 
In 2001, the Chinese government identified outward direct investment as one of the 
keystones of its 2001-2006 Tenth Five-Year Plan and set aside 500 billion US dollars for 
outbound investment within these five years. In particular, the government directed specific 
sectors to invest overseas, including the energy sector, which has been allocated 100 billion 
US dollars to spend on CBMAs (South China Moring Post, 2005). 
 
The urge to go global intensified when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 because its participation in this group created not only opportunities for Chinese 
companies to expand their trade but also intensive competition between local and foreign 
companies within the domestic market. 
 
                                                     
44 Source: A Brave New World, The Climate for Chinese M&A Abroad, Economists Intelligence 
Unit, 2010. 
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In 2006, the Chinese government reinforced the “go global” policy in its 2006-2010 Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan, aiming to bring the corporate sector in line with China’s globalization. The 
most recent five-year plan, the 2011-2015 Twelfth Five-Year Plan, has clear targets in place, 
including a 17% increase in overseas investment, which contemplates overseas investment 
of US$150 billion by 2015.45 
 
4.2.5 Existing Literature on Chinese CBMA Performance 
 
Despite the recent surge in CBMA activity, few academic studies empirically examine the 
performance of Chinese acquirers in CBMAs. Rather, existing studies of Chinese CBMAs 
are merely reviews of existing theories, descriptions of the current situation and case studies.   
 
Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008) examine the strategic motivation and performance of 27 
CBMAs conducted between 2000 and 2004 by Chinese acquirers listed on either the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. They find that Chinese CBMAs are driven primarily 
by strategic motivations, for example, to facilitate international expansion and 
diversification (the primary motive for 39% of acquirers), to increase market share and 
power and to acquire strategic assets (the primary motive for 27% of acquirers) and to 
overcome government-mandated barriers (the primary motive for 7% of acquirers). In terms 
of merger performance, Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008) find that Chinese acquirers 
experience significantly positive announcement returns of 1.3% three days around the 
merger announcement, which supports the view that CBMAs enable international firms to 
create value for their shareholders by exploiting imperfections in product, factor and capital 
markets. 
 
Wu and Xie (2010) study 32 Chinese CBMAs conducted by acquirers listed on either the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2000 to 2006 and find that both pre-acquisition 
performance and the proportion of state-owned shares are positively correlated with the 
                                                     
45 Source: MOFCOM’s 12th Five-Year Plan for utilization of foreign investment, 15 May, 2012. 
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performance of Chinese companies that engage in CBMAs. Their results indicate that better 
managers are able to extend their management competence to the combined company and 
that higher levels of state ownership benefit acquisition performance through favourable 
government policies and stricter supervision by state agencies, which leads to fewer 
irrational acquisitions. However, they do not find any significant effect of corporate age or 
free cash flow on acquirer performance.  
 
Chen and Young (2010) test the relationship between state ownership and acquirer 
performance by looking at 39 Chinese CBMAs conducted from 2000 to 2008. They 
proposed two hypotheses, the first being that increased state ownership in the acquiring firms 
will lead investors to view the deal in less favourable terms (the principal-principal conflict) 
and the second being that environmental complexity will moderate the negative effect of the 
principal-principal conflict (the moderating effect). They find support the principal-principal 
conflict by observing a negative relationship between government ownership in the 
acquiring firm and merger announcement returns but find no support for the moderating 
effect.  
 
Gu and Reed (2010) study the performance of 145 CBMAs by Chinese acquiring firms over 
the period 1994 to 2008. They aim to investigate whether stock markets view Chinese 
CBMAs as value enhancing for shareholders and whether there is a change in the market 
perception of CBMAs between before the “go global” period and after the “go global” period. 
Their results indicate that throughout the entire sample period, the market reacts positively 
to Chinese CBMA announcements. However, market reaction to CBMAs becomes less 
favourable during the “go global” period. They propose two hypotheses to explain the 
market reaction to CBMA after the implementation of go global policy, which aimed to 
encourage overseas investment. One is that CBMA volume increased as a result of go global 
policy, but with less attractive targets on average; hence, volume reduces quality. The other 
hypothesis is that the go global policy redirects investment towards industries with national 
strategic value at the expense of profits. They find no support for the latter hypothesis and 
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suggest that whatever the role national strategic interest plays in motivating Chinese CBMAs 
after the go global policy, it is unlikely that this motivation has come at the expense of 
shareholder wealth.  
 
Black et al. (2013) compare the performance of Chinese domestic and cross-border mergers 
from 2000 to 2009 and find that CBMA acquirers enjoy significantly higher returns over the 
long term, although short term CBMA returns are more negative than those of domestic deals. 
They also find that acquirers’ returns vary substantially according to acquirer size and to 
target characteristics. Their results suggest indicate that resource-related deals are more 
likely to generate significant wealth for shareholders only for domestic deals in the short run, 
indicating that external political biases against government efforts to acquire resources at the 
expense of shareholder wealth are unfounded.  
 
4.2.6 Hypotheses Development 
 
Over the past decade, the growing scarcity of quality natural resources in China has led to 
an upsurge in resource-related CBMAs.46 The Chinese government has not only paid more 
attention to the resource-related sector but has provided it with more legislative flexibility 
and easier access to financing than any other sectors, particularly after the tremendous 
investment losses in US financial sector during the crisis. For example, with respect to more 
flexible legislation, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2011 
increased the scope of its provincial-level approval authority to US$300 million for the 
resource-related sector and to US$100 million for other sectors to accelerate the approval 
process. With respect to easier access to financing, the Chinese government created two 
special funds to support companies undertaking mine investment overseas in 2009; these 
companies are also able to obtain access to outward economic and technical cooperation 
funding from the Ministry of Finance.  
                                                     
46 Resource-related CBMAs are defined as deals in which targeted at firms operate in the energy or 
materials industry sectors.   
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A recent study by Gu and Reed (2010) of 145 Chinese outbound M&As from 1994 to 2008 
finds that firms in the energy, natural resources and technology sectors are the most common 
targets and that the proportion of CBMAs involving these targets increased from 13% to 
30% after the “go global” period. They suggest that this boost is consistent with the purpose 
of the “go global” policy to assure sufficient resource availability for China’s future 
economic growth and is profit-enhancing for Chinese acquirers. Black et al. (2013) compare 
the abnormal returns of Chinese cross-border and domestic M&As between 2000 and 2009 
and find that the market reacts positively to resource-related deals in the short run for 
domestic transactions only, indicating that external political biases against China are 
unfounded.  
 
Furthermore, Jacks (2013) reveals that long-term inflation-adjusted price appreciation is 
most pronounced for commodities that are “in the ground”, such as energy, minerals and 
natural gas, whereas prices for resources that can be grown have trended downwards. He 
suggests that during periods of industrialization and urbanization, as occurred in China in 
the 2000s, “in-the-ground” commodity prices can be pushed further off trend. Moreover, the 
post-acquisition success of natural resource-related transactions is less dependent on the 
post-acquisition integration capabilities of the acquiring firms than the success of their non-
resource-related counterparts is. This result occurs because resource-related transactions 
tend to have one clear goal, to access resources, and once the resources are extracted, the 
mission is complete. 
 
Although the torrent of publicity in western countries has emphasized China’s intensions to 
“lay its hands on the world’s resources” in a close-to-imperial manner and to confer unfair 
advantages upon the target firms, and the possibility of Chinese government to redirect 
investment towards sectors with national strategic value at the expense of shareholders’ 
wealth; we suggest the overall effect of stronger domestic demand, more legislative 
flexibility, easier access to financing and smoother integration processes, along with the 
price appreciation of “in the ground” commodities, leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis I – Bidders acquiring resource-related targets should earn higher abnormal 
returns than bidders acquiring non-resource-related targets do in Chinese CBMAs. 
 
Much attention has been paid to the RMB exchange rate in recent years, and the US has 
placed commercial pressure on China to appreciate its currency against dollar. After keeping 
the RMB fixed at RMB8.25: US$1 for more than ten years during a period of high growth 
and declining inflation rates, the People’s Bank of China announced on 21st of July 2005 
that it would revalue RMB exchange rate to RMB8.11: US$1 and lift its de facto fixed peg 
of the RMB to the USD by implementing a managed float system. Since then, the nominal 
rate of the RMB against the USD has appreciated over 20% (McKinnon (2005) and Qin and 
He (2011)). Most existing literature on the RMB exchange rate has focussed on issues related 
to the risks and opportunities associated with future exchange rate movements, for example, 
whether RMB appreciation will lead to a zero-interest liquidity trap in Chinese financial 
markets that will render the central bank helpless to combat future deflation, similar to the 
earlier experience of Japan (McKinon (2006), McKinnon (2005) and Qiao (2005)); less 
attention has been given to the impact of RMB appreciation on the volume of Chinese 
CBMA activity and to acquirer performance after removal of the peg.  
 
Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) discover that currency movement is a major factor in 
determining the pattern of CBMAs such that firms in countries whose currencies have 
appreciated (depreciated) are more likely to be acquirers (targets). After econometrically 
controlling for overall time trends, they find that short-run movements between two 
countries’ currencies increase the propensity of firms in the country with the appreciating 
currency to purchase firms in the country with the depreciating currency. Moreover, they 
suggest that the effect of currency movements on merger likelihood is likely to be indicative 
of a more general valuation effect such that higher-valued firms tend to purchase lower-
valued firms and that the wealth explanation is a more appropriate argument for this scenario 
than the mispricing explanation is.  
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Chen, Officer and Shen (2014) examine the effect of currency appreciation on acquiring 
firms’ wealth creation in an international context and find that CBMAs led by acquiring 
firms with “large currency appreciation” generate higher short- and long-term abnormal 
returns. The short-term wealth enhancement is more pronounced when acquiring firm is 
from a country with better corporate governance and legal environments. The 
outperformance for post-acquisition returns is more pronounced for acquiring firms with 
stronger shareholder rights.47  
 
Another study by Black et al. (2013) specifically examines Chinese CBMAs and suggests 
that RMB appreciation could benefit bidding firms’ wealth creation if they are able to acquire 
more cheaply abroad, but find no evidence to support this argument. The results of this study 
could be limited by the relatively small sample size (43 CBMAs) because their work 
considers only the performance of acquirers listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. We use a more comprehensive dataset comprising 111 CBMAs undertaken by 
Chinese acquirers listed on all stock exchanges with available accounting information and 
propose the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II – Chinese bidders earn higher abnormal returns in the period after currency 
appreciation than in the period before currency appreciation48 due to the lower cost of 
capital and increased relative wealth.  
 
The worsening of the financial crisis in the US beginning in mid-2008 caused liquidity to 
dry up for a large number of western firms. To combat the liquidity shortage, these firms are 
                                                     
47 Chen, Officer and Shen (2014) find that acquiring firms from weak corporate and shareholder 
rights countries are more likely to overpay their targets following large currency appreciation, thus 
result in lower announcement returns for acquiring firms’ shareholders. Moreover, acquiring firms 
from countries with weak shareholder rights make poor choices of targets and thus, any synergies 
generated over the long term might be so negative as to offset any benefit from currency appreciation-
driven CBMAs. 
48 We classify the Currency Appreciation period as the period after the RMB exchange rate reform 
on 21 July 2005. 
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forced to downsize and sell off their assets, which results in severe depreciation in firm value 
and thus makes them potential targets of Chinese acquirers. Moreover, after the financial 
crisis, many western governments relaxed their monitoring and approval mechanisms for 
Chinese investment, particularly with respect to investment undertaken by SOEs. This 
friendlier environment creates greater opportunities for Chinese companies to acquire 
overseas. For instance, in February 2013, China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
successfully completed its US$15.1 billion takeover of Canadian oil and gas company Nexen, 
making it China’s largest-ever foreign takeover.  
 
In our sample, we also observe evidence of a dramatic increase in the number of completed 
CBMAs during the post-crisis period, from 8 deals in 2007 to more than 20 deals per year 
since then. Additionally, the financial crisis has decreased merger competition and hence the 
bid premium for Chinese acquirers. We suggest that the lower valuation and bid premiums 
for western firms are likely to create wealth gains for Chinese acquirers that undertake 
CBMAs during the crisis period. However, bidding firms’ managers may have concerns 
about increased competiveness in the M&A market as economic conditions improve because 
foreign buyers are likely to return to the market and create competitive disadvantages for 
Chinese firms. Moreover, potential targets might be less willing to sell because the recovery 
of financial markets could give them access to alternative means of financing.49 Considering 
the above-mentioned factors together, we argue that the financial crisis is likely to increase 
managerial opportunism and decrease shareholder wealth because managers might succumb 
to the temptation to buy assets quickly rather than focusing on carefully researched targets. 
 
Therefore, we suggest that although foreign acquisitions are ostensibly welcomed and more 
foreign assets are available at lower costs, Chinese acquirers are relatively inexperienced in 
integrating cross-border deals, and this lack of management expertise combined with 
managers’ rush to purchase “bargain targets” rather than carefully identifying specific targets 
will offset the wealth benefit derived from the financial crisis and lead to long-term 
                                                     
49A Brave New World, The Climate for Chinese M&A Abroad. 
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underperformance of the acquiring firms.  
 
Hypothesis III – Chinese bidders earn lower abnormal returns in the period after the 
financial crisis period50 than in the period before the financial crisis period because the 
wealth benefit associated with the lower cost of capital is outweighed by the wealth 
destruction associated with managerial opportunism. 
 
  
                                                     
50 We classify the Financial Crisis period as the period after Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008. We use this event date to separate the periods before 
and after the financial crisis for the following reasons: after the burst of the US housing bubble in 
late 2006, the first phase of financial crisis commenced in August 2007 when BNP Paribas terminated 
withdrawals from three hedge funds that specialized in US mortgage debt. It was one year before 
the crisis came to a head, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers’ on 15 September 2008 was a 
turning point for the global financial meltdown. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy was the largest failure 
of an investment bank since the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert 18 years before. Immediately 
after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, an already distressed financial market began to suffer a 
period of extreme volatility, during which the Dow Jones Industrial Average experienced its largest 
one-day point loss, largest intra-day range of more than 1,000 points and largest daily point gain.  
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Sample Selection and Data Description  
 
The second wave of Chinese CBMAs was ushered in by China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 
(Chen and Yong (2010)); therefore, we collect a sample of Chinese CBMAs announced 
between 1 January 2002 and 31 January 2011 from Thomson One Banker. The original 
sample contains 1,205 deals. We require bidders to be listed firms and exclude from the 
sample leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, 
repurchases and privatizations, leaving us with 394 transactions. Among those transactions, 
we include only successful deals, which results in a sample of 225 deals. Following Gu and 
Reed (2010), we exclude deals in which either the bidder or target operates within the 
financial sector because the financial reporting standards and requirements of the financial 
sector differ from those of other sectors, which yields a sample of 167 transactions. Finally, 
we exclude deals that are missing accounting information, which gives us a total number of 
111 CBMAs. 
 
We collect a number of informational items from Thomson One Banker, including the 
nationality, public status, DataStream code, and primary industry as measured by the four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code of each acquirer and target; and the 
announcement date, form, method of payment, and status of each deal. In addition, the 
following data are obtained from DataStream: each acquirer’s share price, market value, 
market-to-book value, leverage, funds from operations and common equity; and market 
indexes for Standard and Poor's / Toronto Stock Exchange Composite, Standard and Poor's 
/ Australian Stock Exchange 300, FTSE Bursa Malaysia Klci, FTSE Bursa Malaysia ACE, 
Standard and Poor's / Hkex GEM, Hang Sheng, FTSE AIM All-Share, TSE Mothers, 
NASDAQ Composite, New York Stock Exchange Composite, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
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Composite, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite, Shenzhen Stock Exchange SME 
Composite, Shenzhen Chinext Composite, MDAX Frankfurt, and MSCI Singapore. 
 
4.3.2 Methodology 
 
4.3.2.1 Short-Term Event Study Methodology 
 
To measure short-term market announcement period returns, we follow Brown and Warner’s 
(1985) standard event study methodology and calculate CARs for a three-day period (-1, +1) 
surrounding the announcement date supplied by Thomson One Banker.  
We calculate the normal returns of the acquirer and the market as follows: 
ri = ln(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
) 
 
Where ri is the daily normal return of firm i. Pi, t and Pi, t-1 refer to the daily price index for 
firm i at day t and day t-1, respectively.  
rm(i) = ln(
Pm(i),t
Pm(i),t−1
) 
 
Here, rm(i) is the stock exchange index normal return at which firm i is listed. Pm(i), t and  
Pm(i), t-1 refer to the daily price index for the stock exchange index at which firm i is listed 
on days t and t-1, respectively. 
 
We then follow Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller’s (2002) modified market adjusted model and 
calculate AR on any stock i as the difference between its return and the simultaneous return 
on the market portfolio: 
ARi,t = ri,t − rm(i),t 
 
Finally, we summate ARs to give the 3-day cumulative AR (3-day CAR) surrounding the 
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announcement date: 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t
t=+1
t=−1
 
 
T-statistics are used to test whether the null hypothesis holds, that is, whether the mean CAR 
is equal to zero for a sample of n firms. The conventional formula to compute t-statistics is 
as follows:  
tCARi =
∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1
(σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) /√n)
 
 
where ∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1  refers to the sample mean and σ (∑
CARi
n
i=n
i=1 ) refers to the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviation for the sample of n firms. To assess the strength of the evidence 
against the null hypothesis, we convert t-statistics into probabilities (i.e., p-values), which 
are presented in the results section. The larger the p-value, the weaker the evidence that the 
mean CAR is different from zero; and vice versa. 
 
4.3.2.2 Long-Term Methodology 
 
To measure long-term acquirer returns, many researchers advocate the use of BHAR 
approach because of its accurate measure of the abnormal returns experienced by an investor 
(Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999); Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Buchheim et al. (2001)).  
 
We follow the BHAR approach employed by Buchheim et al. (2001) and measure returns 
over the twenty-four months after the deal announcement month (24-month BHAR). The 
BHAR is computed as the difference between the compounded actual return and the 
compounded predicted return: 
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BHARi,t = ∏[1 + Ri,t] −
T
t=0
∏[1 + Rm,t]
T
t=0
 
 
where Ri,t refers to the monthly returns of acquiring firm i at month t and Rm(i),t refers to the 
monthly returns of the stock exchange index on which firm i is listed at month t. 
 
Regarding the computation of t-statistics, we note that the BHAR approach is associated 
with a potential positive-skewness problem, whereby it can produce statistically significant 
results even when there is none due to the short-run movement effect. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
suggest that the bootstrapped t-statistic helps correct for instances in which the 
methodological approach over-rejects the data and hence incorrectly rejects a true null 
hypothesis. Therefore, we implement the skewness-adjusted bootstrapped t-statistics 
procedure used by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) to compute the statistical significance of 
BHAR. The skewness-adjusted t-statistic is given by the formula below: 
tsa = √n (S +
1
3
γ̂S2 +
1
6n
γ̂) 
 
where γ̂ is the skewness, S is the standard deviation, and n is the number of observations: 
S =
BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t
σ(BHARt)
 
 
γ̂ =
∑ (BHARit − BHAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t)
3n
i=1
nσ(BHARt)3
 
 
 
4.3.3 Empirical Model  
 
Our empirical model aims to test how industry preferences, major changes in currency policy 
and the global financial crisis affect the market reaction to Chinese cross-border merger 
announcements over both the short and long terms. Our focus is on acquiring firm returns 
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because this allows us to include not only public acquisitions but also private and subsidiary 
acquisitions. In addition, we control for various acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics 
when testing market reactions in both time horizons. Because our sample spans more than 
nine years, during which time both the economic and political systems in China substantially 
evolved, we control for year fixed effects in the model. Furthermore, to account for repeat 
acquirers, the standard errors are clustered at the acquiring firm level. Combining all 
variables, the multivariate framework for acquirer CAR or BHAR is shown as below: 
 
CAR or BHAR = α + β1 × Resource − Related Targets Dummy + β2
× Currency Appreciation Dummy + β3 × Financial Crisis Dummy + β4
× Stock Dummy + β5 × Cash Dummy + β6 × Public Deal Dummy + β7
× Diversifying Deal Dummy + β8 × Book − to − Market + β9
× Ln(Size) + β10 × Leverage + β11 × Cash Flows − to − Equity + β12
× Sigma + β13 × Run − Up + ∑ γi × Year Dummy + εi 
 
The dependent variable in our model is either CAR or BHAR, which are the market reactions 
to a merger announcement in the short and long terms, respectively. Our main results are the 
three-day CAR around the merger announcement date and the BHAR over the twenty-four 
months after the deal announcement month. 
 
Table 4.1 presents the correlation coefficients of each pair of variables used in the 
multivariate analysis. Our results show that a high correlation exists between the “Currency 
Appreciation” dummy and the “Financial Crisis” dummy, may likely to create 
multicollinearity problems. To check for the severity of multicollinearity, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is computed following all of the regressions. We find that the VIF 
values for these two dummies are under 2 in all of the regressions. The mean VIFs for all 
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regressions are also under 2, hence there is no multicollinearity concern.51 
 
[Insert Table 4.1] 
 
Modelling the bidder’s choice between resource-related and non-resource-related targets is 
important as it allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of target industry 
preference on bidder returns (i.e., estimates that control for endogeneity biases). The 
instrumental variable constructed is named as “Scope”, which takes the value of one if, the 
bidder belongs to either the resource-related sector or is a SOE; takes the value of two if the 
bidder belongs to the resource-related sector and is a SOE; and zero otherwise. We argue 
that the “Scope” variable is positively correlated with the choice of target being resource-
related, but its correlation with bidder returns is less clear. To test the presence of 
endogeneity bias, we implement the Heckman two-stage procedure for our sample. We find 
that the “Scope” variable is highly significant and positively correlated to the choice of target 
being resource-related. The pseudo-R2 of the first-stage equation suggests that the model 
explains 82.6% of the choice of targets. From the first-stage equation, we construct an 
inverse Mills ratio and add it as an additional regressor to the second-stage equation. The 
coefficient on this endogeneity control (or selection term) is negative but statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. Thus, we suggest that the coefficient estimates for bidder 
returns shown in our results below are reliable.52 
 
In our model, the key variables are “Resource-Related Target”, “Currency Appreciation” and 
“Financial Crisis”. “Resource-Related Target” is a binary variable equal to one if the target 
operates in the energy and materials industry sectors and equal to zero otherwise. “Currency 
Appreciation” is a binary variable equal to one if the merger is conducted after the RMB 
                                                     
51 The results of multicollinearity checks are available upon request. 
52 The results for the first- (selection) and second- (outcome) stage equations are available upon 
request. 
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exchange rate reform on 21 July 2005 and equal to zero otherwise. “Financial Crisis” is a 
binary variable equal to one if the merger is conducted after Lehman Brothers filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008 and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Drawing from the existing literature, we include in our model several of the most frequently 
used and relevant measures of deal- and bidder-specific characteristics as control variables. 
They are as follows: method of payment; target firm listing status; deal diversification; and 
the acquirer’s valuation, size, leverage, free cash flow, idiosyncratic volatility and run-up 
before the deal announcement. 
 
“Stock” and “Cash” are used to classify different payment types. “Stock” is a binary variable 
equal to one if the deal is financed using 100% stock, and “Cash” is a binary variable equal 
to one if the deal is financed using 100% cash. Travlos (1987) suggests that in a world 
characterised by asymmetric information, an all-cash offer indicates potential 
undervaluation of the acquiring firm and will result in non-negative announcement returns 
for the acquirer, whereas an all-stock payment signals potential overvaluation of the 
acquiring firm and will cause significant losses for the acquirer at the announcement. His 
results are consistent with the signalling hypothesis. Moreover, Chang (1998) compares the 
announcement returns for privately held and publicly listed targets when stock and cash 
offers are used and find that in contrast to the negative abnormal returns typically found for 
publicly traded targets, acquirers experience positive announcement returns on stock offers 
when the target is privately held. However, in cash offers, the acquirer returns are zero and 
are insignificantly different for both types of targets. 
 
We also control for the listing status of the target firm in our model. “Public Deal” is a binary 
variable equal to one if the target firm is a public firm and equal to zero if the target firm is 
a private firm. Recent literature shows that acquirers obtain positive announcement returns 
when they purchase privately held targets but experience zero to negative returns when they 
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purchase publicly listed targets. This difference in performance is commonly known as the 
“private target discount” and is explained generally by the lack of market liquidity for and 
more information asymmetry with private targets (Chang (1998); Koeplin, Sarin, and 
Shapiro (2000); Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004); Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 
(2006); Officer (2007)).  
 
In addition, there is a considerable literature on the impact of industry relatedness on acquirer 
value creation. On the one hand, many studies find that diversification is value-destroying 
for acquirers, whereas the opposite is true for focussed acquisitions. This diversification 
discount is usually justified by agency theory, overinvestment and cross-subsidization 
arguments and by the inefficient allocation of resources between firms in different industries 
(Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004); Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller (2008)). On the other 
hand, Black et al. (2012) compare the merger performance of Chinese and US bidders and 
find that the diversifying effect exists in US market but does not play a significant role in 
China. Other studies reveal that diversifying acquisitions are value-enhancing for acquiring 
firms’ shareholders and suggest that this diversification premium might emanate from 
enhanced economies of scope and market power, the coinsurance effect, and internal capital 
market efficiencies (Matsusaka (1993); Hubbard, Kuttnerand Palia (1999)). Here, we control 
for deal diversification by creating a binary variable “Diversifying Deal”, which equals one 
if the target is in a different industry than the bidder as measured using the first two digits of 
the four-digit Primary SIC code of the two firms and equals zero otherwise. 
 
Moreover, Jensen (2005) suggests that high valuations increase managerial discretion; 
consequently, managers tend to undertake less favourable acquisitions when good 
acquisitions are no longer available. Dong et al. (2006) find that acquirers with higher 
valuations are likely to experience lower announcement period returns. However, Zhou et al. 
(2012) evaluate the performance of Chinese acquirers that engage in domestic M&As and 
find a positive relationship between market-to-book ratio and acquirer returns in the short-
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run, whereas the opposite trend is observed in the long-run. Hence, we control for the 
acquiring firm’s valuation by measuring its “Book-to-Market” ratio, which is computed as 
the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
 
The effect of firm size on merger performance has been highlighted in a number of studies. 
For example, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) document a significant negative effect 
of firm size on announcement returns, which might be due either to the lack of analyst 
coverage of small firms, which results in profitable opportunities for investors when a firm’s 
stock price deviates temporarily from its real value, or to the higher risk is associated with 
smaller firms, which yields higher returns for investors. Although Black et al. (2012) do not 
find a negative correlation between firm size and Chinese acquirer performance in the short 
term, they discover a significantly positive correlation over the long term, whereby increases 
in firm size lead to higher acquirer returns. In our model, we control for firm’s size effect by 
measuring its “Ln (Size)”, which is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market valuation 
one month prior to the deal announcement date. 
 
In addition, we control for the debt-to-equity ratio of the acquiring firm because much 
attention has been paid in previous literature to the costs and benefits of leverage on firm 
value. Acquirer’s “Leverage” is used as a proxy for its financial risk and is calculated as 
(long-term debt + short-term debt & current portion of long-term debt) / (total capital + short-
term debt & current portion of long-term debt) at one year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) 
suggest that debt can alleviate agency conflicts between stockholders and managers, which 
is commonly known as the debt-monitoring theory. Maloney, Macormick and Mitchell (1993) 
find evidence to support this theory in context of the M&A market; specifically, they show 
that leverage is positively correlated with acquirer announcement returns because it helps to 
reduce agency costs and forces managers to work harder to maximize the cash flow of 
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existing capital and to search for new positive net present value investments. However, they 
also note that the benefit of debt can be limited by its high cost, which can lead to 
underinvestment, asset substitution and bankruptcy costs in the normal corporate setting.  
 
In contrast to the debt-monitoring theory, the free cash flow theory suggests that cash flow 
increases the agency costs of firms and results in poor investment opportunities because 
managers with more free cash flow tend to invest in negative net present value projects when 
positive net present value projects are no longer available rather than paying cash out to 
shareholders (Stulz (1990) and Jensen (1986)). Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) extend on 
the free cash flow theory and find that acquirer announcement returns and cash flow are 
negatively correlated but that the negative correlation is more pronounced for firms with 
poor investment opportunities. Moreover, Harford (1999) examines the acquisition 
behaviour of cash-rich firms and finds that they have more agency conflicts and are more 
likely to make acquisitions. Consistent with the free cash hypothesis, the acquisitions of 
cash-rich firms are value-destroying, as evidenced by negative acquirer announcement 
returns and poor post-acquisition operating performance of the combined firm. Accordingly, 
we control for the acquirer’s “Cash Flows-to-Equity” in our model, which is measured as 
the funds from operations divided by the common equity at one year before the deal 
announcement.53 
 
In addition to cash flow, information asymmetry is also known to influence firm performance. 
For instance, Dierkens (1991) considers the relationship between abnormal returns and 
proxies for the nature of the information environment in equity issues and finds that higher 
information asymmetry is significantly positively correlated with a drop in price at the equity 
issue announcement. Based on Dierkens’ (1991) measure of information asymmetry, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for information 
                                                     
53 Funds from operations represent the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits. It is 
the cash flow of the company. 
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asymmetry and examine its effect on bidder announcement returns in M&As. They report a 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and acquirer announcement returns in 
all-stock offers but not in all-cash offers. More recently, Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos 
(2012) document a negative effect of idiosyncratic volatility on acquirer announcement 
returns for public acquisitions but not for private ones. Therefore, we control for 
idiosyncratic volatility, known as “Sigma” in our model, which is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the acquirer’s market-adjusted daily returns over a three-month period ending 
one week before the deal announcement. 
 
Finally, we control for acquirer “Run-Up”, which is measured as the acquirer-specific returns 
in the period leading up to a merger announcement using the market-adjusted BHAR over a 
three-month period ending one week before the deal announcement. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) examine the incentives for managerial decisions by analysing the relationship 
between acquirers’ past performance and acquirer returns on acquisitions and find that bad 
managers make bad acquisitions simply because they are bad managers, which is consistent 
with the notion that poor performance drives managers to try something new. Alternatively, 
Rosen (2006) finds that idiosyncratic acquirer returns are weakly negatively related to 
acquirer announcement returns. His results support a particular version of Roll's hubris 
hypothesis, which predicts that the worst acquisitions are made by well performing firms 
because their managers are most likely to be infected by hubris. 
 
4.3.4 Sensitivity Tests 
 
For robustness reasons, regression results are produced after controlling for the year effect 
and standard errors are reported after controlling for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. 
Additionally, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to control 
for potential outliers. To ensure the reliability of our results, the short-run event window is 
extended from 3 days to 5 days around the announcement date, and the long-run event 
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window is shortened from 24 months to 12 months after the announcement month. As a 
further check, we change the benchmark market index for CAR and BHAR calculations to 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index and find that the results remain largely 
unchanged. Finally, we restrict the sample to acquiring firms listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, and find that the results largely support our main findings, 
although certain coefficients lose their significance at conventional levels. To save space, all 
robustness test results are available upon request.  
 
4.3.5 Summary Statistics 
 
This section presents the time series and target country distributions of Chinese CBMAs, as 
well as analyses of acquirers’ short- and long-term abnormal returns according to both the 
acquiring and target firms’ industry sectors. 
 
4.3.5.1 Time Series Distribution of Chinese CBMAs Stratified by Target Nationality 
 
Table 4.2 reports the time-series distribution of Chinese CBMAs stratified by target 
nationality. We find that the number of completed M&As has tripled between 2002 and 2010. 
Indeed, after a dramatic increase between 2007 and 2008, more than 20 deals are conducted 
during each year. Particularly, we observe that in 2009, when most developed countries 
remain mired in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the number of successfully 
completed CBMAs reached a record high, accounting for 25 deals in our sample. Almost 
half of these deals are targeted at firms in cash-strapped economies, such as the United States, 
Canada and Australia. This boost in merger activity can be attributed to many factors, such 
as China’s increasing economic power; the implementation of a series of government 
programs designed to encourage outward FDI projects to alleviate China’s resource 
bottleneck, facilitate industrial upgrades, improve innovation capabilities, and increase the 
competence of Chinese firms on the global market (Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008)); and 
 252 
 
the global financial crisis, which altered foreign countries’ attitudes towards Chinese 
acquirers and created myriad opportunities for them to buy assets more cheaply abroad. 
 
[Insert Table 4.2] 
 
Table 4.3 shows that in terms of the deal volume time distribution of targets based on 
nationality, there are three top destinations for Chinese CBMAs: Hong Kong, the United 
States, and Australia. Hong Kong targets account for more than 17% of total deal volume. 
There are two possible reasons for the popularity of Hong Kong targets: the first is that Hong 
Kong provides confidentiality to foreign investors, which is commonly used by 
multinational firms to store wealth beyond the purview of tax authorities (Harris (1993)); the 
other is that Hong Kong is geographically close to China and thus gives Chinese acquirers 
convenient access to trade and financing. The next most frequent target nation is the United 
States. The Chinese government is evidently gearing up to channel more of its investment 
towards the United States, especially after the burst of housing bubble in late 2006, which 
resulted in severely depreciated prices in many asset classes. Moreover, the Chinese 
government has been seeking better returns for its massive currency reserves, which before 
the financial crisis were typically parked in low-yielding securities, such as short-term US 
treasury bonds. Because the risks associated with these bonds increased after the crisis, the 
Chinese government is moving towards longer-term investments to shield itself from short-
term market swings, for example, by acquiring more tangible assets at discounted prices. 
The third most preferred target country is Australia, which is popular for its well-recognized 
high-quality metals and mines, coupled with a relatively more friendly environment for 
Chinese acquirers. In addition, Australian targets benefit Chinese acquirers through lower 
operational cost because they are located closer to China than are other resources-rich 
countries, such as Canada and the United States. 
 
We note that there is a major shift in target country preference over time. Prior to 2007, Hong 
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Kong, Indonesia and Germany were the most targeted destinations, whereas since 2007, 
firms in Hong Kong, the United States, Australia, Singapore, Canada and Japan have become 
the preferred targets of Chinese acquirers. This evolution of target country preference from 
primarily emerging markets to developed markets not only signals the level of market 
development but also indicates the radical expansion of Chinese acquirers into overseas 
assets. 
 
Both the media and the prior literature have paid much attention to the industrial preferences 
of Chinese CBMAs. Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008) note that Chinese acquirers that engage 
in outbound M&A activities are driven by resource exploration, for example, to obtain 
foreign advanced technology and resources. Black et al. (2012) find that there is a strong 
preference for resource-related targets in Chinese overseas acquisitions. In addition to 
industrial preferences, the “Chinese premium” has generated significant attention in the 
international CBMA market, particularly with respect to resource-related deals. For example, 
the price premium offered by China National Offshore Oil Corporation to take over Unocal 
was US$6 higher per share than the price offered by Chevron Corporation. Although the deal 
was ultimately unsuccessful, commentators argue that the “go global” policy directs 
investment towards industries with critical strategic value, which leads firms to undertake 
deals that promote national interests at the expense of shareholder wealth (Gu and Reed 
(2010); Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008); Chen and Young (2010)). For the above-mentioned 
reasons, we stratify Chinese CBMAs by target industry and examine the wealth creation for 
bidding firms’ shareholders in each industrial sector over both the short and long terms to 
assess the impact of industrial preferences on bidder returns. 
 
4.3.5.2 Acquirer CAR Stratified by Target Industry 
 
Table 4.3 presents the deal volume and acquirer performance of Chinese CBMAs stratified 
by the target’s industrial sector. We show that the most favoured targets operate in the high-
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technology, materials, industrials and energy sectors. In addition, Chinese firms that acquire 
either resource-related or industrial targets generate significantly positive abnormal returns 
for their shareholders in the short term. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3] 
 
4.3.5.3 Acquirer BHAR Stratified by Target Industry 
 
Despite the overall significant wealth destruction of Chinese acquirers over the long term, 
as observed in Table 4.4, we find that for deals targeting resource-related firms, acquirers 
enjoy insignificant abnormal returns two years post-acquisition. Thus, both our short- and 
long-term univariate analyses do not indicate that resource-related CBMAs are value 
destroying for bidding firms’ shareholders, even if they are motivated by national interests. 
 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents the univariate comparison results for bidder CAR and BHAR under 
various bidder- and deal-specific characteristic portfolios, as well as the short- and long-term 
multivariate regression analyses results of bidder abnormal returns for the overall sample. 
 
4.4.1 Univariate Analyses 
 
In addition to evaluating acquirers’ share price movements in various industrial sectors 
around and post-acquisition, we aim to determine whether there is a significant performance 
difference between acquisitions targeting resource-related and non-resource-related firms to 
determine if acquisitions driven by national interests come at the expense of shareholder 
wealth. Additionally, we aim to examine whether there is any performance difference 
between Chinese acquirers that undertake CBMAs before and after two major events. One 
event is the change in fiscal policy that occurred when the Chinese government removed its 
currency peg on 21 July 2005, which resulted in substantial RMB appreciation (i.e., 
“Currency Appreciation”); the other event is the financial meltdown that occurred after 
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on 15 September 2008, which led to an extraordinary 
plunge in asset prices for many western firms (i.e., “Financial Crisis”). Recent literature has 
highlighted the important interrelationships between currency appreciation and 
macroeconomic factors that may influence CBMA propensities. Erel, Liao and Weisbach 
(2012) show that either currency appreciation or macroeconomic performance can affect the 
valuation of a bidder or target, which leads to real increases in wealth and enhanced abilities 
to finance acquisitions for acquirers. In a similar vein, we argue that both currency 
appreciation and the financial crisis could lead to lower cost of acquisition and increased 
relative wealth for Chinese acquirers engage in CBMAs. 
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In addition, we note that bidding firms’ shareholder returns in both the short- and long-terms 
can differ significantly depending on various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics. 
However, most prior studies focus on the US market, and only a few examine the Chinese 
domestic market. For this reason, we extend the prior research by constructing various 
portfolios to assess and compare the performance of Chinese bidders in CBMAs. The 
following comparisons are conducted: 100% Cash vs. Not 100% Cash; Diversifying Deal 
vs. Focussed Deal; High BTMV vs. Low BTMV; Large Bidder vs. Small Bidder; High 
Leveraged Bidder vs. Low Leveraged Bidder; High Cash Flow-to-Equity Bidder vs. Low 
Cash Flow-to-Equity Bidder; High Sigma Bidder vs. Low Sigma Bidder; and High Run-Up 
Bidder vs. Low Run-Up Bidder. 
 
The “100% Cash” and the “Not 100% Cash” subgroups are created depending on whether 
the deal is financed exclusively with cash. The “Public Deals” subgroup includes deals 
targeting publicly listed firms, whereas the remaining deals are included in the “Private 
Deals” subgroup. The “Diversifying Deals” and “Focussed Deals” subgroups are created 
according to whether the acquirer and target belong to the same industry, with same-industry 
deals in the latter subgroup and others in the former subgroup. We further categorize top-
tertile book-to-market ratio acquirers as “High BTMV Bidder” and bottom-tertile book-to-
market ratio acquirers as “Low BTMV Bidder”. The same categorization method is used to 
classify “Large Size Bidder”/“Small Size Bidder”, “High Leverage Bidder”/“Low Leverage 
Bidder”, “High Cash Flow-to-Equity Bidder”/“Low Cash Flow-to-Equity Bidder”, “High 
Sigma Bidder”/“Low Sigma Bidder” and “High Run-Up Bidder”/“Low Run-Up Bidder”.  
  
4.4.1.1 Short-Term Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 4.5 summarizes the mean 3-day CAR around the deal announcement date for various 
bidder- and deal-specific characteristic portfolios, as discussed above. Statistical tests for the 
difference in means for each portfolio pairs and p-values are presented. 
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 [Insert Table 4.5] 
 
We find that over a three-day event window, acquirers targeting resource-related firms earn 
significant announcement abnormal returns of 1.98% but fail to significantly outperform 
those targeting non-resource-related firms. This is in line with the prior results of Black et 
al. (2012), who find that firms acquiring targets in resource-related sectors (particularly 
energy and industrials) earn significant positive abnormal returns in the short term, although 
their results are largely driven by domestic M&As because their CBMA sample is relatively 
small. Gu and Reed (2010) expect to find negative announcement returns for CBMAs 
targeting firms in energy and high-technology industries, given that two of the three 
motivations underlying the go global policy are to secure natural resources and to appropriate 
new technologies. However, their results show no support for this proposition and indicate 
that the market responds positively to CBMAs involving energy and high-technology targets 
after the implementation of the go global policy. Both of these studies, as well as our results, 
indicate that although there is a strong preference for Chinese firms, especially SOEs, to 
acquire resource-related targets overseas, these transactions are not undertaken at the 
expense of shareholder wealth.54 
 
Additionally, we find that acquirers earn 1.40% (p-value=0.023) announcement returns after 
currency appreciation and statistically outperform acquirers that announce CBMAs before 
currency appreciation by 2.86% at a 5% significance level. Likewise, the 3-day CAR 
accruing to bidders after the financial crisis are 1.79% (p-value=0.018), which significantly 
outperform announcement returns accruing to bidders before financial crisis by 2.08%. Our 
results suggest that both RMB appreciation and the financial crisis result in higher 
announcement abnormal returns for Chinese acquirers, possibly because these two events 
increase the relative valuation of acquirers, enhance the abilities of acquirers to finance 
                                                     
54 Out of 30 SOE bidders in our sample, 26 of them are targeted at resource-related targets. 
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acquisitions, and lower the cost of targets in western economies. However, to more precisely 
assess the effect of each event on bidder returns, multivariate analysis is essential given there 
is a time period overlap between the currency appreciation and financial crisis periods. 
 
In contrast to prior studies, we that find CBMAs that are not financed exclusively with cash 
earn significant announcement abnormal returns of 1.29% (p-value=0.042). Nevertheless, 
this superior performance is insignificantly different than that of CBMAs with all cash offers. 
The high BTMV bidder, large bidder, and high leverage bidder are all associated with 
significantly positive 3-day CAR of 1.84%, 1.65% and 1.34%, respectively. However, none 
of them is shown to significantly outperform its counterpart. 
 
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, the low cash flow-to-equity 
bidders in our sample enjoy significant positive announcement abnormal returns of 1.93%. 
This wealth enhancement is also shown to be significantly higher than that for bidders with 
high cash flow-to-equity ratios and can be attributed to the agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. Managers tend to accumulate excess cash to avoid monitoring 
by external capital providers and to advance their personal interests, thereby excess cash 
results in value-destroying acquisitions.    
 
4.4.1.2 Long-Term Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 4.6 presents the mean long-term 24-month BHAR under various bidder- and deal-
specific characteristic portfolios, as discussed above. Significant differences in the means of 
each portfolio are observed. Statistical tests for the difference in means for each portfolio 
pairs and bootstrapped p-values are presented. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6] 
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We find that the CBMAs involving resource-related targets experience insignificant 24-
month BHAR for bidding firms’ shareholders. Nevertheless, the abnormal returns accruing 
to resource-related targets are 24.4% significantly higher than their counterparts. Therefore, 
we suggest that although resource-related CBMAs fail to generate any significant wealth 
effect for bidders, they are significantly less value destroying than their counterparts over 
longer period. 
 
With respect to the effect of RMB appreciation on Chinese cross-border acquirer abnormal 
returns two years after the merger announcement, we find that although acquirers experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns of -13.01% after RMB appreciation, their abnormal 
returns before and after currency appreciation are insignificantly different. This univariate 
comparison suggests that the effect of increased relative wealth and lower cost of capital for 
acquirers stemming from currency appreciation is insignificant on acquirer returns in the 
long term. However, this results may be misleading because it also includes the effect of 
financial crisis on acquirer returns.  
 
The 24-month BHAR for acquirers that engage in CBMAs before the financial crisis is 
significantly negative at -13.7%; however, this underperformance is insignificantly different 
than that of acquirers that engage in CBMAs after the crisis. We argue that this is because in 
the long term, the wealth destruction associated with managerial risk taking is more likely 
to offset the wealth creation derived from the lower cost of acquisition for CBMAs 
undertaken during the financial crisis period. 
 
Over a longer horizon, the wealth creation from not 100% cash financed deals is reversed. 
We observe that deals without all cash financing are associated with a -20.2% significant 
loss of wealth two years post-deal announcement. In addition, this underperformance is 
shown to be -28.0% lower than the performance of all cash deals. This is consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis proposed by Travlos (1987), which maintains that an all-
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cash offer indicates potential undervaluation of the acquiring firm and will thus result in 
positive returns for the acquirer over a longer period. 
 
The long-term abnormal returns experienced by bidders engaged in public and diversifying 
deals are significantly negative at -13.6% and -20.8%, respectively. However, they do not 
significantly underperform their counterparts over the long term. Moreover, low BTMV and 
low leverage bidders earn significantly negative post-announcement abnormal returns of   
-22.1% and -23.7%, respectively, but do not significantly underperform their counterparts.  
 
Additionally, high sigma bidders suffer from significant wealth loss two years post-merger 
announcement, and this wealth loss is significantly higher than that of their counterparts. 
Consistent with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007), our results indicate that 
idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for information asymmetry has a significant negative effect 
on acquirer returns.  
 
Finally, we find that low run-up bidders are associated with significant post-announcement 
abnormal returns of -43.0% at a 1% level and that high run-up bidders significantly 
outperform low run-up bidders by 48.3% over the long term. In line with the findings of 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), our results indicate that acquirers’ past performance is 
positively correlated with their merger performance.  
 
4.4.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 
The results from the univariate analyses could be misleading because abnormal returns are 
compared without taking into account any confounding effects. To analyse these results more 
formally, we use a multivariate regression framework and control for other deal- and 
acquirer-specific characteristics. This section presents and discusses the regression results 
for acquirer returns over both the short and long terms. 
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4.4.2.1 Short-Term Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.7 presents the 3-day CAR regression results that control for the acquirer- and deal-
specific characteristics discussed in Section 4.3.3., and for year fixed effects. To account 
repeat acquirers, the standard errors are clustered at the acquiring firm level. 
 
[Insert Table 4.7] 
 
Regressions (1) and (4) show that the resource-related target dummy is positive but 
insignificant at conventional levels. Our multivariate results confirm the univariate findings 
by showing that although resource-related deals promote national interests, they do not do 
so at the expense of shareholder wealth. By examining our data more closely, we note that 
the market perception towards resource-related deals is significantly positive if the deal is 
not diversifying in nature. In other words, investors actually welcome focussed resource-
related CBMAs in the short term.55  
 
Regression (2) and (4) indicate that CBMAs conducted after RMB appreciation are 
associated with significantly higher CARs than those conducted before RMB appreciation. 
This value enhancement is in line with Chen, Officer and Shen’s (2014) results, in which 
they find that CBMAs led by acquirers with “large currency appreciation” generate higher 
short and long-term abnormal returns. Erel, Liao and Weibach (2012) suggest that the effect 
of currency appreciation on bidder returns is likely to be indicative of a more general 
valuation effect and can be attributed either to the misvaluation explanation (Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003)) or to the wealth explanation (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). 
                                                     
55 In a subsample of focussed acquisitions (80 deals), we run the same regression as regression (4) 
in Table 4.7, and find that the resource-related target deals are associated with 2.55% CAR 
improvement at 10% significance level. Additionally, by adding an interaction term of resource-
related target*diversifying into regression (4) in Table 4.7, the resource-related target dummy 
becomes significantly positive at 10% level. More detailed results are available upon request.  
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Regardless, both explanations predict a positive correlation between bidder CARs and 
increases in relative valuation of the bidding firms. In our case, the wealth explanation is 
more likely given that RMB has generally posted steady one-way appreciation for most of 
the time since the RMB exchange rate reform. Nonetheless, we extend our analysis to the 
long term to distinguish these two explanations.  
 
In contrast to the effect of currency appreciation, the effect of the financial crisis on acquirer 
performance is found to be positive but insignificant in the short term. One might suggest 
that the financial crisis triggered in United States could bring about a substantial slump in 
the stock prices of western firms and cause stocks to trade at much lower multiples than 
before the crisis; hence, during the crisis, the cost of acquisition for Chinese acquirers 
decreases and the wealth gains from CBMAs conducted by Chinese acquirers increase. 
However, it is also possible that managers are likely to become opportunistic during the crisis 
and conduct value-destroying transactions. Managers may believe that they will encounter 
more difficulties in completing acquisitions when economic conditions improve because the 
competition for targets will increase and that targets will be less willing to sell to Chinese 
acquirers if the economic recovery provides targets with alternative means of raising funds. 
Therefore, managers tend to make acquisitions without carefully identifying specific targets 
and engage in a “rush to buy”, even if they anticipate a decline in shareholder wealth in the 
short-term because they hope that their decisions will generate value in the long term. Such 
managerial opportunism hurts shareholder value and negates the positive effect of the lower 
acquisition costs. To test for managerial opportunism, we further examine the long-term 
performance of acquirers. If managers are truly more opportunistic during the crisis, we 
would expect to see a strong negative correlation between the financial crisis variable and 
acquirer returns in the long-term multivariate regression.   
 
We find that one of the most pronounced differences between the Chinese merger market 
and western merger markets is the positive perception of the Chinese market towards deals 
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financed with pure stock. In contrast to the negative signalling effect of stock payments 
observed in the US market in prior studies, our results indicate that stock offers are associated 
with significant wealth enhancement for bidders in the short term. The effect of payment 
method on acquirer returns seems to be driven by the predominant proportion of private 
deals in our sample (over 70% of the sample CBMAs are targeted at privately held firms), 
given that Chang (1998) finds that acquirers gain significant announcement returns in stock 
offers when the target is privately held. Chang (1998) also reveals that cash offers are on 
average associated with zero announcement returns to acquirers. 
 
In addition, consistent with the free cash flow theory, whereby free cash flow increases the 
agency costs of acquiring firms and leads to poor investment decisions (Stulz (1990) and 
Jensen (1986)), we find that the cash flow-to-equity value has a significantly negative 
influence on acquirer announcement abnormal returns at a 5% level in all regressions. 
Moreover, on the contrary to Rosen’s (2006) finding, our results show that bidder run-up is 
significantly positively correlated to bidder returns in the short term. 
 
Overall, our multivariate results appear to be largely in line with the results obtained from 
the univariate analysis, except with respect to the financial crisis variable, which loses its 
significance when the analysis controls for other firm- and deal-specific characteristics.  
 
4.4.2.2 Long-Term Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Extending the horizon until the results of CBMAs are known allows us to more precisely 
determine the source of takeover gains after currency appreciation; that is, whether the 
increase in the acquirer’s relative valuation stems from misvaluation or a real increase in 
wealth. If the misvaluation explanation holds such that either overpricing of the acquirer or 
underpricing of the target could lead to a potentially profitable investment for the acquirer, 
valuations will tend to revert to their true value in the long term, and we would expect to see 
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a reversal of CAR over time (Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009)). 
Alternatively, if the wealth explanation holds such that currency appreciation leads to a real 
increase in wealth and lowers the potential cost of capital for acquirers, valuation will tend 
to persist subsequent to the acquisition, and we would expect to see no reversal of CAR in 
the longer run (Froot and Stein (1991)). Additionally, the long-term analysis allows us to test 
whether managers are more opportunistic during financial crisis periods. Specifically, if 
managers are indeed more opportunistic, the wealth benefits associated with the lower cost 
of acquisition would be cancelled out by the wealth destruction caused by managerial 
opportunism, and we would expect to see negative returns for acquiring firms over the long 
term. Table 4.8 presents the acquirers’ BHARs two years post-announcement because this 
period provides sufficient time for the merger results to become known.  
 
[Insert Table 4.8] 
 
Regressions (1) and (4) in Table 4.8 demonstrate that firms acquiring resource-related targets 
experience positive but insignificant long-term abnormal returns. Hence, the argument that 
resource-related CBMAs promote national interests at the expense of shareholder wealth is 
unfounded. Furthermore, we find that diversified resource-related acquisitions are 
significantly more value destroying than focussed ones over the long term.56 
 
The coefficient on the currency appreciation dummy is significantly positive at 1% level in 
regressions (2) and (4). Our results strongly support the view that the impact of valuation on 
acquirer returns stems from the wealth effect described by Froot and Stein (1991), meaning 
that the increase in relative valuation due to currency appreciation reflects a real increase in 
acquirer wealth and enhances acquirers’ abilities to finance acquisitions overseas. Our results 
                                                     
56 By adding an interaction term of resource-related target*diversifying into regression (4) in Table 
4.8, we find the coefficient on this interaction term is -0.40 and statistically significant at 10% level. 
More detailed results are available upon request. 
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also suggest that the positive market reaction at the announcement can be justified by real 
economic gains (or synergies) from currency appreciation-driven acquisitions. Both the 
short- and long-term results on currency appreciation provide solid supports for our second 
hypothesis. 
 
On the contrary, the coefficient on the financial crisis dummy is negative and significant at 
5% level in regressions (3) and (4). This sign of reversal on acquirer performance in the long 
term provides clear evidence for the proposition that managers are likely to be opportunistic 
and succumb to the temptation to buy assets that have become cheaply available during the 
financial crisis, rather than focusing on carefully researched targets, supporting our third 
hypothesis.  
 
Interestingly, the signs on the stock and cash variables both reverse in the long run. 
Regression (4) shows that all cash offers are associated with weakly significant positive 2-
year BHARs. This result provides supports for the positive signalling effect of all-cash offers 
and suggests that the market will reward undervalued acquirers that engage in CBMAs over 
the long term.  
 
The sigma (idiosyncratic volatility) of the acquiring firm is negatively related to the BHAR 
at 1% significance level in all regressions, suggesting that as the information asymmetry of 
the acquiring firm increases, the BHAR decreases, all else being equal. 
 
Moreover, we find that the acquirer run-up (acquirer-specific stock momentum) is associated 
with higher abnormal returns in the long term and such correlation is marginally significant 
in all regressions. Essentially, our results suggest that value-enhancing acquisitions are 
simply more likely to be conducted by better managers.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter employs the most up-to-date dataset comprising 111 CBMAs conducted by 
Chinese acquirers listed on all stock exchanges from 1 January 2002 to 31 January 2011. We 
aim to examine both short- and long-term acquirer abnormal returns according to different 
industrial sectors and different timeframes (i.e., before and after currency appreciation, and 
before and after the global financial crisis) to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
motivations and performance of Chinese acquirers undertaking CBMAs over the last decade 
and to help alleviate western concerns about further Chinese outbound investment. 
 
Our results indicate that although resource-related cross-border deals promote national 
interests, they are not value-destroying for shareholders, in either the short or long run. 
Indeed, focussed acquisitions targeting resource-related firms are especially welcomed by 
the market. We suggest that this preference by the market arises because resource-related 
acquisitions contain substantial tangible assets, and thereby are easier to integrate especially 
when the deal is focussed. Moreover, focussed acquisitions targeting resource-related firms 
are more likely to be carried out by SOEs, which align their interests with China’s 
development and hence are more likely to be supported by the government, to benefit from 
favourable government policies and to have easier access to government funding. 
Additionally, these deals attract high levels of media attention and face unfavourable 
perceptions from western countries, which make deal completion more difficult. Therefore, 
successfully completed deals must involve an enormous amount of pre-acquisition planning 
such that once these deals are announced, they are perceived positively by the market. 
 
Furthermore, after China officially revalued its currency to RMB8.11: $US1 and modified 
its exchange rate system by de-pegging the RMB from the US dollar and implementing the 
managed float system on July 21, 2005, the RMB exchange rate has strengthened 
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substantially, which has led to increased relative wealth and lower potential cost of capital 
for Chinese acquirers engaged in CBMAs. Indeed, we find that acquirers engaged in CBMAs 
after currency appreciation are associated with substantial improvement in returns over both 
the short and long terms. In other words, our results suggest that the increase in relative 
valuation resulting from RMB appreciation can be transformed into significant wealth gains 
for acquiring firms’ shareholders. 
 
Finally, the ongoing economic woes following the global financial crisis in 2008 has opened 
up attractive overseas investment opportunities for Chinese acquirers by decreasing the 
valuation and bid premiums of western firms. However, we find that acquirers engaged in 
CBMAs after the financial crisis experience insignificant announcement gains and a 
significant wealth loss two years post-merger announcement. Accordingly, we argue that the 
financial crisis promotes managerial opportunism, whereby managers succumb to the 
temptation to acquire abroad without careful planning and that the wealth destruction 
associated with higher managerial risk taking significantly outweighs the benefit of the lower 
cost of acquisition for acquirers during the financial crisis period, leading to substantial long-
term underperformance. 
 
Overall, our work indicates that several hypotheses may operate to explain CBMAs from 
China. In particular, some CBMAs fit neoclassical theories better and some fit behavioural 
theories better, depending on the period in which the deal is conducted.  
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Table 4.1 Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlations of all variables used in the multivariate analysis. The sample contains 111 Chinese CBMAs announced 
between 1 January 2002 and 31 January 2011, where bidders are listed on all stock exchanges. “Resource-Related Target” is a dummy variable 
equals to one for deals targeting firms within either energy or materials sector, and zero otherwise; “Currency Appreciation” is a dummy variable 
equals to one for deals carried out after the RMB exchange rate reform on 21st July, 2005, and zero otherwise; “Financial Crisis” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals undertook after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on 15thof September2008, and zero otherwise; “Stock” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals financed with pure stock, and zero otherwise; “Cash” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals financed with 
pure cash, and zero otherwise; “Diversifying Deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder industry differs from that of the 
target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and 
zero otherwise; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Leverage” is calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion 
of long-term debt)/(total capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; 
“Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily returns from DataStream over the period beginning 105 days and 
ending 6 days before the deal announcement; Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the bidding firm’s stock over the 
period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days before the deal announcement from DataStream. 
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 Resource-
Related 
Target 
Currency 
Appreciation 
Financial 
Crisis 
Stock Cash Public 
Deal 
Diversi-
fying 
Deal 
Book-
to-
Market 
Ln(Size) Leverage Cash 
Flows-to-
Equity 
Sigma 
Currency Appreciation -0.0878            
Financial Crisis -0.0337 0.5335           
Stock -0.0652 0.1049 0.0220          
Cash 0.0463 -0.0792 0.0438 -0.1292         
Public Deal 0.2703 0.0443 -0.0015 -0.0384 0.0412        
Diversifying Deal -0.1529 0.0443 0.0793 0.1553 -0.0045 -0.0742       
Book-to-Market -0.1518 0.0665 0.0355 0.1298 -0.0780 -0.0234 0.1318      
Ln(Size) 0.3795 0.1519 0.0862 -0.2568 0.0880 0.0242 -0.1605 -0.4206     
Leverage 0.0960 0.0283 0.0064 -0.1498 -0.0492 0.2889 -0.0894 -0.0016 0.0516    
Cash Flows-to-Equity 0.1863 0.0382 0.0230 -0.1687 0.0296 0.1073 -0.2080 -0.3173 0.3441 0.0648   
Sigma -0.2949 0.2305 -0.0216 0.1022 -0.2018 -0.1482 0.0864 0.4468 -0.4212 0.0049 -0.0932  
Run-Up 0.1022 -0.0478 0.1172 -0.0162 0.2224 0.0623 0.2008 -0.1584 0.0055 0.0402 0.0077 -0.1193 
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Table 4.2 Time Distribution of Targets by Nation 
This table shows the time-series distribution of Chinese cross-border M&As and of targets 
stratified by their nation. The figures shown represent the number of deals conducted in each 
target nation by year.  
Nation 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Jan. 2011 Total 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Australia 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 3 3 0 13 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 
British Virgin 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 5 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
France 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 
Germany 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 
Hong Kong 1 3 2 2 1 3 4 2 1 0 19 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Indonesia 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Russian Fed 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 
South Korea 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
United 
Kingdom 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
United States 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 4 4 2 17 
Total 8 3 8 3 3 8 22 25 24 7 111 
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Table 4.3 Acquirer 3-day CAR by Target Industry 
This table reports the acquirer short-term 3-day CAR(-1, +1) around the date of deal announcement stratified by the target industry. The industry 
sector is classified by target TF Macro Industry obtained from Thomson One Banker. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 
3-day CAR. For the abbreviated industries: Overall stands for all industry sectors in the full sample; CPS stands for Consumer Products and 
Services; Energy stands for Energy and Power; Health stands for Healthcare; HT stands for High Technology; IND stands for Industrials; Realest 
stands for Real Estate; Telcom stands for Telecommunication; Energy & Materials are classified as Resource-Related sector in our sample. The 
mean CARs are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and 
* respectively. “N” donates the number of deals conducted within each industry sector. 
 
Acquirer Short-Term Performance 3-day CAR by Target Industry 
 Overall CPS Energy Health HT IND Materials Media Realest Retail Staples Telecom Energy  
& Materials 
Mean 0.0086  -0.0024  0.0207**  -0.0488  -0.0072  0.0312**  0.0193*  0.0070  0.0738  -0.0856  0.0084  -0.0239  0.0198***  
P-Value (0.129)  (0.886)  (0.038)  (0.284)  (0.488)  (0.013)  (0.066)  (0.605)  (0.201)  (0.182)  (0.768)  (-) (0.007)  
N 111 3 15 2 28 17 23 4 3 4 11 1 38 
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 Table 4.4 Acquirer 24-month BHAR by Target Industry 
This table reports the acquirer long-term 24-month BHAR(0, +24) after the deal announcement month stratified by the target industry. The industry 
sector is classified by target TF Macro Industry obtained from Thomson One Banker. The equation BHARi,t = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t=0 ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t=0  
is used to calculate 24-month BHAR. For the abbreviated industries: Overall stands for all industry sectors in the full sample; CPS stands for 
Consumer Products and Services; Energy stands for Energy and Power; Health stands for Healthcare; HT stands for High Technology; IND stands 
for Industrials; Realest stands for Real Estate; Telcom stands for Telecommunication; Energy & Materials are classified as Resource-Related sector 
in our sample. The mean BHARs are reported and bootstrapped p-values (1000 replications) are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1% 
level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals conducted within each industry sector. 
 
Acquirer Long-Term Performance 24-month BHAR by Target Industry 
 Overall CPS Energy Health HT IND Materials Media Realest Retail Staples Telecom Energy  
& Materials 
Mean -0.1286**  -0.0462  0.1983  -0.0049  -0.1755  -0.2038  -0.0764  -0.4157**  -0.2779  -0.1353  -0.1956  -1.7770  0.0320  
P-Value (0.025)  (0.907)  (0.308)  (0.964)  (0.228)  (0.165)  (0.186)  (0.020)  (0.368)  (0.501)  (0.259)  (-) (0.701)  
N 111 3 15 2 28 17 23 4 3 4 11 1 38 
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Table 4.5 Univariate Analysis for Acquirer 3-day CAR 
This table summarizes the mean 3-day CAR(-1, +1) under various bidder- and deal- specific 
characteristic portfolios. The “Resource-Related Target” subgroup contains deals targeting 
firms within either energy or materials sector, whereas deals targeting firms within other 
industry sectors are included in the “Non-Resource-Related Target” subgroup. The “After 
Currency Appreciation” subgroup includes any deals carried out after the RMB exchange 
rate reform on 21st July, 2005, any deals carried out before the RMB exchange rate reform 
are included in the “Before Currency Appreciation” subgroup. The “After Financial Crisis” 
subgroup contains any deals undertook after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on 15thof 
September2008, with all remaining deals include in the “Before Financial Crisis” subgroup. 
The “100% Cash” and “Not 100% Cash” subgroups are created depending on whether or 
not the deal is financed purely with cash. The “Public Deals” subgroup includes deals 
targeting publicly-listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the “Private 
deals” subgroup. The “Diversifying Deals” and the “Focussed Deals” subgroups are created 
according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry, with the same 
industry deals in the former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further categorize 
the top-tertile book-to-market ratio acquirers as “High BTMV Bidder”, while the bottom-
tertile book-to market ratio acquirers as “Low BTMV Bidder”. Same categorization method 
is used to classify “Large Size Bidder”/“Small Size Bidder”, “High Leverage Bidder”/“Low 
Leverage Bidder”, “High Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder”/“Low Cash Flows-to-Equity 
Bidder”, “High Sigma Bidder”/“Low Sigma Bidder” and “High Run-Up Bidder”/ “Low Run-
Up Bidder”. The equation CARi = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate 3-day CAR. The 
mean CARs are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. Statistical tests for 
differences in means are also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within each 
portfolio. 
  
 274 
 
 Mean 3-day CAR P-Value N 
Resource-Related Target 0.0198*** (0.007) 38 
Non-Resource-Related Target 0.0027  (0.723) 73 
Difference 0.0171  (0.149)  
    
After Currency Appreciation 0.0140** (0.023) 90 
Before Currency Appreciation -0.0146  (0.296) 21 
Difference 0.0286** (0.045)  
    
After Financial Crisis 0.0179** (0.018) 61 
Before Financial Crisis -0.0028  (0.740) 50 
Difference 0.0208* (0.065)  
    
100% Cash -0.0035  (0.780) 29 
Not 100% Cash 0.0129** (0.042) 82 
Difference -0.0163  (0.203)  
    
Public Deal 0.0145  (0.193) 31 
Private Deal 0.0063  (0.340) 80 
Difference 0.0082  (0.514)  
    
Diversifying Deal 0.0086  (0.521) 31 
Focussed Deal 0.0086  (0.150) 80 
Difference 0.0000  (0.997)  
    
High BTMV Bidder 0.0184* (0.070) 37 
Low BTMV Bidder 0.0139  (0.132) 37 
Difference 0.0045  (0.740)  
    
Large Size Bidder 0.0165** (0.014) 38 
Small Size Bidder 0.0083  (0.521) 38 
Difference 0.0082  (0.570)  
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 Mean 3-day CAR P-Value N 
High Leveraged Bidder 0.0134* (0.083) 38 
Low Leveraged Bidder -0.0056  (0.659) 38 
Difference 0.0189  (0.199)  
    
High Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder -0.0058  (0.566) 37 
Low Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder 0.0193* (0.091) 37 
Difference -0.0251* (0.097)  
    
High Sigma Bidder 0.0168  (0.172) 38 
Low Sigma Bidder  0.0123  (0.025) 38 
Difference 0.0045  (0.733)  
    
High Run-Up Bidder 0.0117  (0.275) 37 
Low Run-Up Bidder 0.0037  (0.691) 38 
Difference 0.0800  (0.569)   
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Table 4.6 Univariate Analysis for Acquirer 24-month BHAR 
This table summarizes the mean 24-month BHAR(0, +24) under various bidder- and deal- 
specific characteristic portfolios. The “Resource-Related Target” subgroup contains deals 
targeting firms within either energy or materials sector, whereas deals targeting firms within 
other industry sectors are included in the “Non-Resource-Related Target” subgroup. The 
“After Currency Appreciation” subgroup includes any deals carried out after the RMB 
exchange rate reform on 21st July, 2005, any deals carried out before the RMB exchange 
rate reform are included in the “Before Currency Appreciation” subgroup. The “After 
Financial Crisis” subgroup contains any deals undertook after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy 
on 15thof September2008, with all remaining deals include in the “Before Financial Crisis” 
subgroup. The “100% Cash” and “Not 100% Cash” subgroups are created depending on 
whether or not the deal is financed purely with cash. The “Public Deals” subgroup includes 
deals targeting publicly-listed firms, whereas the remaining targets are included in the 
“Private deals” subgroup. The “Diversifying Deals” and the “Focussed Deals” subgroups 
are created according to whether the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry, with 
the same industry deals in the former subgroup and the others in the later one. We further 
categorize the top-tertile book-to-market ratio acquirers as “High BTMV Bidder”, while the 
bottom-tertile book-to market ratio acquirers as “Low BTMV Bidder”. Same categorization 
method is used to classify “Large Size Bidder”/“Small Size Bidder”, “High Leverage 
Bidder”/“Low Leverage Bidder”, “High Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder”/“Low Cash Flows-
to-Equity Bidder”, “High Sigma Bidder”/“Low Sigma Bidder” and “High Run-Up Bidder”/ 
“Low Run-Up Bidder”. The equation BHARi,t = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t=0 ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t=0  is used 
to calculate 24-month BHAR. The mean BHARs are reported and bootstrapped p-values 
(1000 replications) are shown in parentheses. Statistical tests for differences in means are 
also presented. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** 
and * respectively. “N” donates the number of deals within each portfolio. 
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 Mean 24-month BHAR P-Value N 
Resource-Related Target 0.0320  (0.701) 38 
Non-Resource-Related Target -0.2123*** (0.005) 73 
Difference 0.2443** (0.040)  
    
After Currency Appreciation -0.1301** (0.042) 90 
Before Currency Appreciation -0.1223  (0.036) 21 
Difference -0.0078  (0.957)  
    
After Financial Crisis -0.1218  (0.136) 61 
Before Financial Crisis -0.1370* (0.089) 50 
Difference 0.0152  (0.894)  
    
100% Cash 0.0781  (0.510) 29 
Not 100% Cash -0.2017*** (0.002) 82 
Difference 0.2798** (0.029)  
    
Public Deal -0.1104  (0.220) 31 
Private Deal -0.1357* (0.060) 80 
Difference 0.0253  (0.842)  
    
Diversifying Deal -0.2018* (0.064) 31 
Focussed Deal -0.1003  (0.140) 80 
Difference -0.1016  (0.423)  
    
High BTMV Bidder -0.1721  (0.232) 37 
Low BTMV Bidder -0.2207*** (0.001) 37 
Difference 0.0486  (0.754)  
    
Large Size Bidder -0.0866  (0.202) 38 
Small Size Bidder -0.1283  (0.322) 38 
Difference 0.0417  (0.733)  
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 Mean 24-month BHAR P-Value N 
High Leveraged Bidder -0.1542  (0.161) 38 
Low Leveraged Bidder -0.2369** (0.031) 38 
Difference 0.0827  (0.586)  
    
High Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder -0.0452  (0.579) 37 
Low Cash Flows-to-Equity Bidder -0.1766  (0.141) 37 
Difference 0.1314  (0.359)  
    
High Sigma Bidder -0.2643** (0.022) 38 
Low Sigma Bidder  0.0081  (0.924) 38 
Difference -0.2724* (0.055)  
    
High Run-Up Bidder 0.0534  (0.586) 37 
Low Run-Up Bidder -0.4300*** (0.000) 38 
Difference 0.4834*** (0.000)   
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Table 4.7 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Acquirer 3-day CAR  
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of a sample of Chinese 
CBMAs announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 January 2011, where bidders are listed 
on all stock exchanges. The dependent variable is “3-day CAR”, which is the three-day event 
window CAR(-1, +1) where day 0 is the announcement day; the equation CARi =
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
T
t  is used to calculate CAR. The main variables are “Resource-Related 
Target”, “Currency Appreciation”, and “Financial Crisis”. “Resource-Related Target” is a 
dummy variable equals to one for deals targeting firms within either energy or materials 
sector, and zero otherwise; “Currency Appreciation” is a dummy variable equals to one for 
deals carried out after the RMB exchange rate reform on 21st July, 2005, and zero otherwise; 
“Financial Crisis” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals undertook after Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy on 15thof September2008, and zero otherwise; “Stock” is a dummy 
variable equals to one for deals financed with pure stock, and zero otherwise; “Cash” is a 
dummy variable equals to one for deals financed with pure cash, and zero otherwise; 
“Diversifying Deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder industry 
differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit Primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and zero otherwise; 
“Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity one 
month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Ln(Size)” is the natural logarithm 
of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Leverage” is calculated 
as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total capital + 
short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from 
operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily 
returns from DataStream over the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days before the 
deal announcement; Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the 
bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days before the deal 
announcement from DataStream. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. All 
regressions are controlled for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of 
observations.
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  3-day 
CAR   
3-day 
CAR    
3-day 
CAR    
3-day 
CAR   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Resource-
Related Target 
0.0156      0.0154  
 (0.234)      (0.214)  
Currency 
Appreciation 
  0.0915 ***   0.0846 ** 
   (0.010)    (0.050)  
Financial Crisis     0.0368  0.0084  
     (0.332)  (0.830)  
Stock 0.0822 *** 0.0816 *** 0.0856 *** 0.0802 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  
Cash -0.0136  -0.0103  -0.0144  -0.0104  
 (0.275)  (0.360)  (0.216)  (0.363)  
Public Deal 0.0008  0.0053  0.0061  0.0009  
 (0.957)  (0.686)  (0.640)  (0.951)  
Diversifying 
Deal 
-0.0100  -0.0057  -0.0103  -0.0050  
 (0.493)  (0.652)  (0.438)  (0.710)  
Book-to-Market 0.0017  0.0030  0.0021  0.0011  
 (0.925)  (0.860)  (0.906)  (0.952)  
Ln(Size) 0.0050  0.0047  0.0056 * 0.0036  
 (0.219)  (0.114)  (0.089)  (0.288)  
Leverage 0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  
 (0.438)  (0.438)  (0.443)  (0.420)  
Cash Flows-to-
Equity 
-0.1201 ** -0.1056 ** -0.1115 ** -0.1089 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.018)  
Sigma 0.0036  0.0013  0.0024  0.0019  
 (0.477)  (0.795)  (0.617)  (0.711)  
Run-Up 0.0371 * 0.0362 * 0.0400 * 0.0343 * 
 (0.075)  (0.065)  (0.054)  (0.099)  
Constant -0.0472  -0.1085 ** -0.0744 ** -0.1037 ** 
 (0.297)  (0.017)  (0.092)  (0.031)  
N 111   111   111   111   
Adj-R2 0.139   0.198   0.152   0.195   
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Table 4.8 Multivariate Regression Analysis for Acquirer 24-month BHAR 
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of a sample of Chinese 
CBMAs announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 January 2011, where bidders are listed 
on all stock exchanges. The dependent variable is “24-month BHAR”, which is the BHAR 
calculated over a 24-month period after the deal announcement month. The equation 
BHARi = ∏ [1 + Ri,t] −
T
t ∏ [1 + Rm,t]
T
t  is used to calculate BHAR. The main variables are 
“Resource-Related Target”, “Currency Appreciation”, and “Financial Crisis”. “Resource-
Related Target” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals targeting firms within either 
energy or materials sector, and zero otherwise; “Currency Appreciation” is a dummy variable 
equals to one for deals carried out after the RMB exchange rate reform on 21st July, 2005, 
and zero otherwise; “Financial Crisis” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals undertook 
after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on 15thof September2008, and zero otherwise; “Stock” 
is a dummy variable equals to one for deals financed with pure stock, and zero otherwise; 
“Cash” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals financed with pure cash, and zero 
otherwise; “Diversifying Deal” is a dummy variable equals to one for deals where the bidder 
industry differs from that of the target, as defined by the first two digits of the four digit 
Primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from Thomson One Banker, and zero 
otherwise; “Book-to-market” is the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity one month prior to the deal announcement from DataStream; “Ln(Size)” is the natural 
logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity one month prior to the deal announcement 
from DataStream in millions of US dollars at the currency rate of 2010; “Leverage” is 
calculated as (long-term debt + short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt)/(total 
capital + short term debt and current portion of long term debt) one year prior to the deal 
announcement from DataStream; “Cash flows-to-equity” is calculated as funds from 
operations divided by common equity one year prior to the deal announcement from 
DataStream; “Sigma” is the standard deviation of the bidding firm’s market-adjusted daily 
returns from DataStream over the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days before the 
deal announcement; Run-up” is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the 
bidding firm’s stock over the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days before the deal 
announcement from DataStream. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. All 
regressions are controlled for year-fixed effects and their p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. “N” denotes the number of 
observations.
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  24-month 
BHAR 
 24-month 
BHAR 
 24-month 
BHAR 
 24-month 
BHAR 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Resource-Related 
Target 
0.0534      0.0484  
 (0.675)      (0.700)  
Currency 
Appreciation 
  1.8542 ***   1.8445 *** 
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
Financial Crisis     -0.4267 ** -0.4133 ** 
     (0.023)  (0.020)  
Stock -0.4531  -0.4206  -0.4812  -0.4603  
 (0.147)  (0.164)  (0.106)  (0.138)  
Cash 0.1020  0.1382  0.1143  0.1520 * 
 (0.264)  (0.106)  (0.210)  (0.079)  
Public Deal 0.0921  0.0703  0.1094  0.0572  
 (0.433)  (0.459)  (0.296)  (0.602)  
Diversifying Deal -0.0220  0.0108  -0.0166  0.0221  
 (0.850)  (0.926)  (0.884)  (0.842)  
Book-to-Market -0.0096  0.0138  0.0051  0.0172  
 (0.949)  (0.925)  (0.971)  (0.901)  
Ln(Size) -0.0344  -0.0189  -0.0339  -0.0254  
 (0.286)  (0.505)  (0.290)  (0.416)  
Leverage -0.0030  -0.0021  -0.0033  -0.0024  
 (0.240)  (0.394)  (0.190)  (0.335)  
Cash Flows-to-
Equity 
0.0743  -0.0840  0.1219  -0.0617  
 (0.870)  (0.844)  (0.787)  (0.889)  
Sigma -0.1051 *** -0.1155 *** -0.1072 *** -0.1134 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  
Run-Up 0.4621 ** 0.3592 * 0.4741 ** 0.3562 * 
 (0.023)  (0.054)  (0.016)  (0.051)  
Constant 0.1160  -1.8249 *** 0.5363  -1.3747 *** 
 (0.735)  (0.000)  (0.209)  (0.009)  
N 111   111   111   111   
Adjusted-R2 0.221   0.305   0.248   0.320   
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5.1 Conclusion 
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese 
domestic and cross-border M&As by evaluating acquiring firms’ merger motives, stock 
performance, and key determinants of performance. To do so, we first examine the effect of 
merger momentum and how this effect fluctuates during different market valuation periods 
to shed light on the source of merger momentum and on the motives for Chinese domestic 
M&As. Moreover, we investigate how the merger momentum effect differs between value 
and growth bidders to provide insight on whether investors evaluate mergers based on 
bidders’ past managerial performance. Second, given that investment banks act as an 
important intermediary in corporate M&As, we extend our analysis to the effect of the 
reputation of the acquiring firms’ investment bank on acquirer performance to test the 
effectiveness of the reputation-quality mechanism in merger advisory services. Additionally, 
we offer new evidence on the key factors that differentiate the advisory services of top-tier 
and non-top-tier investment banks. Third, we examine the wealth effects of favourable 
exchange rates and valuations stemming from RMB exchange rate reform and the global 
financial crisis on acquiring firms. Furthermore, we investigate whether the national interest 
in accruing resources and shareholder value creation are mutually achievable through 
resource-related CBMAs. Finally, this thesis provides in-depth empirical analyses in the 
Chinese context of common bidder- and deal-specific factors that have been found to affect 
acquirer returns in previous studies of other markets, including state ownership in the 
acquiring and target firms, method of payment, target listing status, acquirer size, BTMV, 
ROA, leverage, sigma, run-up, relative size of deal to acquirer, deal value and diversification. 
 
In Chapter 2, we focus on the effect of merger momentum on acquiring firms’ abnormal 
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returns over the short and long terms. We find a form of momentum in mergers at the market 
level but not at the firm level. More specifically, our results show that merger momentum, 
as measured by the trailing 12-month average CAR in the broad market, imposes a 
significantly positive effect on bidder announcement and long-term abnormal returns. 
Additionally, we find that both merger wave and stock market momentum measures (i.e., the 
trailing 12-month number of mergers and trailing 12-month return on the SHComp index) 
are significantly positively correlated with bidder abnormal returns over the long term. These 
findings are in line with the neoclassical theory of mergers, which posits that merger waves 
may be caused by changes in the business environment that lead to an increase in overall 
stock prices and more profitable merger opportunities. Hence, neoclassical theory also 
implies that the primary motive of mergers and the source of merger momentum is synergy 
creation.  
 
Our findings contribute to the existing literature by documenting that merger momentum 
patterns exist outside the developed merger market; however, we further suggest that unlike 
the UK and US markets, where investor sentiment theory is found to be the cause of merger 
momentum (Rosen (2006) and Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008)), the source of merger 
momentum in China is synergy creation, as predicted by the neoclassical theory. Moreover, 
we find that the firm-level stock momentum variable, which is measured as the trailing 12-
month BHAR on the bidder’s stock, exerts a negative and significant impact on bidder 
abnormal returns over the long term, suggesting that the possibility of managerial hubris and 
market-timing motives for Chinese merger activities cannot be ignored. 
 
Prior studies indicate that there is often a positive correlation between market valuation and 
the intensity of merger activity and that merger motives may change as market valuation 
varies. We therefore classify the market into high-, neutral-, and low-valuation periods based 
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on the P/E ratio of the SHComp index and use the SHComp index itself as robustness check, 
following the same methodology employed by Bouwman et al. (2009). However, we observe 
that the number of acquisitions per month during hot-valuation markets is only marginally 
higher than the number of acquisitions per month during cold-valuation markets; most 
acquisitions are conducted when market valuation is neutral. Our results are in stark contrast 
to those of existing studies based on developed markets and suggest that in China, the stock 
market over-valuation is not the primary driver of merger activity. 
 
In addition, in the spirit of Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008), we examine the effect of 
merger momentum during hot-valuation periods and during cold-valuation periods. 
Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) find that the market reaction to a merger announcement 
is positively correlated to its reaction to other recent mergers, particularly during hot-
valuation periods and that acquirers experience more significant long-term reversals if they 
announced deals during hot merger markets. The authors attribute their findings to overly 
optimistic investor sentiment during hot market valuation periods. 
 
In contrast, we find that the merger momentum effect may not be as significant when market 
valuation is high, either in the short or long term. Hence, we do not support the view that 
investors are overly optimistic about merger announcements during hot-valuation markets. 
Nevertheless, acquiring firms’ shareholders experience significantly higher announcement 
and post-announcement abnormal returns if the merger is initiated on-the-wave rather than 
off-the-wave, which indicates that mergers that occur on-the-wave and during stock market 
booms are conducted to exploit synergies and to add firm value in the long term, supporting 
the neoclassical theory of mergers. However, our results also indicate that the bidder-specific 
stock momentum measure exerts a more significant and negative impact on bidder abnormal 
returns over the long term for deals announced during hot market valuation periods than for 
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deals announced at other times. Therefore, although we identify the neoclassical explanation 
as the primary driver of merger waves, our results suggest that bidding firms’ managers are 
more likely to be overconfident or to favour the market-timing strategy during high-
valuation markets, and therefore these rationales help to explain a nontrivial fraction of 
merger activity in China. 
 
When the analysis is extended to the low market valuation subsample, we find that the effect 
of merger momentum on bidder abnormal returns is insignificant in the short term but 
significantly positive in the long term. This signals that the stock price will revert to its 
fundamental value over time as the track record of the merger becomes known, which 
indicates the existence of overly pessimistic investor sentiment during cold-valuation 
periods. Moreover, this result implies that acquisitions are primarily driven by synergy 
creation during cold-valuation periods. Additionally, both merger wave and stock market 
momentum measures exert a significantly positive impact on bidder announcement returns 
when market valuation is low. We also observe that the bidder’s specific stock momentum 
has no effect on bidder returns. Overall, these results again suggest that mergers are driven 
by synergy creation; however, motivations relating to managerial hubris or market-timing 
are not found during cold-valuation markets. Nevertheless, we find evidence of the bounded 
rationality of investors and overly pessimistic investor sentiment during cold market 
valuation periods. 
 
Furthermore, we suggest that the Chinese market serves as an ideal testing ground to 
examine whether investors base their merger evaluations on, and over-react to, the bidding 
firm’s managerial track record because nearly 90% of acquisitions in the Chinese market are 
targeted at private firms, whose value is more difficult for investors to estimate. Moreover, 
the Chinese financial market suffers from severe information asymmetries and information 
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uncertainty problems and is filled with an overwhelming number of individual investors. 
Zhang (2006) and Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) also posit that investors’ over-reaction tends 
to be more pronounced under conditions of information uncertainty. We find that when 
bidders are divided into value and growth subsamples based on whether their BTMVs are 
within the top or bottom tertile, the effect of merger momentum is more prominent for 
growth bidders than that for value bidders in the short term, whereas the opposite trend is 
found over the long term, as evaluation is replaced by real firm performance. Our results 
indicate that individual investors fail to understand that past managerial performance is not 
necessarily a good indicator of future performance or that high firm valuation does not 
necessarily equal better firm performance; hence, employing such an evaluation approach 
could lead to potentially value-destroying decisions and should thus be discouraged.  
 
We further extend our study to explore the role of investment banks in Chinese domestic 
M&As. In Chapter 2, we document a substantial increase in merger activity, and it is almost 
certain that the demand for merger advisory services from investment banks moves in line 
with takeover volume. Additionally, investment banks act as information producers and are 
responsible for reducing the adverse impact of information asymmetry in corporate 
takeovers. Given that investment banks come to the market repeatedly, it is essential that 
they provide credible advice and thereby develop a reputation that will attract future 
mandates and justify higher advisory fees. However, most of the existing literature based on 
the US market fails to support this intuitive reputation-quality mechanism, and there is no 
theoretical or empirical work on this subject in China. We aim to fill this gap in the literature 
and hence dedicate chapter 3 to an examination of these issues. 
  
One important departure of our study is that we use a modified reputational measurement 
that accounts for the difference between the abilities of small and large bidders to employ 
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top-tier investment banks, which alleviates the bidder-advisor matching problem; most 
earlier studies fail to use this approach. In addition, we use a binary classification to measure 
investment bank reputation, as advocated by Fang (2005). We first download from Thomson 
One Banker the yearly top-25 investment bank league tables based on the total value of the 
transactions on which they advised for a sample of M&A transactions targeting China. Then, 
to balance the reputational effect between large and small bidders, we re-rank these 
investment banks according to the total number of transactions on which they advised. A 
deal is classified as being advised by a top-tier investment banks if its advisor is within the 
top-10 investment banks in the previous year’s league table.  
 
Our results show that the effect of a top-tier investment bank is reflected by a significant 
increase in the stock price of the acquiring firm in the short term, with no long-term reversal, 
which supports the “superior deal” hypothesis, whereby more prestigious investment banks 
are more skilled at reducing the adverse impact of information asymmetry for their clients 
and charge premium fees. These results also confirm the validity of the reputation-quality 
mechanism of merger advisory services in China. 
 
Upon further investigation of the sources of top-tier investment bank improvements, we find 
that top-tier investment banks are associated with insignificantly higher completion rates. 
This finding may imply that top-tier investment banks are skilled across multiple dimensions 
and will act according to their clients’ needs; for example, top-tier banks are better skilled at 
completing complex mergers and mergers that face resistance (i.e., the “better deal 
completion skills” hypothesis), but they are also trustworthy and thus more willing to turn 
away value-destroying deals, even if their advisory fees are largely contingent on deal 
completion (i.e., the “preventing poor deals” hypothesis). Therefore, clients that employ top-
tier investment banks do not face a trade-off between these objectives. Additionally, we find 
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that the time to resolution and completion are significantly longer for top-tier investment 
banks. This finding is consistent with our proposed “diligent advisor” hypothesis, which 
posits that top-tier investment banks have more reputational capital at stake and thus take 
more time to carefully evaluate the terms of transactions and negotiate favourable terms for 
their clients. In sum, our findings suggest that top-tier investment bank-associated gains stem 
from their diligence; their enhanced abilities to identify targets with higher potential 
synergistic gains, negotiate favourable terms for their clients and facilitate smooth deal 
execution; and their trustworthiness and willingness to sacrifice their advisory fees by 
rejecting bad deals for their clients. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the existing literature by using a modified reputation measure to 
explicitly account for the difference in the abilities of large and small bidders to employ top-
tier investment banks (i.e., bidder-advisor matching). It further contributes to the literature 
by being the first empirical study to provide support for the effectiveness of reputation-
quality mechanism for merger advisory services in China, whereas most studies based on 
the US market fail to find support for this mechanism. Moreover, Chapter 3 offers incentives 
for investment banks to act in the best interests of their clients to protect their most valuable 
asset: their reputations. Finally, it provides justification for the widely published investment 
bank “league tables” because we find that Chinese bidders do not form “lock-in” 
relationships with certain investment banks but are instead performance chasers; hence, the 
construction of “league tables” should motivate investment banks to render superior services 
in return for a high and stable ranking in the league tables, which in turn will allow them to 
charge premium fees for future mandates. 
 
Although the global financial crisis clearly diminished investment banking revenue 
worldwide, it also resulted in significant changes to the M&A landscape. In particular, the 
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global finical crisis has accelerated China’s “go global” policy by placing Chinese firms in 
a privileged financial position relative to their competitors in more developed countries.57 
Moreover, the RMB exchange reform implemented in 2005 has led to substantial RMB 
appreciation and has boosted Chinese CBMA volume because Chinese firms can benefit 
from their relative increase in wealth by engaging in CBMAs. However, the FT reports that 
the massive spike in Chinese overseas investment in recent years was due partly to 
opportunistic buying because assets were cheap and partly to a structural secular shift in 
Chinese overseas investment, which moved from securing natural resources to acquiring 
brands and technology.58 The FT’s assertions cast doubt on the wealth effects of favourable 
valuation and exchange rates on the acquiring firms. Nevertheless, regardless the structural 
secular shift, Chinese acquirers’ preference for natural resources cannot be overlooked. 
Rather, natural resource-related acquisitions have been the primary theme of Chinese CBMA 
over the past decade and have caused significant political tensions; hence, it is evident that 
resource-related transactions are critical from both the political and economic perspectives 
and thus are worth investigating.  
 
Motivated by the above trends and facts, and the lack of related literature, we examine 
whether there is a significant performance difference between acquisitions targeting 
resource-related firms and acquisitions targeting non-resource-related firms to determine 
whether acquisitions driven by national interests are undertaken at the expense of 
shareholder wealth. Moreover, we aim to determine whether there is any difference in 
performance between Chinese acquirers that conducted CBMAs before and after two major 
events. The first such major event is the change in fiscal policy that occurred when the 
                                                     
57 Source: OECD, China Investment Policy, 2013. 
58 Source: FT.com, Chinese investors surged into EU at height of debt crisis, 6 October, 2014. 
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Chinese government removed its currency peg on 21 July 2005, which resulted in substantial 
RMB appreciation (i.e., currency appreciation); the second major event is the financial 
meltdown that occurred after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008, 
which led to an extraordinary plunge the asset prices for many western firms (i.e., the 
financial crisis). Recent work has focussed on the impact of currency appreciation and other 
macroeconomic factors on the propensity to conduct CBMAs. For instance, Erel, Liao and 
Weisbach (2012) indicate that either currency appreciation or macroeconomic performance 
could affect the valuation of bidders or targets, resulting in real increases in wealth and 
enhanced abilities to finance acquisitions for acquirers. Similarly, we propose that currency 
appreciation and financial crisis could lead to increased relative wealth or lower cost of 
acquisition for Chinese acquirers that engage in CBMAs and could thus affect CBMAs 
performance. 
 
Our results indicate that bidders experience insignificant abnormal returns overall. After 
simultaneously controlling for various factors that affect bidder performance, we find that 
regardless of the national strategic motives embedded in resource-related deals, such deals 
are not undertaken at the expense of shareholder wealth; and determine that resource-related 
deals are particularly welcomed by investors if they are focussed.  
 
We further find that deals conducted after currency appreciation are associated with higher 
bidder announcement abnormal returns. Moreover, when we extend the analysis to the long 
term, thereby allowing the results of the CBMAs to be known, we find that bidders that 
undertake acquisitions after RMB reform continue to enjoy higher abnormal returns. These 
results are in line with the wealth explanation for takeover gains described by Froot and Stein 
(1991). Specifically, the increase in relative valuation due to currency appreciation reflects 
a real increase in acquirer wealth and enhances the acquirer abilities to finance acquisitions 
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overseas. In addition, this valuation effect tends to persist and add to firm value over the long 
term. 
 
Moreover, our results show that although acquirers engaged in CBMAs after the financial 
crisis are not perceived more or less favourably by the market in the short term, these 
acquisitions lead to significant losses for shareholders over time. This underperformance is 
likely to be the result of managerial opportunism, whereby managers succumb to the 
temptation to buy assets that have become cheaply available during the financial crisis 
without carefully researching the targets. 
 
Chapter 4 not only fills the gap in the literature but also sheds light on the motives behind 
Chinese CBMAs during specific time periods. We find that in general, managers act 
rationally and engage in well-planned acquisitions following currency appreciation to take 
advantage of the relative increase in wealth and lower cost of capital but tend to be less 
rational and gravitate towards opportunistic buying during the financial crisis period. Our 
study further contributes to the literature by implying a possible phenomenon that might be 
an interesting subject for future study, namely, the effect of favourable valuation may not 
always benefit acquiring firms’ shareholders but might instead vary depending on whether 
the favourable valuation is temporary or rather permanent.  
 
5.2 Implications and Proposals for Future Research 
 
Chapter 2 shows that neoclassical theory of mergers can shed light on the primary motives 
of merger activity, the source of merger momentum, and hence factors that affect bidder 
wealth creation in Chinese domestic M&As. In addition, it offers evidence of other motives 
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for merger activity, such as managerial hubris and market timing, and shows that these 
motives tend to play a more prominent role in triggering merger activity in hot-valuation 
markets, whereas they are least detectable when market valuation is low. Therefore, we 
suggest that investors respond to acquisitions conducted in hot-valuation markets with 
caution, especially if the government gradually unwinds its restrictions on daily stock market 
fluctuation and the investor sentiment effect becomes more pronounced. 
 
Moreover, our results in Chapter 2 suggest that although Chinese investors tend to be overly 
pessimistic during cold-valuation markets, the overoptimism widely observed among 
investors in the US and UK markets during bullish periods is not detected in China. In order 
words, Chinese investors tend to be affected more by negative market sentiment than by 
positive market sentiment. Future research on why investors become prone to different 
market sentiments is suggested because this could help us better understand how investors 
process new information and make decisions. 
 
Additionally, we find that due to the severe information asymmetry problem in China, 
investors tend to evaluate mergers based on bidders’ past managerial performance, which 
can lead to potentially value-destroying investment decisions. As a result, we suggest that 
the Chinese government should place more emphasis on developing accounting disclosure 
standards that will require managers to release more firm information and thereby decrease 
corporate opacity, which in turn will allow investors to perform more accurate assessments 
of firms’ fundamental value. In these conditions, investors would be more objective and 
better positioned to make investment decisions.  
 
The results presented in Chapter 3 support the effectiveness of the reputational-capital 
mechanism for merger advisory services in China and indicate that the source of gains 
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associated with top-tier investment banks is a combination of their skills, diligence and 
trustworthiness. Our results highlight the importance of developing and maintaining 
reputational capital for investment banks and provide justification for the widely published 
investment bank “league tables”. We suggest the construction of “league tables” should 
motivate investment banks to provide high-quality services to stay at the top of the league 
tables and effectively reduce banks’ selfish incentives to complete bad acquisitions to secure 
contingency fee payments.  
 
Given that this is the first study to examine the effect of investment bank reputation on bidder 
returns in China, our study provides numerous opportunities for future research, including 
the following areas: investment banking contracts and fees; other sources of top-tier 
improvement; the wealth effects of top-tier bankers versus non-top-tier bankers; and the 
determinants and wealth effects of employing financial advisors compared with executing 
deals in-house. 
 
Our findings in Chapter 4 alleviate concerns about the wealth effects associated with 
resource-related CBMAs. We find that although resource-related cross-border deals promote 
national interests, they are not undertaken at the expense of shareholder wealth. Indeed, such 
deals are especially value-enhancing for focussed resource-related bidders around the 
merger announcement. In addition, resource-related acquisitions often encounter 
“protectionism” from target countries and ultimately fail to be completed in many instances. 
Therefore, we recommend the establishment of policies designed to avoid similar obstacles 
to large-scale overseas investment by Chinese firms in the future. Research is also 
recommended to untangle the reasons for these negative reactions so that appropriate actions 
can be taken to reduce or eliminate them. 
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Further, our results show that managers tend to be opportunistic and to conduct value-
destroying transactions as a result of the favourable valuation effect of the global financial 
crisis. To avoid this, we suggest that institutional investors or blockholders play a more active 
role in monitoring and constraining the self-serving or irrational behaviour of corporate 
managers, especially during periods when managerial discretion is expansive. 
 
Finally, despite the success of the “go global” in directing more Chinese companies to 
expand overseas, we find that their post-expansion performance is less than promising. 
Hence, future research is recommended to identify potential factors that help to boost 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. For example, a comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of different policies across various provinces in China could be conducted by 
considering their initial provincial conditions, and any effective policies identified through 
this process can be implemented on a national scale to enhance the performance of acquiring 
firms.
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